OPINION
MATTHEWS, Justice.
We decided Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors and Industrial Indemnity Co., 651 P.2d 1163 (Alaska 1982), in favor of Bignell1 and issued an order concerning costs and attorney’s fees on appeal which stated:
The appellant may apply to the Superior Court for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to AS 23.30.145(c) after attorney’s fees have been set by the Board [972]*972under AS 23.30.145(a) and (b). In deciding the question of fees under AS 23.30.-145(c), the Superior Court should consider the nature, length and complexity of the services performed on appeal in both the Superior Court and the Supreme Court. In addition, the Superior Court should consider the fee which the Board has awarded. See Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352, 366 (Alaska 1979).
After the Board awarded Bignell attorney’s fees under AS 23.30.145(a) and (b), Bignell applied to the superior court for attorney’s fees for appellate proceedings, in accordance with this order.2 Bignell requested attorney’s fees of $24,520, an award which Bignell calculated as twice that which his attorneys would have received had they been working on an hourly fee basis. The trial court awarded the amount requested, noting that it was convinced that Bignell’s counsel spent substantially more time on appeal than the 147 hours they had estimated; that the benefits resulting from their services were of a high degree; and that their compensation was contingent upon success on appeal, an unlikely event once compensation had been denied at the superior court level.3
The appellants challenge the award as manifestly unreasonable, and thus an abuse of discretion, for three reasons.
I.
Appellants’ first contention is that a fee which is computed by multiplying an attorney’s hourly rate times the time expended — the hourly fee — “must be deemed the outer limit of the ‘full fee’ to which a claimant’s counsel is entitled on appeal in a workers’ compensation proceeding.” [At.Br. 7-8] The term “full fee” referred to by appellants is taken from the following language in Providence Washington Insurance Company v. Bonner, 680 P.2d 96, 100 (Alaska 1984):
We have previously taken the position that attorney’s fees on an appeal in a worker’s compensation case should be a reasonable fee, i.e., a full fee for the reasonable time and expense of litigating the case on appeal adjusted, if necessary, to reflect the statutory attorney’s fee award from the Board. See Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).
We used the term “full fee” in Bonner to distinguish the standard for attorney’s fees in workers’ compensation cases from that [973]*973in ordinary civil litigation under Civil Rule 82. In workers’ compensation cases the objective is to make attorney fee awards both fully compensatory and reasonable so that competent counsel will be available to furnish legal services to injured workers. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352, 365-66 (Alaska 1979). By contrast, the purpose of Civil Rule 82 is to afford reasonable partial compensation for attorney’s fees to the winning civil litigant. Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 512 P.2d 575, 588 (Alaska 1973); Irving v. Bullock, 549 P.2d 1184, 1190 (Alaska 1976).
We did not say in Bonner that a “full fee” should be equated with an hourly fee, although there may be grounds for drawing such an inference from the “reasonable time and expense” language which follows the term “full fee.” In light of the foregoing we take this occasion to clarify this aspect of Bonner. In Bonner we held only that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a full fee. The hourly fee method was used by the claimant and the trial court to compute a reasonable fully compensatory fee. There was no question as to whether other methods might also have been used, and we did not hold that only an hourly fee could be a reasonable fully compensatory fee.4
Such a holding would have been at variance with our decision in Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979). There we held that attorney’s fees for successful claimants’ counsel on appeal should be based on “the same factors that the Workmen’s Compensation Board considers when it grants attorney’s fees for non-controverted claims: ‘the nature, length and complexity of the services performed, transportation charges, and the benefits resulting from the services to the compensation beneficiaries.’ ” Id. at 366, quoting AS 23.30.145(a). We noted that under AS 23.-30.145 “high awards for successful claims may be necessary for an adequate overall rate of compensation, when counsel’s work on unsuccessful claims is considered.” Id. Thus, full compensation is not necessarily limited to an award of an hourly fee.
II.
Appellants next contend that the court’s conclusion that Bignell’s counsel spent substantially in excess of 147 hours representing Bignell on appeal is unsupported in the record. Appellants argue that “the superior court apparently rejected Bignell’s argument that the court should impose a multiplication factor” and that the superior court implicitly found “that counsel spent twice the number of hours identified in his affidavit.” [At.Br. 13]
While the superior court did not specifically use a multiplication factor, it did say that it was relying on the contingency of Bignell’s counsel’s compensation and the likelihood of success after being denied compensation at the superior court level as factors justifying the award. There is no implication that the court found that counsel spent twice the number of hours claimed.
