1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 W.N.M., No. 1:26-cv-01536-DJC-SCR 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER 14 WARDEN OF THE CALIFORNIA CITY 15 DETENTION FACILITY, 16 Respondent. 17 18 Petitioner W.N.M. has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and a Motion 19 for Temporary Restraining Order seeking release from immigration custody.1 On 20 March 9, 2026, the Court notified the parties that it intended to rule on the merits of 21 22 1 Petitioner also seeks to proceed using his initials. (ECF No. 1.) The Court grants Petitioner’s request to proceed under a pseudonym. “The normal presumption is that parties must use their real names.” 23 Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1) 24 (“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.”). However, it is common for courts to permit parties to proceed under a pseudonym “when anonymity is necessary to preserve 25 privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature[.]” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up and citations omitted) (holding “that a party may 26 preserve his or her anonymity in judicial proceedings in special circumstances when the party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing the 27 party’s identity”). The Court finds that good cause is met as the public’s interest in knowing Petitioner’s identity is outweighed by his need for anonymity in these immigration proceedings. Accordingly, 28 Petitioner’s request to proceed under a pseudonym is GRANTED. 1 the Petition. For the reasons discussed below, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 2 is GRANTED IN PART. 3 BACKGROUND 4 Petitioner W.N.M. is currently detained by immigration authorities at the 5 California City Detention Center. (Habeas Pet. (“Pet.”) (ECF No. 1) ¶¶ 1, 6.) He was 6 born in Kenya and entered the United States in 2007 pursuant to a two-year visitor’s 7 visa. (Id. 12, 23; TRO (ECF No. 10) at 5.) He has been married to a United States 8 citizen since 2012. (TRO at 5.) Petitioner submitted a Violence Against Women Act 9 claim on or about October 6, 2022. (Pet. at 19.) Petitioner has also applied for a 10 green card. (TRO at 5.) On several occasions, Petitioner was detained and released. 11 (TRO at 6.) On one such occasion in 2022, Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear 12 and released from ICE custody. (Opp’n (ECF No. 15) at Ex. 2.) He was re-detained on 13 May 11, 2025, following an arrest for criminal trespass. (TRO at 6.) He remains in ICE 14 detention at California City Detention Center. (See generally Pet.) 15 On February 23, 2026, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, a 16 motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), and a motion to appoint counsel 17 (ECF No. 3). Counsel was appointed for Petitioner on March 3, 2026. (ECF No. 8.) On 18 March 8, 2026, Petitioner filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (TRO (ECF 19 No. 12).) On March 9, 2026, the Court informed the parties that it intended to rule 20 directly on the Petition and set a briefing schedule. (ECF No. 12.) Briefing is now 21 complete. (MTD (ECF No. 12); Response (ECF No. 15).) 22 LEGAL STANDARD 23 The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 24 injunction are “substantially identical.” See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & 25 Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, 26 Plaintiff must show (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable 27 harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his 28 favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 1 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are ‘serious 2 questions going to the merits’ — a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the 3 merits — then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips 4 sharply in the plaintiff's favor,’ and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” All. for 5 the Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). 6 DISCUSSION 7 I. Administrative Exhaustion 8 The parties disagree whether Petitioner has administratively exhausted his 9 remedies under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Respondent contends that Petitioner is “a visa 10 overstay and not an applicant for admission” and thus subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), 11 and pursuant to that statute, he “failed to pursue his statutory remedies before the 12 agency” by requesting a bond hearing. (See generally MTD.) In turn, Petitioner 13 objects that he has a due process liberty interest warranting relief but alternatively 14 requests a stay to pursue administrative remedies under section 1226(a). (See Reply.) 15 Because the Court finds that Petitioner is likely to be successful on the merits of his 16 procedural due process claim as discussed below, the administrative exhaustion claim 17 is irrelevant. E.A.T.B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1323 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 18 2025) (observing “Petitioner does not claim to be entitled to a hearing consistent with 19 a particular statute: he argues that the Due Process Clause requires it”); Vargas v. 20 Jennings, No. 2-cv-5785-PJH, 2020 WL 5517277, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2020) 21 (noting respondents’ argument that lack of entitlement to a hearing does not bear on 22 whether a hearing is required for procedural due process). Respondent’s Motion to 23 Dismiss (ECF No. 14) is thus DENIED on this basis. 24 II. Procedural Due Process & Winter Factors 25 Petitioner is likely to be successful on the merits of his procedural due process 26 claim because the record demonstrates Petitioner has acquired a government-created 27 due process liberty interest. In connection with the Opposition, Respondent provided 28 Petitioner’s Form I-213, which is the “Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien.” (Ex. 2 1 (ECF 14)). There, the detainer narrative states that “[o]n 07/07/2022 [Petitioner] was 2 issued a [Notice to Appear] while in ICE custody following a local arrest.” (Id. at 3.) 3 The Court’s prior orders are dispositive on this procedural due process issue. 