Wolf Envelope Co. v. Commissioner

17 T.C. 471, 1951 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 71
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedSeptember 28, 1951
DocketDocket Nos. 25751, 25554, 25555, 25556, 25557, 25558, 25559, 25560
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 17 T.C. 471 (Wolf Envelope Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wolf Envelope Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 471, 1951 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 71 (tax 1951).

Opinion

OPINION.

Tietjens, Judge:

The principal issue concerns the tax effect of an exchange of securities of the Wolf Envelope Company carried out July 1, 1945. There were three types of exchanges, two of which are in controversy. The exchange of class B no par value common stock for new $10 par value common at 20 shares for one is not in question. The challenged exchanges were those in which 5 per cent debenture bonds of the 1945 issue were received. The holders of debenture shares of the 1940 issue exchanged them for debenture bonds of the 1945 issue of the same face amount, but containing terms and conditions substantially different. Also, the holders of class A common shares exchanged such shares for debenture bonds, receiving $175 in face amount of debenture bonds for each share of stock. Respondent contends that the exchanges in which security holders received debentures effected a distribution of earnings and profits accumulated by the Company. The deficiency notices stated that the exchanges resulted in a distribution by the corporation to its stockholders of property, taxable as a dividend, in amounts equal to the fair market value of the debenture bonds, in accordance with the provisions of section 115 (g) (1), Internal Revenue Code.1

Section 115 (g) (1) provides that where a corporation cancels or redeems its stock in such a manner as to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed shall be treated as a taxable dividend to the extent that it represents a distribution of accumulated earnings or profits. The respondent says that the Company accumulated profits from many years of successful operation until the major part of its financial structure consisted of undistributed earnings that had been capitalized and that the 1945 exchange effected a distribution reducing the Company’s assets by $234,625 and increasing by this amount the assets in the hands of the stockholders.

The petitioners contend that section 112 (b) (3) of the Code is controlling here. Such section provides:

No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corporation * * *

Under section 112 (g)* (2) (E) a “reorganization” is defined as including a “recapitalization.” The petitioners contend that the changes effected in 1945 in the capital structure of the Company constitute a recapitalization within the scope of this provision.

It is plain that stock and debenture shares of the corporation were exchanged for debenture bonds of the same corporation and that the exchange was pursuant to a plan adopted by the board of directors. There appears to be no reason to doubt that the debenture bonds were “securities” within the meaning of section 112 (b) (3). They were 20-year 5 per cent bonds. While the Company reserved the right after 1 year to redeem them in amounts of from two to five per cent annually of the total issued and to redeem all after 10 years on payment of a stipulated premium, long term bonds frequently contain similar provisions. Such provisions do not require treatment of the bonds as short term obligations and therefore not “securities.” Cf. L. & E. Stirn, Inc. v. Commissioner, 107 F. 2d 390, reversing 39 B. T. A. 143.

The term “recapitalization” is not defined in the statute. It has a broad meaning, and has been held to apply to exchanges involving debentures. Commissioner v. Neustadt's Trust, 131 F. 2d 528, affirming 43 B. T. A. 848. See also Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance Co., 12 T. C. 1057; Globe-News Publishing Co., 3 T. C. 1199. It has been said to refer to a “reshuffling of a capital structure within the framework of an existing corporation,” Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corporation, 315 U. S. 829. The exchanges here involved accomplished such a rearrangement of the capital structure. This was a “recapitalization” and hence a “reorganization,” within the intent of section 112. See Edgar M. Doeherty, 47 B. T. A. 462, Clarence J. Schoo, 47 B. T. A. 459.

Respondent contends that the exchanges of debentures were without a genuine business purpose of the corporation, and relies on Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 737, and Adams v. Commissioner, (same citation). In the Bazley case, the taxpayer and his wife owned 999 of a corporation’s 1,000 shares of stock. Under a plan of reorganization they exchanged each share for five shares of new no-par-value stock and new debenture bonds, payable in 10 years but callable at any time. In the Adams case the taxpayer owned all but a few shares of a corporation’s stock, and, pursuant to a purported plan of reorganization exchanged each for one share of new no-par-value stock and one 6 per cent 20-year debenture bond. The capital account was reduced and the book surplus left intact. The Tax Court (4 T. C. 897 and 5 T. C. 351), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (155 F. 2d 237 and 246), and the Supreme Court concluded in both cases that the exchanges were not within the reorganization provisions of section 112, but represented a distribution of profits. The Supreme Court pointed out that a distribution of accumulated earnings obtains no immunity by being cast in the form of a reorganization, that nothing was accomplished by the exchanges that could not have been accomplished by an outright dividend of debentures, and that the provisions of section 112 do not apply unless the new arrangement has the characteristics of a reorganization which underlie the purpose of the Congress in postponing tax upon the securities distributed.

The instant case, unlike the Bazley and Adams cases, does not involve a corporation which was the alter ego of the taxpayer. No one stockholder here held a majority of the voting shares at any time.

There was a purpose accomplished by these exchanges. It was one which would not have been carried out by an outright dividend of debentures. The sequence of events and trend of interests which led to this transaction are shown in detail in the stipulated facts and are summarized in our stated findings.

The founders of the Company had developed an unusually profitable business. The stock was always closely held and, with only minor exceptions, remained in the possession of the families of the founders. When Affelder and Alan Littman entered the employ of the Company, the founders were enjoying the fruit of their investment and good business fortune. Affelder contributed some inventions and developments and served as superintendent of the Company. Alan Littman became sales manager. These two men succeeded in effecting an increase in the Company’s earnings. As a consequence they received employment contracts providing for a fixed salary and additional compensation to be measured by a percentage of the increases they were able to bring about in the profits. The “participation certificates” and the “B” stock issued later, in 1925, carried out this scheme of additional compensation. The “A” stock, replacing the former common, carried a fixed dividend representing the earnings level of the business prior to 1918. The “R” stock was to receive all further dividends.

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Wolf Envelope Co. v. Commissioner
17 T.C. 471 (U.S. Tax Court, 1951)

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Bluebook (online)
17 T.C. 471, 1951 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 71, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wolf-envelope-co-v-commissioner-tax-1951.