Mr. Justice McLEAN
delivered the opinion of the court.
This case is before us on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Arkansas.
An action was brought by the State of Arkansas in . the Pulaski Circuit Court, against the plaintiff in error, and his sureties, Chester Ashley and others, upon his official bond as late Treasurer of State, for the recovery of a certain.sum of money alleged to have been received by him, as treasurer, between the 27th day of October, 1836, and the 26th day of December, 1838. And a judgment was. recovered against him and his Securities, on the 13th of June, 1845,. for $ 3,359.22 [204]*204and costs. An execution having been issued on the judgment,on' the 24th of February, 1847, the plaintiff tendered to the defendant in error, who prosecuted the suit as Attorney-General, the full amount of the judgment, -interest, and costs, in- the notes of the Bank of the State' of Arkansas, which were refused.
The above facts being stated in a petition to the Supreme Court of Arkansas on the 25th of February, 1847, an alternative mandamus was issued to Trapnall, the defendant in error, to receive" the bank-notes in satisfaction of the judgment, or show cause why he shall refuse to do so.
On the return of the mandamus", the defendant admitted the. judgment and tender of the notes ; but alleged that he was not authorized to receive them in satisfaction of the judgment, because the twenty-eighth section of the bank charter, under which alone the plaintiff could claim a right so to satisfy the judgment, was- repealed by an act of the legislature, approved January 10th, 1845.
It was agreed by the parties, that the record of the judgment should be made a part of the proceeding; that the defendant was the proper officer by. law to receive satisfaction of the judgment ; that the notes tendered were issued by the bank prior to the year 1840, and that down to the year 1845 the notes of the bank were received and paid out by the State, in discharge of all public dues; that the bank continues to exist with all its corporate functions.
The court were of opinion, that the return of the defendant showed a sufficient cause for a refusal to obey the mandate of-the writ, and gave judgment accordingly.
The twenty-eighth-section of the bank charter, -which was repealed by the" act of 1845, provided “ that the bills and notes of said institution shall be received in all payments of debts due to the State of Arkansas.” - And the question raised for consideration and decision is, whether the' repeal of this section brings the case within the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits a State from impairing the obligations of a contract.
The bank charter was passed on the 2d of November, 1836, with a capital of one million of dollars, to be raised by a sale of the bonds of the State, loans, or negotiations, together with such other funds as may now or hereafter belong to, or be pla.ced under the control and direction -of, the State ”; the principal bank to be located at the city of Little Bock, and its concerns to be conducted by a president and twelv.e directors,' to be appointed by a joint vote of the General Assembly. Branches were, required -to be established, the presidents and directors whereof were to be elected-in the samé manner.
[205]*205The president and directors were to have a common seal, were authorized to deal'in bullion, gold, silver, &e., purchase real property, erect buildings, &c., issue notes, make loans at eight per cent, on indorsed paper, or on mortgages, within the State ; a general board was constituted, who were to make report of the condition of the bank annually, to the legislature, and perform other duties ; and any debtor to the bank, “ as maker or indorser of any note, bill, or bond, expressly made negotiable and payable at the bank, who delays- payment,” should have a judgment entered against him on a notice of thirty days.
Some doubt has been suggested, whether the notes of this bank were not bills of credit within the prohibition of the Constitution. We think they cannot be so held, consistently with the view taken by this court in the case of Briscoe v. The Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 11 Peters, 311. It was there said, that, “ to constitute a bill of credit within the Constitution, it must be issued by a State, on the faith of the State, and be designed to circulate as money. It must be a paper which circulates on the credit of the State, and is so received and used in the ordinary business of life.”
The bills of this bank are "not made payable by the State. A capital is provided for • their redemption, and the general management of the bank, under the charter, is committed to the president and directors, as in ordinary banking associations. They; may in a summary manner obtain judgments against their debtors. And although the directors are not expressly made liable to be sued, yet it is not doubted they may be held legally responsible for an abuse of the trust confided to them.
The entire stoc of the bank is owned by the State. It furnished the capital. md receives the profits. And, in addition to the credit given to the notes of the bank by the capital provided, the State declares, in the charter, they shall be received in- all payments of debts due to it. Is this a- contract? A contract is defined to be an agreement between competent persons, to do or not to dó a certain thing. The undertaking on the part of the State is, to' receive the notes of the bank in payment from its debtors. ' This comes within the definition of a contract. It is-a contract founded upon a good and valuable consideration ; a • consideration- beneficial to the State, as its profits are increased^ by sustaining the credit, and consequently extending the. circulation, of the paper of the bank.
