Wirtz v. American Guild of Variety Artists

267 F. Supp. 527, 64 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2406, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7679
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 18, 1967
Docket66 Civ. 797
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 267 F. Supp. 527 (Wirtz v. American Guild of Variety Artists) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wirtz v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 267 F. Supp. 527, 64 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2406, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7679 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

Opinion

OPINION

MOTLEY, District Judge.

This action was commenced on March 18, 1966 by the Secretary of Labor to have this court set aside as invalid the June-September 1965 election of officers *530 and board members of a labor organization, the American Guild of Variety Artists (AGVA), and to direct a new election under the supervision of the Secretary in accordance with the provisions of Title IV of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) (29 U.S.C. §§ 481-488).

The Secretary’s complaint alleged that AGVA violated Section 401(c) of Title IV LMRDA (29 U.S.C. § 481(c)) in the conduct of the challenged election by: 1) discriminating in favor of certain candidates and against other candidates with respect to the use of lists of members of AGVA, and 2) failing to provide for timely distribution of campaign literature in response to candidates’ reasonable requests. The complaint further alleged that these violations may have affected the outcome of the election. LMRDA, Title IV, Section 402(c) (2) [29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (2)].

AGVA denied in its answer but subsequently admitted that it is a national labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce as defined by Section 3(i), (j) LMRDA (29 U.S.C. §§ 402(i), (j)) and, therefore, its elections are subject to the provisions of Title IV. 1

AGVA challenged the propriety of the exercise of jurisdiction by this court in three affirmative defenses in its answer relating to the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies. These defenses are, in essence, as follows: 1) the complaining members of the union failed and refused to produce proofs or witnesses in support of their case upon invoking their internal remedies, 2) two of the complaining members admitted on the January 17, 1966 hearing that they had no proof or witnesses to support their claims, 3) AGVA continued to investigate the 1965 election complaint, although the complaining members had appealed to the Secretary on January 19, 1966, and duly notified complainants that it had found no evidence to support any of their claims.

In its answer, AGVA also denied that probable cause existed for the Secretary to believe that violations of Title IV had occurred during the conduction of its 1965 election and challenged the sufficiency of the Secretary’s basis for finding probable cause.

Since this court cannot proceed to the merits of this controversy without its jurisdiction having been properly invoked by the Secretary, these needling jurisdictional considerations are disposed of first.

The Secretary’s authority and consequent power to invoke the jurisdiction of this court to achieve the objective of having AGVA’s 1965 election declared void and a new election directed to be held under his supervision is defined by Title IV, Section 402, LMRDA (29 U.S.C. § 482), Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 85 S.Ct. 292, 13 L.Ed.2d 190 (1964).

The first provision of this section, 402 (a), provides that a complaint may be filed with the Secretary by a member of *531 a union complaining of the conduct of an election as violative of Title IV. Such complaint may be filed with the Secretary within one calendar month after one of two occurrences: 1) after the complaining member “has exhausted the remedies available under the constitution and bylaws of such organization and of any parent body” or, 2) after the complainant “has invoked such available remedies without obtaining a final decision within three calendar months of their invocation”.

The second provision of this section, 402(b), requires the Secretary to investigate the aggrieved member’s complaint and, “if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation of this subchapter (Title IV) has occurred and has not been remedied,” he “shall” file suit seeking the relief described above within sixty days after the filing of such complaint.

This court finds that on September 11, 1965 the American Arbitration Association (AAA), which conducted the election for AGVA, concluded its count of the ballots. On October 4, 1965, within thirty days of such completed count, as required by AGVA’s constitution, three candidates for office and members in good standing, Don George, Margie Coate, and Frances Gaar, filed a written complaint with AGVA alleging several violations of Title IV. 2 Filing of this complaint was acknowledged by letter from the union’s National Administrative Secretary, Warren Bailey, on the same date on which it was filed.

The organization’s constitution required it to set a date for a hearing on this complaint within twenty days after October 4, 1966, the date of filing. This was not done.

Under AGVA’s constitution, such hearing could have been held before the National Board, the National Executive Committee or a Trial Board, consisting of not less than three National Board members or other members appointed by the National Executive Committee. 3

At the October 12, 1965 meeting of the National Board, the first meeting after the election, at which the members’ complaint was before it, Warren Bailey was discharged and Richard Jones employed by the newly elected officers as National Administrative Secretary.

Subsequently, Mr. Jones, by letter dated December 3, 1965, advised Mr. George that the National Executive Committee had set a hearing on his complaint for December 13, 1965. This letter was not received by Mr. George until December 6, 1965. The union’s constitution requires ten days written notice of such hearing. 4 On December 7, 1965, Mr. George, by letter, requested a postponement. He later explained in his complaint to the Secretary that December 13 was a date on which all complainants were scheduled to appear in Saranac Lake, New York, and AGVA was aware of this.

It was not until December 22, 1965 that Mr. Jones acknowledged receipt of Mr. George’s letter of the 7th. On this date, AGVA scheduled a new hearing before its National Executive Committee for January 17, 1966. Ninety days from the filing of Mr. George’s complaint without final decision would expire on January 4,1966. AGVA’s letter to Mr. George setting this late hearing date indicates that AGVA was aware of this time element when it wrote its December 22, 1965 letter. In that letter Mr. Jones reminded Mr. George that the union was ready to proceed on December 13, 1965 and that it was he, Mr. George, who caused a postponement. But the facts are that the union had not set a hearing date within 20 days of receipt of Mr. George’s complaint as required by its constitution.

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Bluebook (online)
267 F. Supp. 527, 64 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2406, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7679, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wirtz-v-american-guild-of-variety-artists-nysd-1967.