NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0192n.06
No. 23-5780 FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 01, 2024 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
WINSTON MERRELL, individually, and as next ) ) of kin of Cameron Dwight Merrell, deceased, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ROANE COUNTY GOVERNMENT, ) TENNESSEE Defendant, ) ) CITY OF HARRIMAN, TENNESSEE, et al., ) OPINION ) Defendants - Appellees. )
Before: GIBBONS, BUSH, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Cameron Dwight Merrell died of acute methamphetamine
toxicity after the police, responding to a call about a man in distress, transported him first to jail
and then to the hospital. Merrell’s father, Winston Merrell, brought federal- and state-law claims
individually and as Merrell’s next of kin against the City of Harriman, Tennessee (City) and several
John Doe defendants. The district court judge dismissed all claims against defendants, finding that
Merrell’s father lacked standing to sue on behalf of his son. We affirm.
I.
On August 24, 2020, employees at a gas station in Harriman called 911 to report a man in
distress from a drug overdose. Two city police officers arrived on the scene, observed Merrell
sitting on the ground and struggling to speak, and apprehended him within minutes. Body cameras
captured this encounter. After a police supervisor arrived on scene, Merrell was transported to the No. 23-5780, Merrell v. City of Harriman Tenn., et al.
Roane County jail. Shortly after the officers brought Merrell to the jail, he was transferred to the
hospital where he was pronounced dead of acute methamphetamine toxicity. Merrell died
intestate; he is survived by his wife, Amy Nicole Merrell, and their three children. Merrell’s father
maintains that his son and daughter-in-law were separated and no longer in contact at the time of
his son’s death.
Merrell’s father filed suit individually and as Merrell’s next of kin, purportedly under Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 20-5-106 and 20-5-107. He alleged that the City violated Merrell’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights because the officers failed to promptly seek medical care for Merrell while he
was in their custody. He also asserted two state-law claims for wrongful death and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that Merrell
lacked standing to bring any of the claims. The district court agreed, finding that Merrell’s father
lacked the capacity to sue under Tennessee’s survival statutes because his daughter-in-law and her
children had not waived their rights to bring the claims, and Merrell had not named his father as
his personal representative. Consequently, the district court held that Merrell lacked standing to
bring both his federal claim and state claims. Merrell’s father timely appealed.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Taylor v. City of
Saginaw, 11 F.4th 483, 486 (6th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and he is “entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “We consider all facts and inferences drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Taylor, 11 F.4th at 486–87 (quoting City of Wyandotte
v. Consol. Rail Corp., 262 F.3d 581, 585 (6th Cir. 2001)).
-2- No. 23-5780, Merrell v. City of Harriman Tenn., et al.
III.
A. Federal-Claim Standing
Whether Merrell’s father has standing to bring his federal claim and state claims are
separate analyses. We must first address whether he has federal standing to bring a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Davis v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty. Dist., 899 F.3d 437, 443 (6th Cir. 2018).
Article III of the United States Constitution limits federal courts to hearing actual cases or
controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. To invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a litigant
must have standing. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Logitrans, Inc., 297 F.3d 528, 531 (6th Cir. 2002). This
means that a plaintiff must (1) “have suffered an injury in fact,” (2) “demonstrate causation,” and
(3) “prove that it is likely, rather than merely speculative, that a favorable decision could redress
the injury.” Miller v. City of Wickliffe, 852 F.3d 497, 502–03 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted);
see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Merrell’s father therefore
must prove that he has the requisite standing to bring an action on behalf of Merrell’s estate.
“[A §] 1983 cause of action is entirely personal to the direct victim of the alleged
constitutional tort. Accordingly, only the purported victim, or his estate’s representative(s), may
prosecute a [§] 1983 claim.” Chambers v. Sanders, 63 F.4th 1092, 1100 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2000)). Because federal law does not cover
“the survival of civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the [plaintiff’s] death,” under § 1988 “the
law of the forum is the principal reference point in determining survival of civil rights actions,”
unless the state law is “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589–90 (1978) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 241 (6th Cir. 1984).
-3- No. 23-5780, Merrell v. City of Harriman Tenn., et al.
Under Tennessee law, the right of action for a wrongful death claim “pass[es] to the
person’s surviving spouse and, in case there is no surviving spouse, to the person’s children or
next of kin.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106(a). Because the Tennessee laws allow Merrell’s wife
or children to sue in his place, they are not “hostile to promoting deterrence, protection, and
vindication against § 1983 civil rights infringements” and can be applied to any federal civil rights
action. Jaco, 739 F.2d at 245. The “action may be instituted by the personal representative of
the deceased or by the surviving spouse in the surviving spouse’s own name, or, if there be no
surviving spouse, by the children of the deceased or by the next of kin.” Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 20-5-107(a). But a surviving spouse “has the prior and superior right above all others to bring a
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0192n.06
No. 23-5780 FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 01, 2024 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
WINSTON MERRELL, individually, and as next ) ) of kin of Cameron Dwight Merrell, deceased, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ROANE COUNTY GOVERNMENT, ) TENNESSEE Defendant, ) ) CITY OF HARRIMAN, TENNESSEE, et al., ) OPINION ) Defendants - Appellees. )
Before: GIBBONS, BUSH, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Cameron Dwight Merrell died of acute methamphetamine
toxicity after the police, responding to a call about a man in distress, transported him first to jail
and then to the hospital. Merrell’s father, Winston Merrell, brought federal- and state-law claims
individually and as Merrell’s next of kin against the City of Harriman, Tennessee (City) and several
John Doe defendants. The district court judge dismissed all claims against defendants, finding that
Merrell’s father lacked standing to sue on behalf of his son. We affirm.
I.
