Woodrow June Marshall v. Manuel Portillo, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: February 16, 2026
• Docket: 2:23-cv-01394
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 WOODROW JUNE MARSHALL, Case No. 2:23-cv-01394-APG-DJA

4 Petitioner, Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying a Certificate of 5 v. Appealability

6 MANUEL PORTILLO,1 et al., [ECF No. 9]

7 Respondents.

8 Petitioner Woodrow June Marshall filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus 9 under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 9. In the remaining ground in his petition, he alleges (A) the 10 state court violated the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to confirm his 11 identity as the person convicted of prior judgments of conviction used to impose sentence as a 12 habitual criminal; and (B) trial counsel was ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment for 13 failing to challenge his identity as the person convicted of the prior judgments of conviction. Id. 14 at 31–32. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 The State of Nevada charged Marshall by superseding indictment with 19 counts 17 including burglary while in possession of a firearm, burglary, attempted burglary, invasion of the 18 home while in possession of a firearm, invasion of the home, attempted invasion of the home, 19 grand larceny firearm, grand larceny, and ownership or possession of firearm by prohibited 20 person, committed in 2018. ECF No. 20-8. The State filed a notice of intent to seek punishment 21 1 Marshall is currently incarcerated at Southern Desert Correctional Center (SDCC). See NDOC 22 Inmate Search. Manuel Portillo is the warden for that facility. See Southern Desert Correctional Center Facility | Nevada Department of Corrections. At the end of this Order, I direct the Clerk 23 of Court to substitute Marshall’s current immediate custodian, Manuel Portillo, as the respondent in lieu of Jeremy Bean. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 1 as a habitual criminal alleging eight prior Nevada and two prior California felony convictions.2 2 ECF No. 20-18 at 2–3. 3 Marshall pleaded guilty to all charges under a guilty plea agreement (GPA). ECF Nos. 4 20-25; 20-26 at 3–6. The State agreed not to argue for an aggregate sentence of more than 30

5 years to life imprisonment. ECF No. 20-25 at 3. Marshall agreed he understood he could be 6 sentenced as a habitual criminal. ECF Nos. 20-18; 20-25 at 4. At a hearing on Marshall’s motion 7 to withdraw the guilty plea before sentencing, Marshall’s counsel for the guilty plea negotiations 8 testified he told Marshall “to expect the large habitual” sentence due to Marshall’s “12 prior 9 felonies,” and he testified the defense goal was to ask the court for a “ten to life” sentence. ECF 10 No. 21-2 at 10, 20–21. 11 Before sentencing, the State submitted certified copies of seven Nevada and two 12 California of judgments for felony convictions.3 ECF No. 21-3. Six of the seven Nevada 13 judgments bear Marshall’s name, “Woodrow June Marshall,” and Nevada inmate number 14 #0395423. ECF Nos. 21-3; 21-5. The California abstract of judgment bears the name Woodrow

15 June Marshall. Id. at 31. The Presentence Investigation Report states the records of the Las 16 2 The Nevada convictions included: (1) 1980 burglary conviction in Case No. C50238; (2) 1986 17 conviction for sale of documents to falsify identification and sale credit card to another in Case No. C72171; (3) 1986 burglary conviction in Case No. C73877; (4) 1993 burglary conviction in 18 Case No. C113703; (5) 1999 burglary conviction in Case No. C156132; (6) 2002 conviction for possession of stolen vehicle in Case No. C161317; (7) 2015 conviction for possession of 19 controlled substance in Case No. C296833; and (8) 2016 conviction for attempt home invasion in Case No. C316473. ECF No. 20-18 at 2–3. The California convictions included two 1983 20 burglary convictions in Case No. C-51418. Id. 3 The certified Nevada judgments of conviction included: (1) 1980 burglary conviction in Case 21 No. C50238; (2) 1986 conviction for sale of documents to falsify identification and sale credit card to another in Case No. C72171; (3) 1986 burglary conviction in Case No. C73877; (5) 1999 22 burglary conviction in Case No. C156132; (6) 2002 conviction for possession of stolen vehicle in Case No. C161317; and (7) 2016 conviction for attempt home invasion in Case No. C316473. 23 ECF No. 21-3 at 4–27. The State also submitted case documents and a certified abstract of judgment for two 1983 felony burglary convictions in California Case No. C 51418. Id. at 28–31. 1 Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, the Nevada Department of Public Safety Division of 2 Parole and Probation, the National Crime Information Center, and the Federal Bureau of 3 Investigation reflect that Marshall’s criminal history includes eight of the convictions that were 4 set forth in the submitted certified judgments of conviction.4

