Wood v. Purdue Pharmasutical Company

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 27, 2021·No. 1:21-cv-06447·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SHANE M. WOOD, Plaintiff, 21-CV-6447 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND PERDUE PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated in the Steuben County Jail in Bath, New York, filed this complaint pro se. By order dated August 10, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND In his complaint, which names as the sole defendant the Perdue Pharmaceutical Company (Perdue), Plaintiff sets forth facts regarding two distinct and unrelated matters. First, Plaintiff alleges that, on July 7, 2021, he saw a news report about Perdue “openly admitting to mass producing opiates to create addiction [to] make capital gain. Settling for $200,000,000 over a span of 15 states.” (ECF 1 at 1.) Plaintiff asserts that he “personally” [has] spent 15 years in opioid abuse, which “destroyed” his life, and that he “died 3 times twice [and was] brought back by Narcan.” (Id. at 2.) In a subsequently filed letter, Plaintiff states that he “would like to p[u]rsue a class action suit” (ECF 2 at 1.) Second, Plaintiff asserts claims about events occurring in Steuben County, New York, on

February 13, 2021 (“Steuben County claims”). On that day, Plaintiff was living at the Best Value Inn in Painted Post, New York, in a room paid for by the Department of Social Services. At approximately 6:00 p.m., without probable cause or a warrant, New York State Police officers kicked in Plaintiff’s door without knocking. The officers used excessive force against Plaintiff, even though he was unarmed and cooperative. (ECF 1 at 3.) The officers searched Plaintiff’s room and found nothing illegal. They then dragged Plaintiff out of the room, drove him to a nearby Walmart, and “paraded” him around because the officers believed that Plaintiff had assaulted someone there. According to Plaintiff, no charges were filed against him.2 DISCUSSION A. Claims about opioid addiction The complaint could be construed as asserting a products liability claim under the Court’s

diversity jurisdiction. To establish jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a plaintiff must first allege that the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states. Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998). In addition, the plaintiff must allege to a “reasonable probability” that the claim is in excess of the sum or value of $75,000.00, the statutory jurisdictional amount. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438

2 Plaintiff refers to having received an “index number” from the “Supreme Court,” and thus he may have already filed an action in state court regarding these events. (ECF 2 at 1.) F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). At this stage, the Court will assume without deciding that it has diversity jurisdiction of this matter. Under New York law, there are four separate theories under which a plaintiff may recover based upon a claim of products liability: (1) strict liability; (2) negligence; (3) express warranty;

and (4) implied warranty. See Hilaire v. DeWalt Indus. Tool Co., 54 F. Supp. 3d 223, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 106-07 (1983). To establish a prima facie case with regard to any of these four theories, the plaintiff must show that the product at issue was defective and that the defective product was the actual and proximate cause of his injury. Voss, 59 N.Y.2d at 107-09, see also 89 N.Y. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 2. To state a failure-to-warn claim, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) the manufacturer had a duty to warn; (2) the manufacturer breached the duty to warn in a manner that rendered the product defective, [that is], reasonably certain to be dangerous; (3) the defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury; and (4) the plaintiff suffered loss or damage.” Bee v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 18 F.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Wood v. Purdue Pharmasutical Company, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Wood v. Purdue Pharmasutical Company (Wood v. Purdue Pharmasutical Company) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht
524 U.S. 381 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)
Eagle Associates v. Bank of Montreal
926 F.2d 1305 (Second Circuit, 1991)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Lattanzio v. Comta
481 F.3d 137 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
704 F.3d 208 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Voss v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co.
450 N.E.2d 204 (New York Court of Appeals, 1983)
McCarthy v. Olin Corp.
119 F.3d 148 (Second Circuit, 1997)
Iannaccone v. Law
142 F.3d 553 (Second Circuit, 1998)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)