4 Individuals released from ICE custody have a protected interest in remaining out of 5 custody. See Lopez v. Lyons, No. 2:25-cv-03174-DJC-CSD, 2025 WL 3124116 (E.D. 6 Cal. Nov. 7, 2025); Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01543-DJC-SCR, 2025 WL 3248059 7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2025); Mariagua v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01744-DJC-CSK, 2025 WL 8 3551700 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025); Ortega v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-01663-DJC-CKD, 9 2025 WL 3511914 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025); Souza v. Robbins, No. 1:25-cv-01597-DJC- 10 JDP, 2025 WL 3263897 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2025).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 W.N.M., No. 1:26-cv-01536-DJC-SCR 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER 14 WARDEN OF THE CALIFORNIA CITY 15 DETENTION FACILITY, 16 Respondent. 17 18 Petitioner W.N.M. has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and a Motion 19 for Temporary Restraining Order seeking release from immigration custody.1 On 20 March 9, 2026, the Court notified the parties that it intended to rule on the merits of 21 22 1 Petitioner also seeks to proceed using his initials. (ECF No. 1.) The Court grants Petitioner’s request to proceed under a pseudonym. “The normal presumption is that parties must use their real names.” 23 Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1) 24 (“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.”). However, it is common for courts to permit parties to proceed under a pseudonym “when anonymity is necessary to preserve 25 privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature[.]” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up and citations omitted) (holding “that a party may 26 preserve his or her anonymity in judicial proceedings in special circumstances when the party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing the 27 party’s identity”). The Court finds that good cause is met as the public’s interest in knowing Petitioner’s identity is outweighed by his need for anonymity in these immigration proceedings. Accordingly, 28 Petitioner’s request to proceed under a pseudonym is GRANTED. 1 the Petition. For the reasons discussed below, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 2 is GRANTED IN PART. 3 BACKGROUND 4 Petitioner W.N.M. is currently detained by immigration authorities at the 5 California City Detention Center. (Habeas Pet. (“Pet.”) (ECF No. 1) ¶¶ 1, 6.) He was 6 born in Kenya and entered the United States in 2007 pursuant to a two-year visitor’s 7 visa. (Id. 12, 23; TRO (ECF No. 10) at 5.) He has been married to a United States 8 citizen since 2012. (TRO at 5.) Petitioner submitted a Violence Against Women Act 9 claim on or about October 6, 2022. (Pet. at 19.) Petitioner has also applied for a 10 green card. (TRO at 5.) On several occasions, Petitioner was detained and released. 11 (TRO at 6.) On one such occasion in 2022, Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear 12 and released from ICE custody. (Opp’n (ECF No. 15) at Ex. 2.) He was re-detained on 13 May 11, 2025, following an arrest for criminal trespass. (TRO at 6.) He remains in ICE 14 detention at California City Detention Center. (See generally Pet.) 15 On February 23, 2026, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, a 16 motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), and a motion to appoint counsel 17 (ECF No. 3). Counsel was appointed for Petitioner on March 3, 2026. (ECF No. 8.) On 18 March 8, 2026, Petitioner filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (TRO (ECF 19 No. 12).) On March 9, 2026, the Court informed the parties that it intended to rule 20 directly on the Petition and set a briefing schedule. (ECF No. 12.) Briefing is now 21 complete. (MTD (ECF No. 12); Response (ECF No. 15).) 22 LEGAL STANDARD 23 The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 24 injunction are “substantially identical.” See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & 25 Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, 26 Plaintiff must show (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable 27 harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his 28 favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 1 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are ‘serious 2 questions going to the merits’ — a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the 3 merits — then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips 4 sharply in the plaintiff's favor,’ and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” All. for 5 the Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). 6 DISCUSSION 7 I. Administrative Exhaustion 8 The parties disagree whether Petitioner has administratively exhausted his 9 remedies under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Respondent contends that Petitioner is “a visa 10 overstay and not an applicant for admission” and thus subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), 11 and pursuant to that statute, he “failed to pursue his statutory remedies before the 12 agency” by requesting a bond hearing. (See generally MTD.) In turn, Petitioner 13 objects that he has a due process liberty interest warranting relief but alternatively 14 requests a stay to pursue administrative remedies under section 1226(a). (See Reply.) 15 Because the Court finds that Petitioner is likely to be successful on the merits of his 16 procedural due process claim as discussed below, the administrative exhaustion claim 17 is irrelevant. E.A.T.B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1323 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 18 2025) (observing “Petitioner does not claim to be entitled to a hearing consistent with 19 a particular statute: he argues that the Due Process Clause requires it”); Vargas v. 20 Jennings, No. 2-cv-5785-PJH, 2020 WL 5517277, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2020) 21 (noting respondents’ argument that lack of entitlement to a hearing does not bear on 22 whether a hearing is required for procedural due process). Respondent’s Motion to 23 Dismiss (ECF No. 14) is thus DENIED on this basis. 24 II. Procedural Due Process & Winter Factors 25 Petitioner is likely to be successful on the merits of his procedural due process 26 claim because the record demonstrates Petitioner has acquired a government-created 27 due process liberty interest. In connection with the Opposition, Respondent provided 28 Petitioner’s Form I-213, which is the “Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien.” (Ex. 2 1 (ECF 14)). There, the detainer narrative states that “[o]n 07/07/2022 [Petitioner] was 2 issued a [Notice to Appear] while in ICE custody following a local arrest.” (Id. at 3.) 