The court’s conviction that counsel spent substantially in excess of 147 hours is consistent with counsel’s affidavit which points out that the 147 hours, first, is an estimate; second, is an estimate of the minimum time spent preparing and presenting briefs and oral argument; and third, does not include time spent preparing pleadings other than briefs and oral argument. In an attachment to counsel’s affidavit, a list of such other pleadings was included [R. 142-149] which presents a compelling picture of extensive activity. Thus, based on the record presented, the [974]*974superior court was justified in its conviction that more than 147 hours was expended by Bignell’s counsel on appeal.
III.
Appellants’ third contention is that the court should not have considered the contingency factor or the likelihood of success in determining a fee.
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OPINION
MATTHEWS, Justice.
We decided Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors and Industrial Indemnity Co., 651 P.2d 1163 (Alaska 1982), in favor of Bignell1 and issued an order concerning costs and attorney’s fees on appeal which stated:
The appellant may apply to the Superior Court for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to AS 23.30.145(c) after attorney’s fees have been set by the Board [972]*972under AS 23.30.145(a) and (b). In deciding the question of fees under AS 23.30.-145(c), the Superior Court should consider the nature, length and complexity of the services performed on appeal in both the Superior Court and the Supreme Court. In addition, the Superior Court should consider the fee which the Board has awarded. See Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352, 366 (Alaska 1979).
After the Board awarded Bignell attorney’s fees under AS 23.30.145(a) and (b), Bignell applied to the superior court for attorney’s fees for appellate proceedings, in accordance with this order.2 Bignell requested attorney’s fees of $24,520, an award which Bignell calculated as twice that which his attorneys would have received had they been working on an hourly fee basis. The trial court awarded the amount requested, noting that it was convinced that Bignell’s counsel spent substantially more time on appeal than the 147 hours they had estimated; that the benefits resulting from their services were of a high degree; and that their compensation was contingent upon success on appeal, an unlikely event once compensation had been denied at the superior court level.3
The appellants challenge the award as manifestly unreasonable, and thus an abuse of discretion, for three reasons.
I.
Appellants’ first contention is that a fee which is computed by multiplying an attorney’s hourly rate times the time expended — the hourly fee — “must be deemed the outer limit of the ‘full fee’ to which a claimant’s counsel is entitled on appeal in a workers’ compensation proceeding.” [At.Br. 7-8] The term “full fee” referred to by appellants is taken from the following language in Providence Washington Insurance Company v. Bonner, 680 P.2d 96, 100 (Alaska 1984):
We have previously taken the position that attorney’s fees on an appeal in a worker’s compensation case should be a reasonable fee, i.e., a full fee for the reasonable time and expense of litigating the case on appeal adjusted, if necessary, to reflect the statutory attorney’s fee award from the Board. See Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).
We used the term “full fee” in Bonner to distinguish the standard for attorney’s fees in workers’ compensation cases from that [973]*973in ordinary civil litigation under Civil Rule 82. In workers’ compensation cases the objective is to make attorney fee awards both fully compensatory and reasonable so that competent counsel will be available to furnish legal services to injured workers. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352, 365-66 (Alaska 1979). By contrast, the purpose of Civil Rule 82 is to afford reasonable partial compensation for attorney’s fees to the winning civil litigant. Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 512 P.2d 575, 588 (Alaska 1973); Irving v. Bullock, 549 P.2d 1184, 1190 (Alaska 1976).
We did not say in Bonner that a “full fee” should be equated with an hourly fee, although there may be grounds for drawing such an inference from the “reasonable time and expense” language which follows the term “full fee.” In light of the foregoing we take this occasion to clarify this aspect of Bonner. In Bonner we held only that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a full fee. The hourly fee method was used by the claimant and the trial court to compute a reasonable fully compensatory fee. There was no question as to whether other methods might also have been used, and we did not hold that only an hourly fee could be a reasonable fully compensatory fee.4
Such a holding would have been at variance with our decision in Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979). There we held that attorney’s fees for successful claimants’ counsel on appeal should be based on “the same factors that the Workmen’s Compensation Board considers when it grants attorney’s fees for non-controverted claims: ‘the nature, length and complexity of the services performed, transportation charges, and the benefits resulting from the services to the compensation beneficiaries.’ ” Id. at 366, quoting AS 23.30.145(a). We noted that under AS 23.-30.145 “high awards for successful claims may be necessary for an adequate overall rate of compensation, when counsel’s work on unsuccessful claims is considered.” Id. Thus, full compensation is not necessarily limited to an award of an hourly fee.
II.
