United States v. Claycraft Company

364 F. Supp. 1358, 32 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5215, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11852
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedSeptember 26, 1972
DocketCiv. A. 6308
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 364 F. Supp. 1358 (United States v. Claycraft Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Claycraft Company, 364 F. Supp. 1358, 32 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5215, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11852 (S.D. Ohio 1972).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

KINNEARY, Chief Judge.

This action was instituted by the United States to recover allegedly erroneous refunds of taxes plus interest from the Claycraft Company. The total amount of the refunds is $50,003.14 for the fiscal year ending November 30, 1956 [1956]. Included in this total is the sum of $7,994.05, which constituted a net operating loss carryback from the fiscal year ending November 30, 1959 [1959]. The jurisdiction of the Court arises under Title 28, United States Code, §§ 1340 and 1345, and Title 26, United States Code, § 7405(b), and is not contested.

On February 28, 1968, the Court filed an Opinion and Order denying the relief requested by the United States. Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case with directions to make findings of fact, state conclusions of law, and enter proper judgment in accordance with the provisions of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as construed in Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847, 88 S.Ct. 39, 19 L.Ed.2d 114 (1967).

*1360 For reasons stated below, this Court upon reconsideration determines that its earlier Opinion and Order denying relief to the plaintiff was erroneous.

The following findings of fact are made upon the entire record in the case. This case was tried to the Court on November 29, 30 and December 1, 2, 1966. Neither party has prof erred additional evidence following the remand.

INTRODUCTION

Claycraft is an integrated miner-manufacturer of clay and clay products. During 1956 and 1959 the mines owned and operated by Claycraft and the raw materials extracted from each were:

Mine No. Location Mineral
1 Wyandot —■ surface clay
2 Shawnee — fireclay
3 Sugarcreek • — • shale
4 Taylor — shale

Under the provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 613, Claycraft’s income tax return for 1956 claimed a percentage depletion deduction for clay and shale mined. In accordance with the statute, the depletion deduction was computed on the basis of fifteen per cent (15%) of the gross income from the fireclay mined at Shawnee, and five per cent (5%) of the gross income from the clay and shale mined at Sugarcreek, Taylor and Wyandot.

In 1956 and also in 1959 there was an industry-wide dispute between integrated miner-manufacturers of clay and clay products and the Internal Revenue Service concerning the proper basis for determining gross income from mining. Integrated miner-manufacturers contended they were entitled to a percentage depletion allowance based on gross sales of finished clay products. The Internal Revenue Service took the position that gross income from mining was equal, to the market value of the raw mineral product.

In Ohio, the Internal Revenue Service entered into an industry-wide discussion of the proper valuation for percentage depletion purposes of clay and shale. The negotiated valuation was $5.00 per ton for surface clay and shale and $7.00 per ton for fireclay. A representative of the government testified that the agreed prices represented the gross income from mineral after extraction, separation from waste, grinding and screening and secondary screening up to but not including pug mill operations. Claycraft used these industry-wide figures in preparing its 1956 income tax return. 1

On January 29, 1960, the Internal Revenue Service, on its own initiative and without application by Claycraft, made a tax refund to defendant for 1956 in the amount of $36,261.87 with $5,747.22 in interest, the total amount of the refund being $42,009.09, disbursed $39,541.90 in cash and $2,467.19 as a credit against outstanding liabilities. The refund resulted from an Internal Revenue Service decision to compute the depletion allowance as a percentage of gross income from the finished product rather than as a percentage of the gross income from the raw mineral product.

In its 1959 income tax return Clay-craft claimed depletion as a percentage of its gross income from sales of finished brick and tile, claiming a net operating loss carry-back from 1959 to 1956 *1361 in the amount of $15,109.28. 2 This resulted in a tax refund for 1956 of $7,856.83 with interest in the amount of $137.22 for a total refund of $7,994.05.

Following the Internal Revenue Service’s capitulation on the definition of “gross income from mining”, the United States Supreme Court held that Congress intended by 26 U.S.C. § 613

to grant miners a depletion allowance based on the constructive income from the raw mineral product, if marketable in that form, and not on the value of the finished articles. United States v. Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co., 364 U.S. 76, 86, 80 S.Ct. 1581, 1586, 4 L.Ed.2d 1581 (1960).

Cannelton applies retroactively. See, Riddell v. Monolith Portland Cement Co., 371 U.S. 537, 83 S.Ct. 378, 9 L.Ed.2d 492 (1963); United States v. Sparta Ceramic Co., 286 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1960). The parties herein agree that Cannelton is controlling. Thus, at the outset, the Government has established a prima facie case that the refund was erroneous. This alone does not entitle it to relief. The amount of the refund recoverable, if any, must be determined.

Usually the taxpayer is plaintiff in a tax refund suit and consequently bears the burden of proof. Here the United States sues to recover a refund erroneously made. As plaintiff, the Government must prove the amount erroneously refunded. Soltertmann v. United States, 272 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1959). See, United States v. Russell Manufacturing Co., 245 F.Supp. 159 (D.Conn.1964), affirmed 349 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1965).

The ultimate factual issue is the amount of the gross income from mining from each of the mining properties in 1956 and 1959. Claycraft did not sell any crude clay or shale in those or any other years, therefore a constructive gross income must be proven.

Gross income from mining is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 613(c).

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364 F. Supp. 1358, 32 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5215, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11852, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-claycraft-company-ohsd-1972.