Winters v. Smalls

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 19, 2019
Docket1:19-cv-07272
StatusUnknown

This text of Winters v. Smalls (Winters v. Smalls) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Winters v. Smalls, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JASON WINTERS, Plaintiff, -against- 1:19-CV-7272 (CM) K. SMALLS, Warden of AMKC ; CAPT. ORDER TO AMEND BARNABY; CAPTAIN STOKES; DEP. COOK; C.O. GUAMAN, Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at the George R. Vierno Center on Rikers Island, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. By order dated August 5, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,”

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). BACKGROUND The events giving rise to this action occurred “sometime after midnight” on March 9, 2019, at the Anna M. Kross Center, “Dorm 4 top.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ V.) While Plaintiff was sleeping,

an “unknown detainee” attacked him with a “blunt object.” Thereafter, Plaintiff received 30 stitches, and his “blood clotted eye” was painful and swollen. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Guaman was asleep at “post B,” and that he, Cook and, Barnaby “behaved within dereliction of professional performance.”(Id. at 16.) Plaintiff further notes that Defendants did not take photographs of his injury, or allow Plaintiff to “pursue formal charges” against the attacker, or impose any disciplinary infraction on that individual. (Id.) Plaintiff also states without elaboration that there was “no med follow up engaged.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks $100,000 in damages. DISCUSSION Plaintiff does not indicate whether, at the time of the incident, he was a post-conviction prisoner or a pretrial detainee, and it is therefore unclear whether his claims arise under the

Eighth or the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court therefore analyzes Plaintiff’s claims under both frameworks. The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to take reasonable measures to ensure the safety of convicted prisoners, including protecting them against violence by other inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The failure to protect a prisoner constitutes cruel and unusual punishment when prison officials exhibit “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate. Id. at 828; Morales v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr., 842 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1988). To be liable for violating a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights, prison officials must be subjectively aware of an excessive risk to inmate health or safety and disregard it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Deliberate indifference requires more than negligence, but less than conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm.”). “A pretrial detainee’s claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement are governed

by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). A pretrial detainee may prevail in a claim for deliberate indifference even when a state actor merely should have known of the serious risk, an objective standard. Id. at 35 (holding that a pretrial detainee must plead that the defendant “acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant- official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety”); Taylor v. City of New York, No. 16-CV-7857 (NRB), 2018 WL 1737626, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018) (“Although Darnell involved a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a

prisoner’s conditions of confinement, its holding applies with equal measure to failure to protect claims.”). To state a § 1983 claim for inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that correction officials were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s serious medical condition. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976); Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 69-72 (2d Cir. 2009).2

2 A claim that an officer was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s medical needs requires the same two-pronged showing as a claim that an officer was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s physical conditions of confinement. See Darnell, 849 F.3d at 33 n.9 (noting that Moreover, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendants’ direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995)). A defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff’s rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676

(2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”).

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Colon v. Coughlin
58 F.3d 865 (Second Circuit, 1995)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Grullon v. City of New Haven
720 F.3d 133 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Caiozzo v. Koreman
581 F.3d 63 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Darnell v. City of New York
849 F.3d 17 (Second Circuit, 2017)
Hathaway v. Coughlin
37 F.3d 63 (Second Circuit, 1994)

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Bluebook (online)
Winters v. Smalls, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/winters-v-smalls-nysd-2019.