Appellants next contend that the court’s conclusion that Bignell’s counsel spent substantially in excess of 147 hours representing Bignell on appeal is unsupported in the record. Appellants argue that “the superior court apparently rejected Bignell’s argument that the court should impose a multiplication factor” and that the superior court implicitly found “that counsel spent twice the number of hours identified in his affidavit.” [At.Br. 13]
While the superior court did not specifically use a multiplication factor, it did say that it was relying on the contingency of Bignell’s counsel’s compensation and the likelihood of success after being denied compensation at the superior court level as factors justifying the award. There is no implication that the court found that counsel spent twice the number of hours claimed.
The court’s conviction that counsel spent substantially in excess of 147 hours is consistent with counsel’s affidavit which points out that the 147 hours, first, is an estimate; second, is an estimate of the minimum time spent preparing and presenting briefs and oral argument; and third, does not include time spent preparing pleadings other than briefs and oral argument. In an attachment to counsel’s affidavit, a list of such other pleadings was included [R. 142-149] which presents a compelling picture of extensive activity. Thus, based on the record presented, the [974]*974superior court was justified in its conviction that more than 147 hours was expended by Bignell’s counsel on appeal.
III.
Appellants’ third contention is that the court should not have considered the contingency factor or the likelihood of success in determining a fee. Appellants argue first that “an attorney representing a worker’s compensation claimant is entitled to a full fee without reference to success.” [At.Br. 15] They cite M-B Contracting Co. v. Davis, 399 P.2d 433 (Alaska 1965). That case does permit an award of attorney’s fees to an unsuccessful claimant in the discretion of the court. However, in practice such awards are almost never made. As we noted in Alaska Interstate v. Houston, 586 P.2d 618, 621 (Alaska 1978), “If the claim is lost the attorney is ordinarily unpaid.”5
Appellants also argue that contingency is not an appropriate factor for consideration because attorney’s fees are governed by statute and the relevant statute, AS 23.30.-145,6 as interpreted in Arant, does not permit considerations of contingency. As we have observed, supra Section I, Arant acknowledged that “high awards for successful claims may be necessary for an adequate overall rate of compensation when counsel’s work on unsuccessful claims is considered.” 592 P.2d at 366. This is recognition of the legitimacy of considering the contingency of compensation in determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee award.
Further, we have interpreted AS 23.30.-145(c) as calling for an award of reasonable compensation. Rose v. Alaskan Village, Inc., 412 P.2d 503, 509 (Alaska 1966). The Alaska Code of Professional Responsibility in DR 2-106(B) sets forth the factors to be considered in determining a reasonable fee. The contingency of counsel’s compensation is one of them.7 We see no reason to [975]*975exclude that factor from the reasonableness determination to be made in worker’s compensation cases.
In this case, as in many worker’s compensation cases, the only fee arrangement between the claimant and counsel is that counsel will be paid whatever fee is approved by the board or the court, and payment of any fee is contingent upon success.8 A contingency arrangement is ordinarily necessary because most injured claimants lack the financial resources to pay an attorney an hourly fee. If an attorney who represents claimants makes nothing on his unsuccessful cases and no more than a normal hourly fee in his successful cases, he is in a poor business. He would be better off moving to the defense side of the compensation hearing room where attorneys receive an hourly fee, win or lose, or pursuing any of the other various law practice areas where a steady hourly fee is available. As we have noted, the objective of awarding attorney’s fees in compensation cases is to ensure that competent counsel are available to represent injured workers. Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d at 365-66. This objective would not be furthered by a system in which claimants’ counsel could receive nothing more than an hourly fee when they win while receiving nothing at all when they lose.9
In conclusion, we find that none of the three reasons offered by appellants to challenge the award of attorney’s fees has merit. In our view, the court’s award of $24,-520 to Bignell’s counsel was not an abuse of discretion in light of the time spent by counsel, the complexity and novelty of this case,10 the benefit which resulted to Big-nell,11 and the contingent nature of counsel’s right to compensation.
On cross-appeal, Bignell claims that the superior court erred in refusing to award interest on the fee awarded which would reflect the three year delay occurring between the completion of the work and the court’s order. We have never required the addition of pre-judgment interest to an award of attorney’s fees. That is not to say that the fact of a long delay in receiving compensation might not be relevant in determining what amount to award. However, the fee awarded in the present case appears reasonable in light of the purpose of attorney’s fees in workers’ compensation cases even though the fact of delay was not taken into account. Thus, we do not believe that the court abused its discretion in refusing to award interest. The judgment is AFFIRMED.