On August 24, 2020, employees at a gas station in Harriman called 911 to report a man in
distress from a drug overdose. Two city police officers arrived on the scene, observed Merrell
sitting on the ground and struggling to speak, and apprehended him within minutes. Body cameras
captured this encounter. After a police supervisor arrived on scene, Merrell was transported to the No. 23-5780, Merrell v. City of Harriman Tenn., et al.
Roane County jail. Shortly after the officers brought Merrell to the jail, he was transferred to the
hospital where he was pronounced dead of acute methamphetamine toxicity. Merrell died
intestate; he is survived by his wife, Amy Nicole Merrell, and their three children. Merrell’s father
maintains that his son and daughter-in-law were separated and no longer in contact at the time of
his son’s death.
Merrell’s father filed suit individually and as Merrell’s next of kin, purportedly under Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 20-5-106 and 20-5-107. He alleged that the City violated Merrell’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights because the officers failed to promptly seek medical care for Merrell while he
was in their custody. He also asserted two state-law claims for wrongful death and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that Merrell
lacked standing to bring any of the claims. The district court agreed, finding that Merrell’s father
lacked the capacity to sue under Tennessee’s survival statutes because his daughter-in-law and her
children had not waived their rights to bring the claims, and Merrell had not named his father as
his personal representative. Consequently, the district court held that Merrell lacked standing to
bring both his federal claim and state claims. Merrell’s father timely appealed.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Taylor v. City of
Saginaw, 11 F.4th 483, 486 (6th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and he is “entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “We consider all facts and inferences drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Taylor, 11 F.4th at 486–87 (quoting City of Wyandotte
v. Consol. Rail Corp., 262 F.3d 581, 585 (6th Cir. 2001)).
-2- No. 23-5780, Merrell v. City of Harriman Tenn., et al.
III.
A. Federal-Claim Standing
Whether Merrell’s father has standing to bring his federal claim and state claims are
separate analyses. We must first address whether he has federal standing to bring a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Davis v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty. Dist., 899 F.3d 437, 443 (6th Cir. 2018).
Article III of the United States Constitution limits federal courts to hearing actual cases or
controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. To invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a litigant
must have standing. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Logitrans, Inc., 297 F.3d 528, 531 (6th Cir. 2002). This
means that a plaintiff must (1) “have suffered an injury in fact,” (2) “demonstrate causation,” and
(3) “prove that it is likely, rather than merely speculative, that a favorable decision could redress
the injury.” Miller v. City of Wickliffe, 852 F.3d 497, 502–03 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted);
see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Merrell’s father therefore
must prove that he has the requisite standing to bring an action on behalf of Merrell’s estate.
“[A §] 1983 cause of action is entirely personal to the direct victim of the alleged
constitutional tort. Accordingly, only the purported victim, or his estate’s representative(s), may
prosecute a [§] 1983 claim.” Chambers v. Sanders, 63 F.4th 1092, 1100 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2000)). Because federal law does not cover
“the survival of civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the [plaintiff’s] death,” under § 1988 “the
law of the forum is the principal reference point in determining survival of civil rights actions,”
unless the state law is “inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589–90 (1978) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 241 (6th Cir. 1984).
-3- No. 23-5780, Merrell v. City of Harriman Tenn., et al.
Under Tennessee law, the right of action for a wrongful death claim “pass[es] to the
person’s surviving spouse and, in case there is no surviving spouse, to the person’s children or
next of kin.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106(a). Because the Tennessee laws allow Merrell’s wife
or children to sue in his place, they are not “hostile to promoting deterrence, protection, and
vindication against § 1983 civil rights infringements” and can be applied to any federal civil rights
action. Jaco, 739 F.2d at 245. The “action may be instituted by the personal representative of
the deceased or by the surviving spouse in the surviving spouse’s own name, or, if there be no
surviving spouse, by the children of the deceased or by the next of kin.” Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 20-5-107(a). But a surviving spouse “has the prior and superior right above all others to bring a
wrongful death action.” Foster v. Jeffers, 813 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (citing
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-5-106(a), 20-5-110).
A spouse can maintain control over the right of action by bringing the wrongful death
action herself, waiving the right to an administrator to bring the action, or by releasing the claim.
Id. at 453. A surviving spouse, “who knows that [she] has a right of action,” can also waive her
right over the action by “fail[ing] to maintain control over it either by effecting a compromise or
bringing the action to trial.” Id. That is what Merrell’s father argues his daughter-in-law did here.
Though acknowledging that she, then Merrell’s children, hold the superior right to sue on Merrell’s
behalf, Merrell’s father contends that his daughter-in-law waived her right by failing to bring
suit. But Merrell’s father provides no evidence that she knows of her right of action or waived
that right. In addition, he does not argue that the children––who would be next in line after their
mother––are aware of and have waived their potential rights of action, as well. Nor has Merrell’s
father ever pleaded that he was Merrell’s personal representative. Merrell’s father therefore lacks
standing under Tennessee law to bring a civil rights action on Merrell’s behalf.
-4- No. 23-5780, Merrell v. City of Harriman Tenn., et al.
B. State-Claim Standing
As a preliminary matter, we note that the district court was correct that it was not required
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims for wrongful death and intentional
infliction of emotional distress after it dismissed the federal claim. Orton v. Johnny’s Lunch
Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012). Regardless, Merrell’s father lacks standing to
bring his state-law claims for the same reason he lacks standing to bring his federal claim––under
Tennessee law, Merrell’s wife, then his children, have priority to bring those claims, and
Merrell’s father offers no evidence that they waived that right. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-5-106
and 20-5-107. In addition, he failed to allege in either state-law claim that the City’s actions caused
him any injury. Dismissal of these claims was therefore appropriate.
IV.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
-5-