Woods v. Rose

Ninth Circuit

Woods v. Rose

171 F.2d 290, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 2825

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedNovember 17, 1948

DocketNo. 11928

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 171 F.2d 290 (Woods v. Rose) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Woods v. Rose, 171 F.2d 290, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 2825 (9th Cir. 1948).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

On April 18, 1947, Philip B. Fleming, Administrator of the Office of Price Controls,¹ brought an action on behalf of the United States against appellee, Pearl Rose, under § 205(a) and (e) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 925(a) and (e), for the violation of rent regulations issued under § 2 of the Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 902.

On April 23, 1947, Administrator Fleming’s functions with respect to rent control were transferred to Frank 'R. Creedon, Housing Expediter,² who moved for the substitution of himself as plaintiff in Fleming’s place and stead. That motion was made and denied on September 9, 1947.

Thereupon appellee moved to dismiss the action. Indicating that that motion would be granted, the court, on September 9, 1947, directed appellee’s counsel to prepare a “form of dismissal,” meaning, obviously, a form of judgment dismissing the action.

On December 3, 1947, appellant, Tighe E. Woods, who had succeeded Creedon as Housing Expediter, moved for the substitution of himself as plaintiff in Fleming’s place and stead. That motion was granted on March 17, 1948. Before granting it, however, the court, on February 10, 1947, entered a judgment dismissing the action. From that judgment this appeal was taken on April 5, 1948.

The judgment dismissed the action pursuant to appellee’s motion, the ground of which was that Fleming was no longer the real party in interest, was no longer the Administrator of the Office of Temporary Controls and was no longer empowered to maintain the action.

This was not a valid ground of dismissal. The United States was at all times, and is now, the real party in interest. Fleming was a nominal party only.³ Appellee’s motion should have been denied.

Judgment reversed and case remanded for further proceedings.

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PER CURIAM.

On April 18, 1947, Philip B. Fleming, Administrator of the Office of Price Controls,¹ brought an action on behalf of the United States against appellee, Pearl Rose, under § 205(a) and (e) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 925(a) and (e), for the violation of rent regulations issued under § 2 of the Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 902.

On April 23, 1947, Administrator Fleming’s functions with respect to rent control were transferred to Frank 'R. Creedon, Housing Expediter,² who moved for the substitution of himself as plaintiff in Fleming’s place and stead. That motion was made and denied on September 9, 1947.

Thereupon appellee moved to dismiss the action. Indicating that that motion would be granted, the court, on September 9, 1947, directed appellee’s counsel to prepare a “form of dismissal,” meaning, obviously, a form of judgment dismissing the action.

On December 3, 1947, appellant, Tighe E. Woods, who had succeeded Creedon as Housing Expediter, moved for the substitution of himself as plaintiff in Fleming’s place and stead. That motion was granted on March 17, 1948. Before granting it, however, the court, on February 10, 1947, entered a judgment dismissing the action. From that judgment this appeal was taken on April 5, 1948.

The judgment dismissed the action pursuant to appellee’s motion, the ground of which was that Fleming was no longer the real party in interest, was no longer the Administrator of the Office of Temporary Controls and was no longer empowered to maintain the action.

This was not a valid ground of dismissal. The United States was at all times, and is now, the real party in interest. Fleming was a nominal party only.³ Appellee’s motion should have been denied.

Judgment reversed and case remanded for further proceedings.

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171 F.2d 290, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 2825, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/woods-v-rose-ca9-1948.

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