[501]*501JOHNSON, Justice.
This is a personal injury action. The trial court denied a motion for summary judgment of the defendants on the ground that the so-called “fireman’s rule” does not exist in this state. We disagree and reverse and remand.
I.
THE UNUSUAL POSTURE OF THIS CASE AND OUR NARROW APPROACH IN THIS OPINION.
This appeal is before us in an unusual posture. The decision of the trial court that is on appeal is a denial of a motion for summary judgment. Ordinarily, this is not an appealable order. However, the trial court certified this case to us as an interlocutory appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 12(c)(2). We granted permission for these appeals under this rule. We took this unusual action because we viewed the question presented by the motion for summary judgment and the trial court’s decision as one of first impression that would be controlling in this case. We concluded that these appeals would advance the orderly resolution of the litigation. Cf. Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 665 P.2d 701 (1983).
Because of the unusual posture of the case, we are constrained to rule narrowly and address only the precise question that was framed by the motion and answered by the trial court. Upon remand there will be many new questions to be addressed by the parties and the trial court. We do not intend to imply by our decision today what the answers to those questions are, or what the result of the litigation will be. We intend only to answer the question framed by the motion and answered by the trial court.
II.
THE ONLY QUESTION PRESENTED HERE IS WHETHER THE FIREMAN’S RULE EXISTS IN THIS STATE.
The motion for summary judgment of the defendants was “made on the ground that plaintiff’s action is barred by the so-called ‘fireman’s rule,’ which provides that neither a fireman nor a policeman may recover in tort when his injuries are caused by the same conduct that required his official presence.” In ruling on this motion the trial court ruled “that the so-called ‘fireman’s rule’ is inoperative in the State of Idaho.” It is to this question only that we will address ourselves.
III.
THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND ACCEPTED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
In the decision of the trial court on the motion, the trial court set forth findings of fact. Findings of fact are not necessary in decisions on motions for summary judgment. I.R.C.P. 52(a). For the purposes of this opinion, we consider that the findings of fact contained in the trial court’s decision constituted the factual background accepted by the trial court in answering the question framed by the motion. We do not intend by reciting these facts to indicate that we approve them. We only restate them here as a basis for understanding the context in which the question presented here arose. The trial court made the following findings of fact:
FINDINGS OF FACT
On April 11, 1985, a truck contracted through defendant American Farmland, Inc., and driven by defendant Donald Frasher, stopped in Rupert, Idaho in route to Walla Walla, Washington, where they were to deliver a load of potato defoliant chemical which they were hauling. The chemical was manufactured by the various chemical company defendants herein and was packaged in containers provided by Van Leer Containers, Inc. The Frashers stopped at the Wayside Cafe in Rupert, Idaho, and Mr. Frasher proceeded to inspect the truck as was his custom. In so doing, he noticed that some of the chemical which he was [502]*502hauling had leaked into the back of the truck. He then proceeded, upon directions from his dispatcher, to a nearby carwash and washed the material out of the truck.
While at the carwash, and after having completed washing out the truck, Mr. Frasher was approached by Officer Stanley Clark, one of the plaintiffs herein. Officer Clark questioned Mr. Frasher as to the purpose for his presence at the carwash. Mr. Frasher then explained that a small amount of chemical had spilled in his truck and that he had washed it out. He showed Officer Clark a copy of the bill of lading which identified the substance as substituted nitrophenol pesticide liquid NOS FLAMABLE LIQUID (poison) UN2780 (dinitro 3-B).
Officer Clark then left the carwash and Mr. Frasher drove his truck back to the Wayside Cafe. Each of the above-named plaintiffs subsequently responded to the spill while on duty as paid public safety officers in the employ of Rupert City, Minidoka County, or the State of Idaho. The officers returned to the car-wash looking for Mr. Frasher and subsequently found him at the Wayside Cafe, whereupon they proceeded to secure the area in order to protect the public from the effects of the chemical spill.
The five consolidated cases for purposes of this Motion include eight plaintiffs. They are:
Stanley Clark: Police Officer, City of Rupert
Robert Conner: Patrolman, Idaho State Police
Jerald Ketterling: Deputy Sheriff, Minidoka County
Fred Rice: Patrolman, Idaho State Police
Kevin Winn: Patrolman, Idaho State Police
Timothy Hatcher: Sheriff’s Officer, Minidoka County
John Fisher: Lieutenant, Minidoka County Sheriff’s Office
Steven Hobbs: Officer, Rupert City Police
These officers then brought the various lawsuits referred to above against the defendants herein, for injuries which they allegedly suffered as a result of exposure to the chemical on April 11, 1985. Any such injuries arose in the course of and during the scope of the officers’ employment as paid public safety officials.