3 The Court’s prior orders are dispositive on this procedural due process issue. 4 Individuals released from ICE custody have a protected interest in remaining out of 5 custody. See Lopez v. Lyons, No. 2:25-cv-03174-DJC-CSD, 2025 WL 3124116 (E.D. 6 Cal. Nov. 7, 2025); Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01543-DJC-SCR, 2025 WL 3248059 7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2025); Mariagua v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01744-DJC-CSK, 2025 WL 8 3551700 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025); Ortega v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-01663-DJC-CKD, 9 2025 WL 3511914 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025); Souza v. Robbins, No. 1:25-cv-01597-DJC- 10 JDP, 2025 WL 3263897 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2025). For the reasons stated in those 11 cases, Petitioner has established that he has a likelihood of success on the merits. 12 Petitioner has a clear liberty interest in his continued release. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 13 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Applying the balancing test described in Mathews v. 14 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and for the reasons identified in the Court’s prior 15 orders, the Court finds that Petitioner has a substantial private interest in maintaining 16 his out-of-custody status, the risk of erroneous deprivation here is considerable, and 17 Respondents’ interest in detention is low as the effort and costs required to provide 18 Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal. 19 Petitioner has also established irreparable harm based on the deprivation of 20 constitutional rights via immigration detention. See Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 21 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 22 2017). The balance of the equities and public interest are merged as the Government 23 is the non-moving party, and these factors clearly weigh in Petitioner’s favor. See 24 Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1002; Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2023) (“The 25 government also cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable 26 sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” (internal citations and 27 quotation marks omitted)); Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 28 2025) (“[T]he public has a strong interest in upholding procedural protections against 1 unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of 2 immigration detention are staggering.”). 3 Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing 4 under the Due Process Clause. 5 III. Bond 6 “The court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order 7 only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay 8 the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully 9 enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). The Court has “discretion as to the 10 amount of security required, if any,” and it “may dispense with the filing of a bond 11 when it concludes there is no realistic likelihood of harm to the defendant from 12 enjoining his or her conduct.” Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 13 2003). Because the “the [Government] cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in 14 any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations,” 15 Zepeda v. U.S. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983), the Court finds that no security 16 is required here. 17 IV. Type of Bond Hearing and Burden of Proof 18 The Court next determines whether a pre- or post-deprivation bond hearing is 19 warranted. The Form I-213 record reflects that, following Petitioner’s 2022 release 20 from ICE custody into the community, he was arrested for driving under the influence 21 in November 2024, convicted of driving under the influence in February 2025 and 22 sentenced to 90 days’ confinement, and, in April 2025, arrested by local law 23 enforcement for criminal trespass and failure to pay a fine. (Ex. 2 at 4; TRO at 6.) 24 While the Supreme Court has held that “the Constitution requires some kind of 25 hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property,” Zinermon v. Burch, 26 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (emphasis in original), the Court also recognized that there 27 may be some situations that urgently require arrest, in which a prompt post- 28 deprivation hearing is appropriate. Id. at 128; see also Carballo v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1 | 2381464, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025) (ordering timely post-deprivation bond 2 | hearing). While Petitioner styles these violations as mere “infractions,” (TRO at 6), they 3 | provide a cognizable basis for detention. 4 The burden of proof shall also be on the Government. The Government 5 | released Petitioner from ICE custody in 2022, which reflected a determination by the 6 | government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk. Since 7 | the Government initiated re-detention in this case, “it follows that the [G]overnment 8 | should be required to bear the burden of providing a justification for the re- 9 | detention.” J.E.H.G. v. Chestnut, 2025 WL 3523108, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025). 10 CONCLUSION 11 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 12 1. Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED 13 | IN PART as to his procedural due process claim. 14 2. Respondent is ordered to provide Petitioner with a constitutionally 15 | adequate bond hearing before an Immigration Judge within five (5) days of this 16 | ORDER. The Government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and 17 | convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or risk of flight, 18 | and Petitioner shall be allowed to have counsel present. 19 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and enter judgment 20 | for Petitioner. This Order resolves all pending motions. 21 99 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 | Dated: _March 20, 2026 Donel J bnetto Hon. Daniel alabretta 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28