Wolf v. Commissioner

Board of Tax Appeals

Wolf v. Commissioner

40 B.T.A. 1232, 1939 BTA LEXIS 733

CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals

DecidedDecember 22, 1939

DocketDocket No. 92429.

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 40 B.T.A. 1232 (Wolf v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Wolf v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1232, 1939 BTA LEXIS 733 (bta 1939).

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Opinion

[1237]*1237OPINION.

Van Fossan :

The question for decision is whether the contribution of $1,300 made by taxpayer in 1936 as above set out was deductible under section 23 (o) (2) of the Eevenue Act of 1936.¹ As we view it the case turns on the characterization of the “Anisfield Award Committee”, i. e., whether it was such an entity as comes within the statute. There can be no question that the statute is satisfied as to the organization, operation, and purposes of the committee. The purposes were exclusively the encouragement of literary efforts to the end of bettering race relations, the latter phase being educational. It is stipulated that “no part of the income of the fund inures to the benefit of the petitioner or to any private shareholder or individual.” The committee is not engaged in carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation.

Whether the committee was an entity within the requirement of the statute is to be determined by a study of all the facts relating to its [1238]*1238creation, composition, activity, and functions. We take it that the absence of the words “trust” or “fund” or “foundation” can not be determinative. Nor, in our opinion, is it material that no more formal document marked the creation of the committee. The committee was the result of careful planning, and was conceived as an agency adequate in form to carry out the donor’s purpose. It was formally held out to the world as an entity to which books submitted for the award might be sent. The check contributed by petitioner was payable to “Henry S. Canby, Chairman of the Anisfield Award Committee” and was deposited in an account similarly styled, he alone, in such capacity, having authority to draw thereon. It is stipulated that the withdrawal and utilization of the funds were in the sole discretion of the committee. The committee functioned as an entity for the purpose planned and made awards accordingly over several years, taxpayer each year contributing to it the requisite funds. Petitioner had no part in the selection of the recipient of the prize award and in nowise used the committee as a shield to hide private donations. We are of the opinion that the Anisfield Award Committee was such an entity as entitles it to classification within the provisions of section 23 (o) (2) and that petitioner’s donation to it was deductible. See Fifth-Third Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 56 Fed. (2d) 767; Bok v. McCaughn, 42 Fed. (2d) 616.

Decision will he entered under Rule 50.

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[1237]*1237OPINION.

Van Fossan :

The question for decision is whether the contribution of $1,300 made by taxpayer in 1936 as above set out was deductible under section 23 (o) (2) of the Eevenue Act of 1936.¹ As we view it the case turns on the characterization of the “Anisfield Award Committee”, i. e., whether it was such an entity as comes within the statute. There can be no question that the statute is satisfied as to the organization, operation, and purposes of the committee. The purposes were exclusively the encouragement of literary efforts to the end of bettering race relations, the latter phase being educational. It is stipulated that “no part of the income of the fund inures to the benefit of the petitioner or to any private shareholder or individual.” The committee is not engaged in carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation.

Whether the committee was an entity within the requirement of the statute is to be determined by a study of all the facts relating to its [1238]*1238creation, composition, activity, and functions. We take it that the absence of the words “trust” or “fund” or “foundation” can not be determinative. Nor, in our opinion, is it material that no more formal document marked the creation of the committee. The committee was the result of careful planning, and was conceived as an agency adequate in form to carry out the donor’s purpose. It was formally held out to the world as an entity to which books submitted for the award might be sent. The check contributed by petitioner was payable to “Henry S. Canby, Chairman of the Anisfield Award Committee” and was deposited in an account similarly styled, he alone, in such capacity, having authority to draw thereon. It is stipulated that the withdrawal and utilization of the funds were in the sole discretion of the committee. The committee functioned as an entity for the purpose planned and made awards accordingly over several years, taxpayer each year contributing to it the requisite funds. Petitioner had no part in the selection of the recipient of the prize award and in nowise used the committee as a shield to hide private donations. We are of the opinion that the Anisfield Award Committee was such an entity as entitles it to classification within the provisions of section 23 (o) (2) and that petitioner’s donation to it was deductible. See Fifth-Third Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 56 Fed. (2d) 767; Bok v. McCaughn, 42 Fed. (2d) 616.

Decision will he entered under Rule 50.

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40 B.T.A. 1232, 1939 BTA LEXIS 733, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wolf-v-commissioner-bta-1939.

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