IV.
THE FIREMAN’S RULE EXISTS IN IDAHO.
The defendants have cited cases from several other states that have accepted the fireman’s rule. Apparently, Oregon is the only state that has recently considered the rule and has rejected it. Christensen v. Murphy, 296 Or. 610, 678 P.2d 1210 (1984). While we are not inclined to “nose count” how many other jurisdictions have accepted a particular rule of law as a means of deciding whether it will apply in this state, we are impressed that the great majority of states accept the rule. We note, however, little consistency from state to state in the basis for the acceptance of the rule. Some find the rationale for the rule in the treatment of firemen and policemen as licensees to whom landowners owe only the duty not to act wilfully or wantonly. Others have extended this form of the rule to off-premises situations. Still others have predicated their version of the rule on assumption of the risk, usually in the “primary sense,” i.e., that the party whose liability is alleged had no duty to the fireman. The more recent and persuasive cases treat the rule as being compelled by public policy. We find this last rationale to be the most appropriate for our consideration.
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[501]*501JOHNSON, Justice.
This is a personal injury action. The trial court denied a motion for summary judgment of the defendants on the ground that the so-called “fireman’s rule” does not exist in this state. We disagree and reverse and remand.
I.
THE UNUSUAL POSTURE OF THIS CASE AND OUR NARROW APPROACH IN THIS OPINION.
This appeal is before us in an unusual posture. The decision of the trial court that is on appeal is a denial of a motion for summary judgment. Ordinarily, this is not an appealable order. However, the trial court certified this case to us as an interlocutory appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 12(c)(2). We granted permission for these appeals under this rule. We took this unusual action because we viewed the question presented by the motion for summary judgment and the trial court’s decision as one of first impression that would be controlling in this case. We concluded that these appeals would advance the orderly resolution of the litigation. Cf. Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 665 P.2d 701 (1983).
Because of the unusual posture of the case, we are constrained to rule narrowly and address only the precise question that was framed by the motion and answered by the trial court. Upon remand there will be many new questions to be addressed by the parties and the trial court. We do not intend to imply by our decision today what the answers to those questions are, or what the result of the litigation will be. We intend only to answer the question framed by the motion and answered by the trial court.
II.
THE ONLY QUESTION PRESENTED HERE IS WHETHER THE FIREMAN’S RULE EXISTS IN THIS STATE.
The motion for summary judgment of the defendants was “made on the ground that plaintiff’s action is barred by the so-called ‘fireman’s rule,’ which provides that neither a fireman nor a policeman may recover in tort when his injuries are caused by the same conduct that required his official presence.” In ruling on this motion the trial court ruled “that the so-called ‘fireman’s rule’ is inoperative in the State of Idaho.” It is to this question only that we will address ourselves.
III.
THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND ACCEPTED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
In the decision of the trial court on the motion, the trial court set forth findings of fact. Findings of fact are not necessary in decisions on motions for summary judgment. I.R.C.P. 52(a). For the purposes of this opinion, we consider that the findings of fact contained in the trial court’s decision constituted the factual background accepted by the trial court in answering the question framed by the motion. We do not intend by reciting these facts to indicate that we approve them. We only restate them here as a basis for understanding the context in which the question presented here arose. The trial court made the following findings of fact:
FINDINGS OF FACT
On April 11, 1985, a truck contracted through defendant American Farmland, Inc., and driven by defendant Donald Frasher, stopped in Rupert, Idaho in route to Walla Walla, Washington, where they were to deliver a load of potato defoliant chemical which they were hauling. The chemical was manufactured by the various chemical company defendants herein and was packaged in containers provided by Van Leer Containers, Inc. The Frashers stopped at the Wayside Cafe in Rupert, Idaho, and Mr. Frasher proceeded to inspect the truck as was his custom. In so doing, he noticed that some of the chemical which he was [502]*502hauling had leaked into the back of the truck. He then proceeded, upon directions from his dispatcher, to a nearby carwash and washed the material out of the truck.
While at the carwash, and after having completed washing out the truck, Mr. Frasher was approached by Officer Stanley Clark, one of the plaintiffs herein. Officer Clark questioned Mr. Frasher as to the purpose for his presence at the carwash. Mr. Frasher then explained that a small amount of chemical had spilled in his truck and that he had washed it out. He showed Officer Clark a copy of the bill of lading which identified the substance as substituted nitrophenol pesticide liquid NOS FLAMABLE LIQUID (poison) UN2780 (dinitro 3-B).
