Woodruff v. Meade County Board of Commissioners

522 N.W.2d 771, 1994 WL 559012

• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
• Decided: November 28, 1994
• Docket: 18490, 18491
• Status: Published

Opinions

HENDERSON, Retired Justice (on reassignment).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY/ISSUE

In 1992, Ron Woodruff, doing business as Buffalo Beer, was denied renewal of his malt beverage license by the Meade County Board of County Commissioners (Board). When he applied for the same license in 1993, he was again denied. He appealed both denials; and, in a de novo trial consolidating the two appeals, held July 20-21,1993, the trial court reversed the Board and ordered it to approve Woodruffs 1993 application. This case was considered on briefs at the April 1994 Term of Court. Board appeals the following issue:

Did the trial court clearly err when it held that the Board abused its discretion in refusing to renew Buffalo Beer’s malt beverage license?

Holding that the trial court clearly erred, we reverse and reinstate the Board’s original decision.

FACTS

Woodruff is the owner and operator of the Buffalo Chip Campground near Sturgis, South Dakota. Within the confines of this 80-aere campground, which is neither platted nor has a dedicated public right-of-way, is a concert facility and beer establishment known as Buffalo Beer, also owned and operated by Woodruff. These facilities typically operate only in conjunction with the annual Sturgis Motorcycle Classic.

When Woodruffs malt beverage license for Buffalo Beer was not renewed in 1992, the Board justified its denial based on the campground’s “pornographic behavior” and the inability of law enforcement to work effectively on the premises. In 1993, the application was denied on the “basis of location.”

During trial, representatives from several law enforcement agencies testified as to their first-hand knowledge of the Buffalo Chip and other area campgrounds. The trial court also heard the testimony of Woodruff and his employees. Thereafter, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered conceding that although there have been “sporadic problems,” the same also occurs at other area campgrounds. The trial court also found that safety concerns have lessened with the passage of time. Ruling that the Board’s decision was an arbitrary exercise of discretion, the trial court reversed and ordered the Board to issue a malt beverage license to Woodruff for Buffalo Beer.

DECISION

Under SDCL 7-8-30, the trial court took evidence and decided the Board’s decision de novo. Keogan v. Bergh, 348 N.W.2d 462, 464 (S.D.1984). Pursuant thereto, there were thirty-one Findings of Fact and nine Conclusions of Law entered. To reverse, this Court must be definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been committed. SDCL 15-6-52(a); In re Proceedings for Deposit in Court, 417 N.W.2d 187, 188 (S.D.1987); In re Estate of Hobelsberger, 85 S.D. 282, 289, 181 N.W.2d 455, 459 (1970). We so hold.

Under SDCL 35-2-1.2, the Board had the discretionary power to approve or disapprove the license renewal for the Buffalo Chip. We set it forth in its entirety:

All applications for retail licenses except those set forth in § 35-2-1.1 shall be submitted to the governing board of the municipality within which the applicant intends to operate, or if outside the corporate limits of a municipality, to the board of county commissioners of the county in which the applicant seeks to operate. The application shall be accompanied by the required fee. The governing board shall have discretion to approve or disapprove the application depending on whether it deems the applicant a suitable person to hold such license and whether it considers the proposed location suitable. (Emphasis supplied.)

This same discretionary power included the right to determine if the opposed location was suitable. Having said statute before them, and considering all of the above evidence, the Board declined to renew the license due to the “basis of location.”

On appeal to the Eighth Judicial Circuit Court, two dozen officers from several different law enforcement agencies testified about safety and/or law enforcement hindrances at the Buffalo Chip. All agreed that, for the officer’s own safety, no uniformed officer should attempt to enter the grounds without adequate backup. However, on at least two occasions where officers, in pursuit of vehicles fleeing into the Buffalo Chip, did attempt to enter without immediate backup, the police vehicles were stopped by people at the gate, thus permitting the pursued vehicle to disappear into the campground’s crowd. In a separate incident, a state trooper testified that he was denied access to make observations. Woodruff testified that his security people (typically lay persons with little background in security or public safety) did not bar the police; rather, rally participants were probably responsible. The trial court agreed. If these latter contentions are true, then Woodruffs security was obviously not securing the entrances and did not prevent patrons from interfering with law enforcement.

It is apparent that the Findings of Fact understate the evidence and testimony presented. Finding XIII states that in one instance, officers were called to the campground; but when they arrived, they were barred by Woodruffs security and were informed they were no longer needed. Same finding states, “[I]n a stabbing incident in 1990, officers readily entered the campground and took care of the situation.” This is an erroneous summarization of the incident. Two Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) agents of the State of South Dakota were escorted by “security” amidst the crowd to an area in front of the stage where they encountered a “great big guy wearing a black jacket” who was standing on the knife used in the stabbing of a 16-year old intoxicated female. As the entertainment on stage continued without interruption, the great big guy told the agents, “Don’t make a scene, just bend over and pick up the knife and get out of here.” No investigation of the crime scene was able to occur.

Finding XXI reveals, “Appellant [Wood-ruff] has cooperated with and helped law enforcement and at their request placed himself in life-threatening situations on more than one occasion.” Said finding refers to the type of conduct at the campground. Consider the fact that a motorcycle gang took over the stage one year. There is also evidence that a rape occurred at the Buffalo Chip, but no charges were ever brought. Apparently, Woodruff and his security do not have control over the premises.

Patrons, numbering as high as 15,000, must wander about in the dark except when near the stage and concession areas. With this environment, law enforcement (including undercover officers) cannot properly investigate any crime scene at the Buffalo Chip, let alone adequately police it. Roping off a crime scene is considered a fruitless task. Further testimony revealed other instances of police access being controlled, including assertions that Woodruff had to be contacted first before police would be allowed through the gate. The trial court’s findings concerning police access and safety are against the weight of the evidence. R & S Const. Co. v. BDL Enterprises, 500 N.W.2d 628 (S.D.1993).