5 At sentencing, Marshall admitted he “went to prison four times,” and Marshall’s counsel 6 asked the court “to habitualize” Marshall but sentence him to only 10-to-25 years imprisonment. 7 ECF No. 21-7 at 6, 12. The State withdrew from the court’s consideration one of the seven 8 Nevada certified judgments of conviction (Case No. C-161317). Id. at 12. The court sentenced 9 Marshall as a large habitual criminal to an aggregate sentence of 30-years-to-life imprisonment. 10 ECF Nos. 21-7 at 24–25; 21-8 at 3, 5. 11 II. GOVERNING STANDARDS 12 A. AEDPA Standard of Review 13 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) sets forth the standard of 14 review generally applicable in habeas corpus cases:

15 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 16 granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim — 17 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 18 established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 19

20 4 The PSR reports Marshall had the following Nevada prior convictions: (1) 1980 burglary conviction in Case No. C50238; (2) 1986 conviction for sale of documents to falsify 21 identification and sale credit card to another in Case No. C72171; (3) 1986 burglary conviction in Case No. C73877; (4) 1999 burglary conviction in Case No. C156132; (5) 2002 conviction for 22 possession of stolen vehicle in Case No. C161317; (6) 2015 conviction for possession of controlled substance in Case No. C296833; and (8) 2016 conviction for attempt home invasion in 23 Case No. C316473. ECF No. 24-1 at 6–8. The PSR also reported Marshall’s criminal record included two 1983 burglary convictions in California Case No. C-51418. Id. 1 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 2 evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 3 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court 4 precedent within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 “if the state court applies a rule that 5 contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases” or “if the state court 6 confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] 7 Court.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 8 405–06 (2000), and citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). A state court decision is an 9 unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent within the meaning of 10 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the 11 Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s 12 case.” Id. at 75 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). “The ‘unreasonable application’ clause 13 requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s 14 application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (quoting Williams,

15 529 U.S. at 409–10) (internal citation omitted). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks 16 merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the 17 correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing 18 Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), state court 19 factual findings are presumed to be correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 20 The petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled 21 to habeas relief. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). 22 23 1 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 2 Ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims are governed by the two-part test 3 announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A petitioner claiming IAC has the 4 burden to demonstrate (1) the attorney made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning

5 as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced 6 the defense. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 390–91 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 7 To establish ineffectiveness, the defendant must show counsel’s representation fell below 8 an objective standard of reasonableness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. To establish 9 prejudice, the defendant must show “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 10 unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A 11 reasonable probability is “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. 12 Any review of the attorney’s performance must be “highly deferential” and must adopt counsel’s 13 perspective at the time of the challenged conduct, to avoid the distorting effects of hindsight. See 14 id. at 689. The petitioner bears the burden to overcome the presumption that counsel’s actions

15 might be considered sound trial strategy. See id. 16 Federal review of a state supreme court’s decision on an IAC claim is “doubly 17 deferential.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 190 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 18 (2009)). The reviewing court must “take a ‘highly deferential’ look at counsel’s performance . . . 19 through the ‘deferential lens of § 2254(d).’” Id. (internal citations omitted). 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 Ground 11 of the amended petition raises two claims. ECF No. 9 at 31. First, Marshall 22 alleges the state district court violated the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by 23 adjudicating him a habitual criminal because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 1 he was the person who incurred prior judgments of conviction used to impose a habitual criminal 2 sentence. Id. Second, he alleges counsel violated the Sixth Amendment by failing to challenge 3 that Marshall was the individual who incurred those prior convictions. Id. 4 A. State Law

5 At the relevant time, Nevada’s habitual criminal statute provided a sentencing court with 6 discretion to sentence a defendant as a large habitual criminal if the defendant had three prior 7 felony convictions. See NRS § 207.010(1)(b), as enacted by, Laws 2009, c. 156 § 1.5 8 “Under NRS 207.010, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the identity of the 9

5 In 2018, NRS § 207.010, in relevant part, read: 10 1. Unless the person is prosecuted pursuant to NRS 207.012 11 or 207.014, a person convicted in this State of: . . . . 12 (b) Any felony, who has previously been three 13 times convicted, whether in this State or elsewhere, of any crime which under the laws of the situs of 14 the crime or of this State would amount to a felony is a habitual criminal and shall be punished for a 15 category A felony by imprisonment in the state prison: 16 (1) For life without the possibility of parole; 17 (2) For life with the possibility of 18 parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 10 19 years has been served; or (3) For a definite term of 25 years, 20 with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 10 years has 21 been served. 2. It is within the discretion of the prosecuting attorney whether to 22 include a count under this section in any information or file a notice of habitual criminality if an indictment is found. The trial 23 judge may, at his or her discretion, dismiss a count under this section which is included in any indictment or information. 1 person; and (2) the conviction of prior felonies.” Carr v. State, 96 Nev. 936, 939 (1980) (quoting 2 Howard v. State, 83 Nev. 53, 57 (1967)). “[I]in order to use a prior felony conviction for 3 enhancement purposes, the state’s initial burden of production shall be satisfied if the state 4 presents prima facie evidence of the existence of the prior conviction.” Dressler v. State, 107