With whom was this contract made ? We answer, with the holders of the' paper of the bank. . The notes are made payable to bearer; consequently every bond fide holder has a right, under the twenty-eighth section, to pay to the' State any debt he may owe it, in the paper of /the bank. It is a continuing [206]*206Suaranty by the State, that the notes shall be so received. uch a contract would be binding on an individual, and it is n'ot less so on a State.
That the State had the right to repeal the above section may be admitted. And the emissions of the bank subsequent» ly are without the guaranty. But the notes in circulation at the time of the repeal are not affected by it. The holder may still claim the right, by the force of the contract, to discharge any debt he may owe to the State in .the notes thus issued.
It is argued that there could have been violated or impaired no contract with the plaintiff in error, as it does not appear he had the note's tendered- by him in his possession at the time the twenty-eighth section was repealed.
It is admitted that he had the notes in his possession at the time he made the tender, and that they were issued by the bank before the repeal of the sec tion ; and nothing more than this could be required.
The guaranty of the State, that the notes of the bank should be received in discharge of public dues, embraced all. the bills issued by it; the repeal of the guaranty was intended, no doubt, to exclude all the notes of the bank then in circulation. Until the repeal of the twenty-eighth section, the State 'continued to receive and pay out these notes.
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Mr. Justice McLEAN
delivered the opinion of the court.
This case is before us on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Arkansas.
An action was brought by the State of Arkansas in . the Pulaski Circuit Court, against the plaintiff in error, and his sureties, Chester Ashley and others, upon his official bond as late Treasurer of State, for the recovery of a certain.sum of money alleged to have been received by him, as treasurer, between the 27th day of October, 1836, and the 26th day of December, 1838. And a judgment was. recovered against him and his Securities, on the 13th of June, 1845,. for $ 3,359.22 [204]*204and costs. An execution having been issued on the judgment,on' the 24th of February, 1847, the plaintiff tendered to the defendant in error, who prosecuted the suit as Attorney-General, the full amount of the judgment, -interest, and costs, in- the notes of the Bank of the State' of Arkansas, which were refused.
The above facts being stated in a petition to the Supreme Court of Arkansas on the 25th of February, 1847, an alternative mandamus was issued to Trapnall, the defendant in error, to receive" the bank-notes in satisfaction of the judgment, or show cause why he shall refuse to do so.
On the return of the mandamus", the defendant admitted the. judgment and tender of the notes ; but alleged that he was not authorized to receive them in satisfaction of the judgment, because the twenty-eighth section of the bank charter, under which alone the plaintiff could claim a right so to satisfy the judgment, was- repealed by an act of the legislature, approved January 10th, 1845.
It was agreed by the parties, that the record of the judgment should be made a part of the proceeding; that the defendant was the proper officer by. law to receive satisfaction of the judgment ; that the notes tendered were issued by the bank prior to the year 1840, and that down to the year 1845 the notes of the bank were received and paid out by the State, in discharge of all public dues; that the bank continues to exist with all its corporate functions.
The court were of opinion, that the return of the defendant showed a sufficient cause for a refusal to obey the mandate of-the writ, and gave judgment accordingly.
The twenty-eighth-section of the bank charter, -which was repealed by the" act of 1845, provided “ that the bills and notes of said institution shall be received in all payments of debts due to the State of Arkansas.” - And the question raised for consideration and decision is, whether the' repeal of this section brings the case within the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits a State from impairing the obligations of a contract.
The bank charter was passed on the 2d of November, 1836, with a capital of one million of dollars, to be raised by a sale of the bonds of the State, loans, or negotiations, together with such other funds as may now or hereafter belong to, or be pla.ced under the control and direction -of, the State ”; the principal bank to be located at the city of Little Bock, and its concerns to be conducted by a president and twelv.e directors,' to be appointed by a joint vote of the General Assembly. Branches were, required -to be established, the presidents and directors whereof were to be elected-in the samé manner.
[205]*205The president and directors were to have a common seal, were authorized to deal'in bullion, gold, silver, &e., purchase real property, erect buildings, &c., issue notes, make loans at eight per cent, on indorsed paper, or on mortgages, within the State ; a general board was constituted, who were to make report of the condition of the bank annually, to the legislature, and perform other duties ; and any debtor to the bank, “ as maker or indorser of any note, bill, or bond, expressly made negotiable and payable at the bank, who delays- payment,” should have a judgment entered against him on a notice of thirty days.