Partying and entertainment often last throughout the night at the Buffalo Chip. Nude dancing by young women on the campground’s stage has been a mainstay throughout Woodruffs tenure as owner, notwithstanding Meade County officials notifying him that such nudity was intolerable. In 1990, a 16-year-old Sturgis girl was photographed and videotaped as she danced nude on the Buffalo Chip with alcohol in her possession. Nudity has continued on the stage, nevertheless.

It is undisputed that juveniles often have access to the Buffalo Chip. Woodruffs witnesses freely admitted that they frequently catch people sneaking through the barbed wire fence. Although there is no evidence that alcohol is being sold to minors, juveniles have been found drinking intoxicants on the premises. Police have also encountered and arrested numerous underage drinkers who had just exited the Buffalo Chip.

To assert that the Board’s decision is merely arbitrary is to ignore the facts. Comparisons have been made to other campgrounds, such as the Bentshoe campground, but cross-examination of witnesses failed to produce evidence that police access had been restricted or that security did not have control at any of the other campgrounds. Regardless, to permit Buffalo Beer to have a malt beverage license under the guise that Bentshoe is supposedly just as unsafe, results in a two wrongs make a right argument. Unlike the Buffalo Chip, Bentshoe does not sell alcoholic beverages. Admittedly, a booth, operated by an independent group with a one-day special event license, has sold beer during Bentshoe’s concerts. The Board, per Radall’s-Yankton, Inc. v. Ranney, 81 S.D. 283, 134 N.W.2d 297 (1965), has established a line in the sand that the Buffalo Chip has crossed.

Of the nine Conclusions of Law entered by the trial court, Conclusion III bears particular scrutiny and mention. It expresses that the inability to adequately police, access by minors, lack of access by law enforcement, and the type of business engaged in by Woodruff are “endemic to the Sturgis area during the motorcycle rally.” Endemic means that it is restricted or peculiar to a locality or region. Endemic it might be to the Sturgis area, but the city of Sturgis is located in South Dakota, and the laws of this state still apply to the city of Sturgis and surrounding area.

Additionally, Conclusion of Law VI is a mistake of law for it expresses, “Respondent’s decisions in 1992 and 1993 to not renew Appellant’s malt beverage license [were] not supported by substantial evidence.” As reflected above, the evidence was overwhelming that the Buffalo Chip Campground was an unsuitable location for the malt liquor license, as the Board determined, due to the plethora of law enforcement problems. Suffice it to say, the facts do not support the conclusions. R & S Const., 500 N.W.2d at 630. Also, the trial court concluded that Woodruff was denied the due process protections of SDCL 35-2-10. Said statute concerns revocation or suspension of a license, logically meaning the license must have been current at the time of suspension or revocation. Such was not the case here; thus, SDCL 35-2-10 is inapplicable here. See Norgeot v. State, 334 N.W.2d 501, 503 (S.D.1983) (intent of a statute comes from its plain language).

Obscenity, vulgarity and hostility toward law enforcement officers prevail at the Buffalo Chip Campground. Board held the Buffalo Chip was an unsuitable location for possessing malt beverage licenses. In light of this evidence, we are definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court’s findings concerning law enforcement lead to an erroneous result. Chamberlain Livestock Auction v. Penner, 462 N.W.2d 479 (S.D.1990).

The Findings of Fact are clearly erroneous, as entered by the trial court, and totally fail to consider the various facts set forth above. The Conclusions of Law, unsupported by the clearly erroneous findings, are mistakes of law. Permann v. Dept. of Labor, 411 N.W.2d 113 (S.D.1987). Furthermore, the Conclusions rely upon the fact that “the motorcycle rally presents a unique situation.” If it is unique, it does not follow, as a matter of law, that the Buffalo Chip Campground may operate unlawfully.

In Randall’s-Yankton and Luke v. Mellette County, 508 N.W.2d 6 (S.D.1993), this Court upheld the denial of alcohol beverage licenses by the respective boards based on unsuitable locations.

It appears to us that among the factors that may properly be considered in the exercise of a legal discretion would be the type of business which applicant proposes to operate; the manner in which the business is operated; the extent to which minors frequent or are employed in such place of business; the adequacy of the police facilities to properly police the proposed location; as well as other factors which are inherently associated in the sale of alcoholic beverages.

In considering the above factors which may have a bearing upon whether the location is suitable, the legislature undoubtedly had in mind the fact that local governing boards, being familiar with their own communities, and in many instances having personal knowledge of facts which would not be available to the licensing authority solely on the basis of the application submitted, are in a better position to determine whether the place where the applicant proposes to operate is a proper and suitable location.

Randall’s-Yankton, 134 N.W.2d at 300 (emphasis added). This rationale supports the decision of Meade County. Facts in both Luke and Randall’s-Yankton revealed that inadequacy of police protection may deem a location unsuitable. That truth alone is enough to justify denial of the license. Luke, 508 N.W.2d at 8; Randall’s-Yankton, 134 N.W.2d at 299-300. Herein, not only is Woodruff unable to guarantee compliance with the law, but the design of his, business sometimes seems to hinder it. Woodruff simply did not establish that the basis of location of his business was suitable. Luke, 508 N.W.2d at 8.

Reversed.

AMUNDSON and WUEST, JJ., concur. MILLER, C.J., and SABERS, J., dissent. KONENKAMP, J., not having been a member of the Court at the time this case was submitted to the Court, did not participate.