5 Nev. 686, 697–98 (1991). “For the purposes of NRS 207.010 . . . a certified copy of a felony 6 conviction is prima facie evidence of a conviction of a prior felony.” NRS § 207.16(5). 7 “Ordinarily, positive identity is accomplished by the presentation of photographs, 8 fingerprints, and any other available identity data.” Hollander v. State, 82 Nev. 345, 348–49 9 (1966). However, a court may consider uncommon surnames and the identity of first names and 10 surnames in determining whether the State has proven a defendant’s identity. See id. (holding an 11 exemplified copy of past conviction together with defendant’s unusual last name, identical first 12 name, and the added weight given to a conviction record of state in which ex-felon accusation is 13 tried, sufficient to establish defendant’s identity with prior offenses, in prosecution for being an 14 ex-felon in possession of a firearm and violation of Habitual Criminal Act). See also, e.g.,

15 Hefferman v. U S, 50 F.2d 554, 557 (3d Cir. 1931) (holding record of prior convictions, in same 16 court, of defendant of same unusual name, for same offenses, in same building, was prima facie 17 identification of offenses and defendant). 18 B. State Court Adjudications 19 Marshall alleged in his counseled state direct appeal that the state district court abused its 20 discretion by adjudicating him a large habitual criminal without first recognizing its discretion 21 and conducting factor-weighing. ECF No. 21-18 at 38–40. The Nevada Court of Appeals (NCA) 22 affirmed, finding the district court understood its sentencing authority and exercised its 23 1 discretion to adjudicate Marshall a habitual criminal due to his lengthy criminal history. 2 Marshall v. State, 137 Nev. 937 (Nev. App. 2021). 3 Marshall raised his due process and IAC claims in his initial pro se state postconviction 4 petition. ECF No. 22-2 at 7. The state district court denied the petition, finding Marshall

5 attempted to relitigate the claim raised on direct appeal and, even if it was raised on direct 6 appeal, it would be barred under NRS § 34.810(1)(a) as neither challenging his plea as entered 7 involuntarily or unknowingly nor “entered without effective assistance of counsel.” ECF No. 22- 8 5 at 6–7. The state district court also denied the IAC claim as futile as the certified felony priors 9 included Marshall’s name and offender identification number. Id. at 10. The NCA affirmed, 10 finding Marshall did not raise a claim that the prior convictions had inconsistent “identities and 11 fingerprints,” and failed to allege any facts to support his IAC claim: 12 First, Marshall contended counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the validity of the prior convictions that were 13 used to adjudicate him as a habitual criminal. Marshall contended the State did not demonstrate he was the person named in any of 14 the eight certified judgments of conviction that the State presented to the sentencing court. Marshall did not allege any facts to 15 support this claim. [FN 1] On appeal, Marshall argues the prior 16 convictions had inconsistent identities and fingerprints. Marshall did not raise this argument in 17 his petition below; therefore, we decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. See McNelton v. State, 18 115 Nev. 396, 415–16, 990 P.2d 1263, 1275–76 (1999). 19 Therefore, Marshall failed to allege specific facts that, if 20 true, would entitle him to relief. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim without conducting 21 an evidentiary hearing. 22 Marshall v. State, 530 P.3d 863 (Nev. App. 2023). 23 1 C. Claim Under Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments 2 Marshall argues the trial court violated his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 3 Amendments by imposing the habitual criminal sentence because the State failed to prove 4 Marshall was the person who in fact obtained the prior convictions that the State presented. ECF

5 No. 37 at 8–9. 6 Federal habeas relief is available for violations of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 7 United States only and “does not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67– 8 68 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)). Marshall’s claim asserts an error 9 of state law only. Whether a state court abused its discretion in making sentencing choices is a 10 question of state law and is not subject to federal habeas review. See Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 11 616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002) (a trial court’s alleged abuse of discretion in applying state sentencing 12 law cannot form the basis for federal habeas relief). Arguments premised on state law are not 13 cognizable in a federal habeas petition. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–68. 14 Marshall fails to establish there is any clearly established federal law, as determined by

