Wood v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Wood v. State

449 S.E.2d 308, 214 Ga. App. 848, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1077

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedSeptember 27, 1994

DocketA94A1424

StatusPublished

Cited by12 cases

This text of 449 S.E.2d 308 (Wood v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Wood v. State, 449 S.E.2d 308, 214 Ga. App. 848, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1077 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).

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Opinions

Johnson, Judge.

Carol Wood appeals the denial of her motion to suppress and subsequent conviction on one count of possession of amphetamines. Wood was arrested after a search of her home conducted by the Rome/Floyd Metro Task Force, pursuant to a search warrant, yieldec a plastic bag containing amphetamine residue. She asserts that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the affidavit supporting the search warrant did not establish probable cause.

1. The affidavit upon which the search warrant was issued statec that a reliable informant related to the affiant that he had been tole by an unidentified third party that he had seen methamphetamines at Wood’s home. According to the affidavit, the reliable informan) told the officer that this unidentified third party did not know that he would be passing the information along to the police. The reliable informant had no independent knowledge of these facts, but stated tha1 his source “had no reason to lie” to him. Compare State v. Law, 208 Ga. App. 744 (432 SE2d 110) (1993), in which the informant actuallj saw the contraband but a third party identified it as such for him.

“In determining whether an affidavit sufficiently establishes th< probable cause necessary for issuance of a warrant, we employ th< totality of the circumstances analysis enunciated in Illinois v. Gates 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983), and adopted b} [the Georgia Supreme Court] in State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181 (31 SE2d 823) (1984), with the admonition that prudence counsels tha Gates be considered as the outer limit of probable cause. Under tha analysis, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practi cal, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances se forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis o knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fai probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in ¡ particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensur that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that proba ble cause existed. In addition, [the Georgia Supreme Court] has cau tioned attesting officers and magistrates to make every effort to se that supporting affidavits reflect the maximum indication of reliabil ity.” (Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Gary v. State 262 Ga. 573, 577 (422 SE2d 426) (1992).

The facts surrounding the affidavit upon which the magistrate re lied in issuing the search warrant in this case are similar to those i: [849]*849Munson v. State, 211 Ga. App. 80 (438 SE2d 123) (1993), in which this court noted: “[T]he ‘totality of the circumstances’ analysis applies also in situations in which there are two informers.” Id. at 81. A deficiency created by the fact that the reliability of either source has not been established can be corrected by the corroboration of the information, thereby providing a substantial basis for finding probable cause. Id. at 82. In Munson the affiant corrected the deficiency by conducting an independent investigation of the information, verifying not only Munson’s address, but also by involving another law enforcement agency which further investigated and confirmed that marijuana was growing at the location indicated by the informant. The affiant in this case, however, did nothing more to corroborate the information of the reliable informant than to confirm Wood’s address, the make of her car and her hair color. Nothing whatsoever was done to corroborate the unidentified third-party’s information. These steps, which merely verified Wood’s identity but did not tie her to the commission of any crime, do not constitute corroboration so as to cure the deficiency created by the affiant’s reliance on information from a source whose reliability had not been established. No matter how truthful or sincere the information from the reliable source, the crucial question is the unidentified third-party’s reliability, and that is simply not established in the affidavit. “ ‘Our decisions applying the totality of circumstances analysis have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant’s tip by independent police work.’ [Cit.]” (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181, 183 (311 SE2d 823) (1984). In this case, the independent investigation done by the police in an effort to corroborate the information was insufficient. See Davis v. State, 214 Ga. App. 36 (447 SE2d 68) (1994).

We acknowledge that in doubtful or marginal cases preference should be afforded to upholding the warrant. Mincey v. State, 180 Ga. App. 898, 900 (350 SE2d 852) (1986). Nonetheless, we find here that the uncorroborated statement of an unnamed third-party source, as filtered through a reliable informant to a police affiant, did not give rise to probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant. The trial court erred in denying Wood’s motion to suppress.

2. In light of our holding in Division 1 above, we need not address Wood’s remaining enumerations of error.

Judgment reversed.