Some doubt has been suggested, whether the notes of this bank were not bills of credit within the prohibition of the Constitution. We think they cannot be so held, consistently with the view taken by this court in the case of Briscoe v. The Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 11 Peters, 311. It was there said, that, “ to constitute a bill of credit within the Constitution, it must be issued by a State, on the faith of the State, and be designed to circulate as money. It must be a paper which circulates on the credit of the State, and is so received and used in the ordinary business of life.”
The bills of this bank are "not made payable by the State. A capital is provided for • their redemption, and the general management of the bank, under the charter, is committed to the president and directors, as in ordinary banking associations. They; may in a summary manner obtain judgments against their debtors. And although the directors are not expressly made liable to be sued, yet it is not doubted they may be held legally responsible for an abuse of the trust confided to them.
The entire stoc of the bank is owned by the State. It furnished the capital. md receives the profits. And, in addition to the credit given to the notes of the bank by the capital provided, the State declares, in the charter, they shall be received in- all payments of debts due to it. Is this a- contract? A contract is defined to be an agreement between competent persons, to do or not to dó a certain thing. The undertaking on the part of the State is, to' receive the notes of the bank in payment from its debtors. ' This comes within the definition of a contract. It is-a contract founded upon a good and valuable consideration ; a • consideration- beneficial to the State, as its profits are increased^ by sustaining the credit, and consequently extending the. circulation, of the paper of the bank.
With whom was this contract made ? We answer, with the holders of the' paper of the bank. . The notes are made payable to bearer; consequently every bond fide holder has a right, under the twenty-eighth section, to pay to the' State any debt he may owe it, in the paper of /the bank. It is a continuing [206]*206Suaranty by the State, that the notes shall be so received. uch a contract would be binding on an individual, and it is n'ot less so on a State.
That the State had the right to repeal the above section may be admitted. And the emissions of the bank subsequent» ly are without the guaranty. But the notes in circulation at the time of the repeal are not affected by it. The holder may still claim the right, by the force of the contract, to discharge any debt he may owe to the State in .the notes thus issued.
It is argued that there could have been violated or impaired no contract with the plaintiff in error, as it does not appear he had the note's tendered- by him in his possession at the time the twenty-eighth section was repealed.
It is admitted that he had the notes in his possession at the time he made the tender, and that they were issued by the bank before the repeal of the sec tion ; and nothing more than this could be required.
The guaranty of the State, that the notes of the bank should be received in discharge of public dues, embraced all. the bills issued by it; the repeal of the guaranty was intended, no doubt, to exclude all the notes of the bank then in circulation. Until the repeal of the twenty-eighth section, the State 'continued to receive and pay out these notes. Up to that time, no one doubted the Obligation of the State to receive them. The law was absolute and imperative on the officers of the State. The holder of the paper claimed the benefit of this obligation, and it is supposed his,right could never have been questioned. The notes were payable to bearer, and the bearer was the only person who had a right to demand payment of. the bank, or to pay them into the State treasury in discharge of a debt. The guaranty included all the notes of the bank in circulation as clearly as if on the face of every note the words had been engraved, “ This note shall be received by the State in payment of debts.” And that the legislature could not withdraw. this obligation from the notes in circulation at the time the guaranty was repealed, is a position which can require no argument. Any one had a right to receive them, and- to test the constitutionality of the repeal.
Suppose a State legislature should pass'a law authorizing the drawers of promissory notes, payable to bearer, to -discharge the same by the payment of produce. Would such a law affect the rights of the bearer ? The contract would stand, arid the law would be declared void. A standing guaranty by a nfercantile house, to receive in payment of its debts all notes drawn by a certain other house, is valid, on the ground that the notes were taken on the credit of such guaranty. It ihay [207]*207be'terminated by a notice ; but when so terminated, axe not all the notes goo'd against the guarantors, which were executed and circulated prior to the notice ? Who could commend the justice of guarantors, who should endeavor* to avoid responsibility, on so clear a principle ? Louisville Man. Co. v. Welch, post, 461.