15 the Supreme Court, that is applicable to his claim. Marshall cites Walker v. Deeds, 50 F.3d 670 16 (9th Cir. 1995), a pre-AEDPA case in which the Ninth Circuit ruled it a violation of a 17 petitioner’s due process rights for the state trial court to adjudicate him a habitual criminal 18 without making the required finding under Nevada law that it was “just and proper” to do so. 19 ECF No. 46 at 14. But Walker does not constitute clearly established federal law as determined 20 by the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The NCA is not required to 21 apply Walker, nor do so reasonably. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 362 (2000). Second, Walker does 22 not concern the State’s burden to establish identity of prior convictions for habitual criminal 23 1 sentencing. And finally, the holding in Walker, even if relevant, is no longer good law. See 2 Hughes v State, 996 P.2d 890 (Nev. 2000). 3 Assuming arguendo that Marshall raises a federal law claim, I note the NCA declined to 4 consider Marshall’s state law claim because it concluded Marshall never raised in his initial state

5 petition a claim that the State failed to prove “identities.” Marshall v. State, 530 P.3d 863 n.1 6 (Nev. App. 2023). That conclusion is belied by the initial state petition in which Marshall 7 alleged “[t]he Court excepted [sic] the State’s evidence that Petitioner should receive the Large 8 Habitual Offender treatment without the State providing a clear showing of the identity of the 9 person that accumulated the nine (9) felony convictions used as evidence by the State to request 10 that the Petitioner be treated as a Large Habitual Criminal.” ECF No. 22-2 at 7 (emphasis added). 11 Although the NCA may have unreasonably failed to address Marshall’s claim, even if I 12 may consider whether there is a violation of due process or the prohibition of cruel and unusual 13 punishment, I cannot grant federal habeas relief to Marshall because the claim does not survive 14 de novo review. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390 (2010) (“Courts can,

15 however, deny writs of habeas corpus under § 2254 by engaging in de novo review when it is 16 unclear whether AEDPA deference applies, because a habeas petitioner will not be entitled to a 17 writ of habeas corpus if his or her claim is rejected on de novo review, see § 2254(a).”). The 18 State submitted more than three certified judgments of conviction for Nevada felonies bearing 19 Marshall’s unique name. Moreover, as shown in the PSR, more than three of those certified 20 judgments that were attributed to Marshall were corroborated by criminal law agency databases 21 containing Marshall’s criminal history. Nothing leads to a conclusion the State did not establish 22 beyond a reasonable doubt the prior convictions belonged to Marshall. Thus, Marshall’s claim 23 lacks merit. 1 For the foregoing reasons, I deny Marshall’s claim that the state district court violated the 2 Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 3 D. Analysis of IAC Claim 4 The NCA determined that Marshall failed to demonstrate any evidence to support his

5 claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. That determination is objectively 6 reasonable. As explained above, Marshall provides no facts leading to a conclusion that he was 7 not the individual who obtained the prior felony convictions used to qualify him as a large 8 habitual criminal. Even if I were to apply de novo review to this claim, I would deny it. 9 Marshall has not established any basis to conclude counsel’s failure to challenge the identity of 10 the felon who incurred the certified Nevada judgments of conviction fell below an objective 11 standard of reasonableness or any reasonable probability the result of the sentencing would have 12 been different but for counsel’s failure to do so. Marshall’s Sixth Amendment claim is denied. 13 IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 14 A district court is required to issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a

15 final order adverse to a habeas petitioner, rather than waiting for a notice of appeal and request 16 for certificate of appealability to be filed. Fed. § 2254 R. 11(a); CTA9 Rule 22-1(a). Generally, a 17 petitioner must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” to warrant a 18 certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483–84 19 (2000). To meet the threshold inquiry, a petitioner has the burden of demonstrating the issues 20 are debatable among jurists of reason, a court could resolve the issues differently, or the 21 questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Allen v. Ornoski, 435 22 F.3d 946, 950–951 (9th Cir. 2006). Applying these standards, I find a certificate of appealability 23 is unwarranted in this case. I therefore deny Marshall a certificate of appealability. 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 I THEREFORE ORDER that the petitioner Woodrow June Marshall’s amended petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 9) is dismissed with prejudice. 4 I FURTHER ORDER that the petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 42) is denied as moot. 6 I FURTHER ORDER that a certificate of appealability is denied as reasonable jurists would not find my decision debatable or wrong. 8 I FURTHER ORDER the Clerk of Court to substitute Manuel Portillo for the respondent 9] Jeremy Bean, enter judgment accordingly, and close this case. 10 Dated: February 16, 2026 1] G ANDREW P. GORDON 12 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23