Wirtz v. Compania de Servicios Electricos, S.A.

304 F. Supp. 697
CourtDistrict Court, Canal Zone
DecidedJuly 10, 1967
DocketCiv. A. No. 5536
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 304 F. Supp. 697 (Wirtz v. Compania de Servicios Electricos, S.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, Canal Zone primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wirtz v. Compania de Servicios Electricos, S.A., 304 F. Supp. 697 (canalzoned 1967).

Opinion

CROWE, District Judge.

This cause having come on to be heard pursuant to the order to show cause issued by this Court, petitioner being represented by Morton J. Marks and Felix V. De Jesus and respondents by Woodrow De Castro, and the Court having examined the Petition for prosecution of respondents, Compañía de Servicios Eléctricos, S. A. and P. W. Baumgardner, individually and as President and Manager of Compañía de Servicios Eléctricos, S. A., for civil contempt of Court and to enlarge and expand the Judgment of this Court entered on July 9, 1963, the answer of respondents thereto, arguments and statements of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, does hereby now make and enter, pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff-Petitioner, W. Willard Wirtz, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, is and at all times hereinafter mentioned was the duly appointed Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, charged with the duties, responsibilities and authority vested in him by the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (52 Stat. 1060, as amended; 29 U.S.C. 201 [698]*698et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act.

2. Respondent, Compañía de Servicios Eléctricos, S. A., hereinafter referred to as respondent corporation, is and at all times hereinafter mentioned was a corporation organized under the laws of the Republic of Panama, and having a place of business and engaging in business in the Panama Canal Zone, within the jurisdiction of this Court.

3. a. Respondent, P. W. Baumgardner, hereinafter referred to as respondent-individual, is and at all times hereinafter mentioned was an individual of legal age residing in the Republic of Panama.

b. Respondent-individual is and at all times hereinafter mentioned was the President and Manager and principal stockholder of respondent corporation.

c. Respondent-individual, as President and Manager of respondent corporation, is and at all times hereinafter mentioned was in charge, and directed the operations and activities, of respondent corporation in the Panama Canal Zone, within the jurisdiction of this Court.

d. Respondent-individual, as President and Manager of respondent corporation’s operations and activities in the Panama Canal Zone, established, directed and formulated the employment practices and policies of respondent corporation in the Panama Canal Zone, and supervised and directed all activities of respondent corporation’s employees in the said Panama Canal Zone.

4. On April 11, 1963, pursuant to the authority vested in him by the Act, W. -Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, instituted in this Court a civil action to enjoin and restrain respondents from violating certain provisions of the Act, styled W. Willard Wirtz v. Compañía de Servicios Eléctricos, S. A. and P. W. Baumgardner, Individually and as President and Manager of Compañía de Servicios Eléctricos, S. A., being Civil Action No. 5536 in the files of this Court. 5. Thereafter, On July 9, 1963, this Court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in the civil action referred to in paragraph 4 hereof, permanently enjoining and restraining respondent corporation, respondent-individual, their agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all persons acting or claiming to act in their behalf and interest, from violating the provisions of Section 15(a) (2) of the Act, as follows:

1. The defendants shall not, contrary to Section 6 of the Act, pay any of their employees who are engaged in commerce, as defined in the Act, wages at less than the minimum applicable under the Act.
2. The defendants shall not, contrary to Section 7 of the Act, employ any of their employees engaged in commerce, as defined in the Act, for a workweek longer than forty (40) hours, unless the employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of forty (40) hours at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
3. The defendants shall not continue withholding from their employees the amount of $13,369.53. The provisions of this order shall be deemed satisfied when the defendants deliver to the plaintiffs a certified check or checks in the total amount of $13.369.-53 in accordance with the administrative policies and procedures of the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall distribute the proceeds of the payment to the persons found by plaintiff or by his designated representatives, to be entitled to the payment of back wages, or to their estates if that is necessary, and any money not so paid within a reasonable time, because of inability to locate the proper persons or because of their refusal to accept it, shall be covered into the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts.

6. a. Respondent corporation and respondent-individual had full knowledge of the judgment referred to in paragraph 5 hereof and of its contents and terms, [699]*699copies of same having been served upon each of them.

b. Further, on January 23, 1964, this Court issued a writ of execution in the amount of $13,369.53, which was the amount specified in the judgment of this Court referred to in paragraph 5 hereof. Said writ of execution was duly served on respondents by the U. S.. Marshal and was returned on March 20, 1964, together with the sum of $10,887.88. The sum thus collected by the representative of the U. S. Marshal was applied as a partial satisfaction of the aforesaid execution.

c. On August 7, 1964, and continuing through December 10, 1964, alias writs of execution were issued in varying amounts representing the sums then remaining to be paid under the judgment referred to in paragraph 5 hereof. Each of the writs were duly served on respondents by representatives of the U. S. Marshal, returned to the Court together with any sums collected thereunder, and such sums, were applied as partial satisfaction of the judgment referred to in paragraph 5 hereof. Final payment of the sum provided in the aforesaid judgment was received by the representative of the Secretary of Labor on January 11, 1965.

d. During the period referred to in paragraph 6 hereof, respondent corporation and respondent-individual were each represented by counsel and were each fully advised by representatives of Court, the U. S. Attorney, and the Secretary of Labor, as to the content and terms of the judgment referred to in paragraph 5 hereof.

7. a. At all times since July 9, 1963, the date of entry of the judgment referred to in paragraph 5 hereof, respondent corporation and respondent-individual have continued to engage in the construction and reconstruction business within the Panama Canal Zone.

b.

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304 F. Supp. 697, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wirtz-v-compania-de-servicios-electricos-sa-canalzoned-1967.