A State can no more impair, by legislation, the obligation of its own contracts, than- it can impair the. obligation of the contracts of individuals. We naturally look- to the action of a sovereign State, to be characterized by a more scrupulous regard to justice, and a higher morality, than belong to' the ordinary transactions of individuals. The obligation of the State of Arkansas to receive the notes of the bank, in payment of its debts, is much .stronger than in the above case of individual guaranty.
. The bank belonged to the State, and it realized the profits of its operations. It was conducted by the agents of the State, under the supervision of the legislature. By the guaranty, the notes of the bank, for the payment of debts to the State, were equaLto gold and silver. This, to- some extent, sustained their credit, and gave them currency. Loans were made by the bank on satisfactory security. The debts of the bank, ór a large proportion of them, may fairly be presumed to, have been collected. But the means of the bank, thus under the control of the State, became exhausted. Whether this was the result of withdrawing the capital from the bank, by the State, does not appear upon the record. We only know the fact, that its funds have disappeared, leaving, it is said, a large amount of its paper, issued before the repeal of the guaranty, worthless, in the hands of the citizens of the State,
The obligation of the State to receive these notes is denied, on the grdund that the twenty-eighth section was a general provision, liable to be repealed, at any time, by the legislature. And it is compared to a general provision to receive, for public dues, the paper of banks generally, unconnected with the State. There is,no analogy in the two cases. One is a question of public policy, influenced by considerations of general convenience, which every one knows may be changed at the discretion of the legislature. But the other arises out of a contract incorporated into the charter, imposing an obligation on the State to receive, in payment of all debts due to it, the paper of a bank owned by the State, and whose notes are circulated for its benefit. The power of the legislature to repeal the section, the stock of the bank being owned by the State, is not controverted ; but that act cannot affect the notes in circulation at the time of the repeal.
It is objected, that this view trenches upon the sovereignty of the State, in the exercise of its taxing power and in the reg[208]*208ulation of its currency. "We are not aware that a State has power over the currency farther than the right to establish banks, to regulate or prohibit the circulation, within the State, of foreign notes, and to determine in what the public dues shall be paid.
It is a principle controverted by^io one, that, on general questions of policy, one legislature cannot bind those which shall succeed it; but it is equally true and undoubted, that a legislature may make' a contract which shall bind those that shall come after it.
•The notes of the bank in circulation: at the repeal of the twenty-eighth' section, if made receivable by the State in "discharge of public dues, may so far resuscitate them, as that, in the course of time, they will find their way into the treasury of the State, where in justice and by contract they belong. It is presumed there will be no complaint, as there will be no ground for any, by the citizens of the State, if these notes, now dead and worthless, should be so far revived as to reach their appropriate destination. . And if, as a consequence, some increase of taxation should 'be required by the State, it will be nothing more than is common to all other States that perform their contracts. It would be a most unwise policy for s State to improve'its currency through a violation of its contracts. In such a course, .the loss of the State would be incomparably greater than its gain. Any argument in commendation of such an action by a State cannot be otherwise considered than as exceedingly infelicitous, and unjust.
If these notes be receivable in payment of public dues by the State, having been in circulation at the time of the repeal •of the above section, as we' think they clearly are, no doubt can exist as to the sufficiency of the tender. The law of tender. which avoids future interest and costs, has no application in this case. The right to make payment to the State in this paper arises- out of a continuing contract, which is limited in time by the circulation of the notes to be received. They may be offered in payment of debts due to the State, in its own right, before or after, judgment, and without regard to the cause of indebtment.
Whatever may be the demerits of the plaintiff in error, they do not affect the nature and extent" of the obligation of. the State. And that obligation cannot be withdrawn from this paper. Into whosesoever hands it shall come, it carnes with it the pledge of the State to receive it in payment of its debts. In this case the páyment is made by the securities of Wood-ruff, and exacted by the State, to whose organization and management of the bank may be attributed its insolvency. In procuring the notes of the bank, these securities had a right to ' [209]*209rely, and no doubt did rely, upon the guaranty of the State to receive them in’ payment of debts.
In sustaining the application for a mandamus, the Supreme Court of the State exercised jurisdiction in the case. To that court exclusively belongs the question' of its. own jurisdiction. For the reasons stated, the judgment, of the Supreme Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings to that court, as it may have jurisdiction, in conformity to the opinion of this court.
Mr. Justice CATRON, Mr. Justice DANIEL, Mr. Justice NELSON, and Mr. Justice GRIER dissented.