Wood v. Mid-America Management Corp.

192 F. App'x 378
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedAugust 1, 2006
Docket05-4124
StatusUnpublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 192 F. App'x 378 (Wood v. Mid-America Management Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wood v. Mid-America Management Corp., 192 F. App'x 378 (6th Cir. 2006).

Opinion

SUTTON, Circuit Judge.

Dempsey Wood sued his former employer, Mid-America Management Corp., for failing to pay him overtime wages under federal and state law. The district court rejected his claims as a matter of law. Because Wood admits that Mid-America compensated him for all of the overtime that he did report and because he cannot prove that Mid-America had actual or constructive knowledge that he failed to report other overtime hours, he is not entitled to be compensated for these additional, unreported overtime hours. And because he did not sufficiently allege in *379 his complaint that Mid-America failed to pay him at the correct rate for the overtime hours he did report, the district court properly dismissed that claim as well. We affirm.

I.

Mid-America manages commercial and residential properties, including the Imperial House Apartments, a 118-unit complex in Lakewood, Ohio. In 1999, the company hired Wood to work as an on-site maintenance technician at the Imperial House. When Wood interviewed for the position, the managers said it “would require a lot” of overtime and told Wood that he “would be compensated for it.” JA 63. Wood worked for Mid-America through May 2003.

Mid-America paid Wood $8.25 per hour when he started the job and almost $10 per hour by the time he left it. He worked from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. during the week. His duties included (1) performing daily maintenance on the building’s boilers and heating, ventilating and air conditioning system, (2) removing garbage and (3) responding to mechanical or plumbing problems. In the appropriate seasons, he attended to the pool and removed snow from the grounds. And when tenants left the apartment complex, he restored the rental units to their original condition for the next residents.

Every other week, Wood was “on call” to respond to after-hour emergencies. Regardless of whether he responded to a call during these weeks, Mid-America automatically paid Wood for two hours of overtime per week when he was on call. If during these weeks he also worked overtime, he would report these hours on his time card and Mid-America would compensate him for that overtime as well.

Wood was responsible for completing and signing his own time cards, which he submitted to the property manager for processing. On them he documented his regular hours, indicated that he was entitled to receive two hours of overtime pay automatically (during the weeks in which he was on call) and recorded any overtime work that he performed during the pay period. By signing his time card, Wood acknowledged that he “was attesting to [its] accuracy.” JA 101. When Wood worked after normal business hours, no supervisors were at the Imperial House to monitor him. He admitted that he “expected] the people who processed the time cards and took care of payroll matters ... to rely on” his time cards to pay him. JA 103. The parties agree that Mid-America always compensated Wood for overtime he reported in this fashion at a rate of one- and-a-half times his hourly rate.

In August 2004, Wood sued his former employer in federal district court, alleging that it had violated the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and Ohio’s Minimum Fair Wage Standards law, O.R.C. §§ 4111.01 et seq. (incorporating the minimum-wage and overtime-compensation provisions of the FLSA). After discovery, Mid-America moved for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted Mid-America’s motion.

II.

Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.), “to compensate those who labored in excess of the statutory maximum number of hours for the wear and tear of extra work,” Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 460, 68 S.Ct. 1186, 92 L.Ed. 1502 (1948). “Consistent with this goal, the Act requires employers to pay their employees time-and-a-half for work performed in excess of forty *380 hours per week.” Acs v. Detroit Edison Co., 444 F.3d 763, 764-65 (6th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). An FLSA plaintiff “must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she ‘performed work for which he or she was not properly compensated.’ ” Myers v. Copper Cellar Corp., 192 F.3d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686-87, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L.Ed. 1515 (1946)) (brackets omitted).

A.

While Mid-America paid Wood for all of the overtime hours he reported on his time cards, he claims that he did not report all of the overtime he worked and accordingly that Mid-America must pay him for this additional time as well. Pointing to a regulation promulgated under the FLSA, Wood claims that Mid-America owes him for these unreported hours because it knew that he was working them. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.11. That regulation says that “[w]ork not requested but suffered or permitted is work time” and that if “[t]he employer knows or has reason to believe that” an employee “is continuing to work,” then “the time is working time.” Id.

In attempting to bring himself within the requirements of this regulation, Wood offers the following testimony. He acknowledges that “I did” write down “[s]ome” hours, “[a]nd some I didn’t.” JA 98. He would not write down his overtime hours “all of the time,” JA 95, he explains, because “[t]here [are] so many little things in between there that are so numerous, I couldn’t.... I was with this person two minutes, that person five minutes. I went and talked to this person for an hour. Just too many numerous things in between there,” JA 97. Although Wood did not keep any records of the overtime he failed to report, he says he “figured out myself personally” that he worked but did not report an “average of five hours plus a day, per day.” JA 59-60; see also JA 91 (“I could not put [my] finger on the amount of time because I did it continuously.”); JA 92 (“[T]here is no way ... that I can estimate the time I spent with people on a daily basis in the building that I can claim one minute for.”).

This is a bridge too far. “[A]n employee,” it is true, “must be compensated for time she works outside of her scheduled shift, even if the employer did not ask that the employee work during that time,” but this requirement applies only if “the employer ‘knows or has reason to believe that the employee is continuing to work’ and that work was ‘suffered or permitted’ by the employer.” Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C.,

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Bluebook (online)
192 F. App'x 378, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wood-v-mid-america-management-corp-ca6-2006.