Wood v. Moss

195 S.W. 1077, 176 Ky. 419, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 72
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedJune 19, 1917
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 195 S.W. 1077 (Wood v. Moss) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wood v. Moss, 195 S.W. 1077, 176 Ky. 419, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 72 (Ky. Ct. App. 1917).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Thomas

Affirming the case against appellees jointly and dismissing the appeals in the two cases against them separately.

Major Á. T. Wood died testate and a resident of Montgomery county on February 3, 1915. He was about eighty years of age at the time of his death, and his wife with whom he had lived in happy union nearly sixty years preceded him to the grave about eighteen months.

Several years before, Henry Wood, the youngest son o’f Major Wood, died, leaving a widow, the appellee and defendant, Mrs. Iva D. Swaffield (she having married again), and after the death of her first husband, at the request of Maj. Wood, she and her children, together with appellee and defendant, Miss Anna K. Moss, who' had been living for many years with Mrs. Henry Wood as a member of .her family, moved into the house with Major Wood and wife, where they continued to live until the death of the former.

[421]*421-On June 20,1914, while Major Wood and the two defendants were residing in the former’s residence (and before Mrs. Wood’s second marriage) he executed to the defendants a deed to a house and lot located on Winn street, in the city of Mt. Sterling. The deed was prepared by the Major himself, who was a lawyer by profession, and for many years was prominent as a member of the Kentucky bar. He had also filled positions of distinction, and at one time was his party’s candidate for Governor of the Commonwealth.

At Christmas, 1914, he gave to defendant, Iva D. Swaffield, a small diamond brooch, and to defendant, Anna K. Moss, some small diamond ear rings. After his death some of the devisees and legátees under his will, all of whom were'his children except one, who is the widow of a deceased son, brought suit in the Montgomery circuit court against defendants, seeking to cancel the deed to the house and lot upon the ground that the maker of it was mentally incapacitated at the time to do so and was unduly influenced to execute it. Separate suits were brought by the same plaintiffs against each of the defendants to recover the jewelry given to them as Christmas presents, or its value. Each of the latter suits was for a sum less than $200.00, and they were'consolidated with the one brought to cancel the deed, and upon final hearing all of the petitions were dismissed, and to reverse that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

The same grounds are alleged in the two suits to recover the jewelry as are made in the suit to cancel the deed,- and the answers of the defendants in all of the suits put in issue the allegations of the petitions.

The only daughter of the decedent, Mrs. Cox, did not join in either of the suits, nor did the executor of Maj. Wood’s will, but the latter was made a defendant in each of them.

Much feeling seems to have been engendered on the part of plaintiffs, and the attorneys for the litigants have' exhibited great'labor and much research in the preparation and presentation of the cases, but when sifted down the issues are short, and, to our minds, reasonably plain.

Within the due limits of this opinion it would be impossible'to refer to or undertake to analyze the testimony of the various witnesses, and as the disposition of the casejurns chiefly upon'questions of fact, we will undertake only to give our conclusions with such references to circumstances as we deem necessary to fortify them.

[422]*422Previous to 1911, Maj. Wood was United States Pension Agent for the U. S. Government, with his office located in Louisville. After retiring from that office, he moved to Mt. Sterling, where he continued to reside in the manner stated until his death. Those of his children who were living had families of their own, and none, of them, for some reason, either went into his house to reside, or had him to reside with them. He was a man of excellent mind, a wide reader, and kept posted on all current events, and what is more creditable than all else, he seems to have been a man of high appreciation, and of the broadest kindness. This not only endeared him to the defendants, who were constantly associated with him in their joint residence, but caused them to reciprocate by .extending to him all needed attentions and the greatest kindness, exhibiting itself in deep solicitude for his comfort and enjoyment. With his disposition, he appreciated their treatment, and his gratitude caused him to consult with his most intimate friends and long associates as to the advisability of making the deed in contest. To such friends he stated in substance that he very much desired to do so, but he was aware that when the facts should be discovered that the plaintiffs here would raise a disturbance, with which, in his old age, he did not desire to be troubled, and he informed his friendsi that he expected to make the deed, but that he wanted it kept secret as long as he lived. To these witnesses he stated that “he was not physically able to stand the disturbance and the girls (defendants) would be.”

Twnty-two witnesses testified on behalf of defendants, seventeen of whom were neither parties nor related in any manner to them. Among the seventeen were people who had known Maj. Wood for a great number of years, and who had lived neighbors to him. They include people of all occupations from barber to priest. Physicians and lawyers, as well as housewives and bankers, are found among them, and their testimony is of one accord, that in their opinion Major Wood was amply competent to execute the deed at the time he did, and that he was fully aware not only as to the amount of property which he held, but was cognizant of the objects of his bounty, and his duty to them, but also determined in his purpose to exhibit the gratitude which so much beautified and adorned his nature by executing the deed.

For the plaintiffs only three witnesses besides themselves and their relatives gave testimony in the case. [423]*423The three unrelated witnesses include the notary public) who took the acknowledgment, the jeweler who sold the diamonds, and a physician. The physician’s testimony in chief is not of the most convincing nature, and upon cross-examination was largely weakened by the development of the fact that his associations with Major Wood were extremely occasional and of short duration. The other two testified, strongly for defendants.

The testimony of plaintiffs and their relatives is greatly impaired by reason of the fact that before and following the date of the deed some of them were endeavoring to purchase other real estate from the decedent, but he appears to have had mind enough to decline their propositions, and others of them procured bim to go their security at different banks from' which they borrowed money. Other circumstances are found in their testimony, which, according to our view,, weaken it upon the main point; but, however that may be, the overwhelming weight of testimony, from witnesses detailing facts and giving their opinions, is to the effect that Major Wood was fully capable mentally to make the transactions complained of at the times they occurred.

It is insisted that upon occasions he would cry, and-this is urged as conclusive proof of mental weakness. However, in each instance when he is shown to have shed tears it was.because of the mention of the name of his departed wife, to whom he is shown to have been most affectionately attached.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
195 S.W. 1077, 176 Ky. 419, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 72, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wood-v-moss-kyctapp-1917.