Wolstenholme v. City of Oakland

351 P.2d 321, 54 Cal. 2d 48, 4 Cal. Rptr. 153, 1960 Cal. LEXIS 142

• Court: California Supreme Court
• Decided: April 22, 1960
• Docket: S. F. 20341
• Status: Published

Opinions

McCOMB, J.

Petitioner appeals from a judgment which denied her application for a writ of mandate directing respondents to reinstate her to the position of senior librarian of the Library Department of the City of Oakland, California.

Facts: Petitioner was employed by respondent library board from January 1949 until November 9, 1954, at which time she was discharged from her position as senior librarian by the board of library directors. The board operates and manages the Oakland Free Library and had jurisdiction over petitioner’s employment.

On September 20 and 23, 1954, hearings were had before the board with respect to petitioner’s qualifications and suitability for public service.

Thereafter, on November 9, 1954, petitioner was discharged by resolution of the board on the basis of insubordination and misconduct in refusing to answer certain questions which she had been asked. On November 30, 1954, pursuant to the provisions of the charter of respondent municipality, petitioner appealed said discharge to the Civil Service Board of the City of Oakland, which board upheld the decision of respondent library board. On June 6, 1956, one year and seven months after her discharge, petitioner filed the present proceeding in the Superior Court of Alameda County. The trial court found that her delay in filing the instant proceeding was unreasonable and unjustified; and that thereby respondents were irreparably prejudiced.

This is the sole question necessary for us to determine: Is the trial court’s finding that petitioner was guilty of laches in instituting the present proceeding sustained Toy the evidence?

Yes. (1) Public policy requires that an employee of a public body who claims to have been improperly or illegally discharged must act with the utmost diligence in asserting his rights. (Hicks v. City of Los Angeles, 133 Cal. App.2d 214, 219 [3] [283 P.2d 1046] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court]; Newman v. Board of Civil Service Comrs., 140 Cal.App.2d 907, 909 [1] [296 P.2d 41] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court].)

(2) It is presumed that where one has been dismissed from an active position in the public service, someone else has been chosen to take his place. (Hayman v. City of Los Angeles, 17 Cal.App.2d 674, 680 [62 P.2d 1047] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court].)

(3) If a discharged public employee delays unreasonably in bringing an action to obtain reinstatement, prejudice is presumed. (Newman v. Board of Civil Service Comrs., supra, at 910 [3] et seq.; Corcoran v. City of Los Angeles, 136 Cal.App.2d 839, 842 [6] [289 P.2d 556].)

Applying the foregoing rules to the present ease, the record discloses the following: On November 9, 1954, petitioner was discharged from her public employment. Thereafter the library board filled the vacancy created by petitioner’s discharge. She did not file the present action until June 6, 1956, which was one year and seven months after her discharge. The trial court found that this delay was unreasonable, that respondents were thereby irreparably prejudiced, and that petitioner was guilty of laches. Petitioner knew on November 9, 1954, of respondents’ acts which she immediately claimed were “wrongful.” Her only excuse for delay in filing the present action was that her counsel believed that the case of Steinmetz v. California State Board of Education, 44 Cal.2d 816 [285 P.2d 617] (cert, denied, 351 [76 S.Ct. 708, 100 L.Ed. 1448]), would determine her rights in the instant case.

Relative to the delay in filing her petition in the present case, petitioner testified as follows: “Direct Examination. By Mr. Speiser : Q. Mrs. Wolstenholme, subsequent to your discharge by the Library Board and the affirmation of that discharge by the Civil Service Board do you recall any instances in which you called me and asked me concerning the filing of a suit in court on your behalf?

“A. Well, it took me about six months to get over the shock then I started thinking about it. I thought well, something should happen, and I do recall, I can’t say specifically whether it was exactly six months, but I do recall calling you, Mr. Speiser at your home. As a matter of fact, I couldn’t reach you at the office and at that time you told me that you were sort of waiting for the outcome of the Steinmetz ease in Southern California.”

It thus appeared from petitioner’s own testimony that before any thought in her mind to file the instant proceeding in mandamus arose, she delayed “about six months” and then “ started thinking about it. ’ ’ The instant proceeding was commenced on June 6, 1956, about a month and a half after the final decision in Steinmetz v. Board of Education, supra. Thus, it appears that the total extra delay was 7½ months.

Such delay is not the “utmost diligence” with which a public employee claiming wrongful discharge must act. It is a delay unexplained, from which prejudice to the public employer is presumed. (Newman v. Board of Civil Service Comrs., supra, 140 Cal.App.2d 907, 910 [3] et seq.; Corcoran v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 136 Cal.App.2d 839, 842 [6].)

The foregoing evidence clearly supports the questioned finding of the trial court.

In the instant case the delay of petitioner in bringing her action was longer than in the Hayman case, supra [9 months] ; in Kimberlin v. Los Angeles City High School Dist., 115 Cal.App.2d 459 [252 P.2d 344] [12 months]; in Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 47 Cal.App.2d 310 [117 P.2d 901] [15 months] ; in Donovan v. Board of Police Comrs., 32 Cal. App. 392 [163 P. 69] [16 months]; in Newman v. Board of Civil Service Comrs., supra [18 months]; or in Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 120 Cal. App .2d 858 [262 P.2d 37] (hearing denied by the Supreme Court) [about a year and a half].

It appears that petitioner waited 19 months from the date on which she was discharged before instituting this action. Under the authorities cited, petitioner’s cause of action is barred by laches, since the trial court’s finding that there was laches and that the delay in filing the present proceeding was unreasonable and unjustified was fully sustained by the evidence.

In view of our conclusions, it is unnecessary to discuss other questions presented in counsels’ briefs.

The judgment is affirmed.

Schauer, J., Spence, J., and White, J., concurred.