McMurray, P. J., Beasley, P. J., Blackburn, Smith and Ruffin, JJ., concur. Pope, C. J., Birdsong, P. J., and Andrews, J., dissent.

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Johnson, Judge.

Carol Wood appeals the denial of her motion to suppress and subsequent conviction on one count of possession of amphetamines. Wood was arrested after a search of her home conducted by the Rome/Floyd Metro Task Force, pursuant to a search warrant, yieldec a plastic bag containing amphetamine residue. She asserts that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the affidavit supporting the search warrant did not establish probable cause.

1. The affidavit upon which the search warrant was issued statec that a reliable informant related to the affiant that he had been tole by an unidentified third party that he had seen methamphetamines at Wood’s home. According to the affidavit, the reliable informan) told the officer that this unidentified third party did not know that he would be passing the information along to the police. The reliable informant had no independent knowledge of these facts, but stated tha1 his source “had no reason to lie” to him. Compare State v. Law, 208 Ga. App. 744 (432 SE2d 110) (1993), in which the informant actuallj saw the contraband but a third party identified it as such for him.

“In determining whether an affidavit sufficiently establishes th< probable cause necessary for issuance of a warrant, we employ th< totality of the circumstances analysis enunciated in Illinois v. Gates 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983), and adopted b} [the Georgia Supreme Court] in State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181 (31 SE2d 823) (1984), with the admonition that prudence counsels tha Gates be considered as the outer limit of probable cause. Under tha analysis, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practi cal, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances se forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis o knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fai probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in ¡ particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensur that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that proba ble cause existed. In addition, [the Georgia Supreme Court] has cau tioned attesting officers and magistrates to make every effort to se that supporting affidavits reflect the maximum indication of reliabil ity.” (Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Gary v. State 262 Ga. 573, 577 (422 SE2d 426) (1992).

The facts surrounding the affidavit upon which the magistrate re lied in issuing the search warrant in this case are similar to those i: [849]*849Munson v. State, 211 Ga. App. 80 (438 SE2d 123) (1993), in which this court noted: “[T]he ‘totality of the circumstances’ analysis applies also in situations in which there are two informers.” Id. at 81. A deficiency created by the fact that the reliability of either source has not been established can be corrected by the corroboration of the information, thereby providing a substantial basis for finding probable cause. Id. at 82. In Munson the affiant corrected the deficiency by conducting an independent investigation of the information, verifying not only Munson’s address, but also by involving another law enforcement agency which further investigated and confirmed that marijuana was growing at the location indicated by the informant. The affiant in this case, however, did nothing more to corroborate the information of the reliable informant than to confirm Wood’s address, the make of her car and her hair color. Nothing whatsoever was done to corroborate the unidentified third-party’s information. These steps, which merely verified Wood’s identity but did not tie her to the commission of any crime, do not constitute corroboration so as to cure the deficiency created by the affiant’s reliance on information from a source whose reliability had not been established. No matter how truthful or sincere the information from the reliable source, the crucial question is the unidentified third-party’s reliability, and that is simply not established in the affidavit. “ ‘Our decisions applying the totality of circumstances analysis have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant’s tip by independent police work.’ [Cit.]” (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181, 183 (311 SE2d 823) (1984). In this case, the independent investigation done by the police in an effort to corroborate the information was insufficient. See Davis v. State, 214 Ga. App. 36 (447 SE2d 68) (1994).

We acknowledge that in doubtful or marginal cases preference should be afforded to upholding the warrant. Mincey v. State, 180 Ga. App. 898, 900 (350 SE2d 852) (1986). Nonetheless, we find here that the uncorroborated statement of an unnamed third-party source, as filtered through a reliable informant to a police affiant, did not give rise to probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant. The trial court erred in denying Wood’s motion to suppress.

2. In light of our holding in Division 1 above, we need not address Wood’s remaining enumerations of error.

Judgment reversed.

McMurray, P. J., Beasley, P. J., Blackburn, Smith and Ruffin, JJ., concur. Pope, C. J., Birdsong, P. J., and Andrews, J., dissent.

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449 S.E.2d 308, 214 Ga. App. 848, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 1077, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wood-v-state-gactapp-1994.

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