Wood v. Carl's Jr.

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided October 13, 2021·No. 2:20-cv-02329·Unknown

Opinion

1 J. BRUCE ALVERSON, ESQ. prejudice for failure to follow Nevada Bar No. 1339 Local Rule 26-6(c). 2 KARIE N. WILSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7957 3 ALVERSON TAYLOR & SANDERS 6605 Grand Montecito Pkwy, Ste. 200 4 Las Vegas, NV 89149 702-384-7000 Phone 5 702-385-7000 Fax Attorneys for Defendants 6 Carl’s Jr. Restaurants LLC, CKE Restaurants Holdings, Inc., CKE Restaurants, Inc. and 7 Carl Karcher Enterprises, Inc.

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

10 HOLLY MARIE WOOD, CASE NO: 2:20-cv-2329-APG-BNW 11 Plaintiff,

12 v.

13 CARL’S JR., operated and owned by BTO INVESTMENTS, a Delaware corporation; 14 S.L INVESTMENTS, a Nevada corporation; CKE RESTAURANTS, INC., a Delaware 15 Corporation; CARL’S JR. RESTAURANTS HOLDINGS, INC., a foreign corporation; 16 RUCEY MOLINA CRUZ, an individual; DOES 1-10, inclusive; ROE 17 CORPORATIONS/ ENTITIES 1-10 inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 __________________________________________

20 DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

21 COME NOW Defendants CARL’S JR. RESTAURANTS LLC, CKE RESTAURANTS, 22 INC., CKE RESTAURANTS HOLDINGS, INC., CARL KARCHER ENTERPRISES, INC. 23 (collectively, “CKE”), BTO INVESTMENTS, and S.L. INVESTMENTS, by and through their 24 respective counsel of record, and hereby file this Joint Motion for Protective Order. This Motion 1 is made and based upon the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted in 2 support hereof. 3 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 4 I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

5 Plaintiff claims Defendants are in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 6 based on alleged discrimination arising from the sexual harassment, sexual assault, and battery of 7 Plaintiff by Defendant Rucey Cruz. Plaintiff Holly Marie Wood began her employment at Carl’s 8 Jr. located at 1440 West Cheyenne Avenue in North Las Vegas, Nevada in August 2018. 9 Plaintiff claims soon after her hire date, another Carl’s Jr. employee, 33-year-old Rucey Molina 10 Cruz, sexually harassed and assaulted her. 11 It is Defendants’ position that relevant documentation and discovery sought in this action 12 requires the production of certain confidential, business, commercial, personnel, and financial 13 information, as well as other confidential information, and that Defendants have a legitimate 14 need to protect the confidentiality of such information. Plaintiff specifically requested that

15 Defendants produce a copy of the applicable Franchise Agreement between CKE and S.L. 16 Investments, Inc., (subsequently assigned to BTO Investments). Defendants have objected to the 17 production of this document until such time that an appropriate Protective Order is entered to 18 protect Defendants’ confidential and proprietary information. Defendants have proposed and 19 agreed to a Stipulated Protective Order, but Plaintiff will not agree. 20 In Plaintiff’s Second Supplemental 26(a)(1) Disclosure, she produced a sample franchise 21 agreement titled “Sample ‘Form of Carl’s Jr. Restaurant Franchise Agreement’ ‘Carl’s Jr. 22 Restaurant Franchise Agreement’ available” on the internet.1 While this may be a “sample” 23 franchise agreement, the actual Franchise Agreement between CKE and S.L. Investments, Inc.

24 1 (BTO Investments), discusses specific terms including the franchise fee, royalty fees, advertising 2 and promotion obligations, and ownership interests as included in Appendix A through D of the 3 agreement. The sample agreement produced by Plaintiff was not executed and the appendixes 4 regarding fees and ownership interests are blank. Defendants therefore seek entry of a Protective

5 Order to prevent the actual Franchise Agreement and Appendixes and other confidential 6 information from being publicly available or distributed, as necessary to protect Defendants’ 7 proprietary and financial information. 8 II. ARGUMENT 9 Courts generally recognize a right to inspect and copy public records and documents, 10 including judicial records and documents. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 11 (1978). There is a strong “presumption in favor of access to court records.” Foltz v. State Farm 12 Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). The presumption of access “promotes 13 the public’s understanding of the judicial process and of significant public events.” Murname v. 14 Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 2015 WL 5638224, at *1 (D. Nev. Sept. 24, 2015) (citing

15 Kamakana v. City and Cty. Of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 16 The common law right of access is, however, not absolute and is premised upon a 17 specific rationale that should guide its application. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. The United States 18 District Court in Nevada has held that it is “well-established that the court has the authority to 19 shield proprietary information related to the ongoing operations of a business from public 20 review.” Selling Source v. Red River Ventures, 2011 WL 1630338, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 29, 21 2011). “Where the material includes information about proprietary business operations, a 22 company’s business model or agreements with clients, there are compelling reasons to seal the 23 material because possible infringement of trade secrets outweighs the general public interest in

24 understanding the judicial process.” Id. at *6. 1 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the Restatement's definition of “trade 2 secret.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 727 F.3d 1214, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2013), citing Clark v. 3 Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972). Under this definition, a trade secret is “any 4 formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and

5 which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use 6 it.” Id. (quoting Restatement (First) of Torts § 757, cmt. b (1939)). The First Restatement states: 7 An exact definition of a trade secret is not possible. Some factors to be considered in determining whether given information is one’s trade secret are: (1) the extent 8 to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of 9 measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money 10 expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. 11

12 Id. Defendants maintain that the information sought and discovery to be sought meets the factors 13 of the Restatement. 14 A. The Specific Terms of Defendants’ Franchise Agreement are Proprietary and Not Readily Available nor Accessible to the Public Satisfying the First, Second, and 15 Third Factors of the Restatement 16 The Franchise Agreement and relevant Appendixes between CKE and S.L. Investments 17 (subsequently assigned to BTO Investments) contains confidential and financial information that 18 is not readily available nor accessible to the public. During discussions regarding the proposed 19 Stipulated Protective Order, Plaintiff claimed that Carl’s Jr. Franchise Agreement was not 20 confidential and could be accessible to the public on the internet. On September 9, 2021, Plaintiff 21 served her Second Supplemental List of Witnesses and Production of Documents which included 22 a “sample” form of Carl’s Jr.

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