Officer Clark then left the carwash and Mr. Frasher drove his truck back to the Wayside Cafe. Each of the above-named plaintiffs subsequently responded to the spill while on duty as paid public safety officers in the employ of Rupert City, Minidoka County, or the State of Idaho. The officers returned to the car-wash looking for Mr. Frasher and subsequently found him at the Wayside Cafe, whereupon they proceeded to secure the area in order to protect the public from the effects of the chemical spill.
The five consolidated cases for purposes of this Motion include eight plaintiffs. They are:
Stanley Clark: Police Officer, City of Rupert
Robert Conner: Patrolman, Idaho State Police
Jerald Ketterling: Deputy Sheriff, Minidoka County
Fred Rice: Patrolman, Idaho State Police
Kevin Winn: Patrolman, Idaho State Police
Timothy Hatcher: Sheriff’s Officer, Minidoka County
John Fisher: Lieutenant, Minidoka County Sheriff’s Office
Steven Hobbs: Officer, Rupert City Police
These officers then brought the various lawsuits referred to above against the defendants herein, for injuries which they allegedly suffered as a result of exposure to the chemical on April 11, 1985. Any such injuries arose in the course of and during the scope of the officers’ employment as paid public safety officials.
IV.
THE FIREMAN’S RULE EXISTS IN IDAHO.
The defendants have cited cases from several other states that have accepted the fireman’s rule. Apparently, Oregon is the only state that has recently considered the rule and has rejected it. Christensen v. Murphy, 296 Or. 610, 678 P.2d 1210 (1984). While we are not inclined to “nose count” how many other jurisdictions have accepted a particular rule of law as a means of deciding whether it will apply in this state, we are impressed that the great majority of states accept the rule. We note, however, little consistency from state to state in the basis for the acceptance of the rule. Some find the rationale for the rule in the treatment of firemen and policemen as licensees to whom landowners owe only the duty not to act wilfully or wantonly. Others have extended this form of the rule to off-premises situations. Still others have predicated their version of the rule on assumption of the risk, usually in the “primary sense,” i.e., that the party whose liability is alleged had no duty to the fireman. The more recent and persuasive cases treat the rule as being compelled by public policy. We find this last rationale to be the most appropriate for our consideration.
We note with interest that almost 60 years ago this Court handed down a decision concerning the duty of a landowner to a policeman who came on the landowner’s land in the performance of the policeman’s duty and was injured because of the condition of the land. Pincock v. McCoy, 48 Idaho 227, 281 P. 371 (1929). We find this case to be of no real assistance to us in deciding the question presented here. Pin-[503]*503cock deals only with the duty to a licensee and not with the broader issue which the fireman’s rule addresses. Because of the narrow focus of this opinion, we decline to address the current vitality of the rule stated in Pincock.
Defendants have suggested that we use assumption of the risk in the “primary sense” as the basis for our acceptance of the fireman’s rule, despite the general rejection of assumption of the risk as a defense in Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 695 P.2d 369 (1985). We note with interest that the special concurrence of Justice Spear in Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 54-6, 436 P.2d 714, 720-21 (1968), that was relied upon by Justice Bistline in Salinas, (107 Idaho at 988, 990, 695 P.2d 369), carefully distinguished assumption of the risk in the “primary sense” from assumption of the risk in the “secondary sense,” i.e., as a form of contributory negligence. Our reading of Salinas convinces us, however, that any implied rejection of assumption of the risk in the “primary sense” by the majority there was only dicta. The facts of Salinas were appropriate for the application of assumption of the risk in the “secondary sense” only. We do not, therefore, feel bound not to consider whether Salinas declared assumption of the risk in the “primary sense” no longer viable. Nevertheless, we decline to premise our decision here upon such a nebulous and confounded concept.
We are persuaded that public policy is the appropriate ground for us to consider whether the fireman’s rule should apply in Idaho. In doing so we realize that we are involved in the development of the common law in this state in the way Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. referred to the process when he said:
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuition of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.
O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881).
We find persuasive the policy considerations stated by the Michigan Supreme Court in a recent opinion:
The policy arguments for adopting a fireman’s rule stem from the nature of the service provided by fire fighters and police officers, as well as the relationship between these safety officers and the public they are employed to protect.
It is beyond peradventure that the maintenance of organized society requires the presence and protection of fire fighters and police officers. The fact is that situations requiring their presence are as inevitable as anything in life can be. It is apparent that these officers are employed for the benefit of society in general, and for people involved in circumstances requiring their presence in particular.
The public hires, trains, and compensates fire fighters and police officers to deal with dangerous, but inevitable situations. Usually, especially with fires, negligence causes the occasion for the safety officer’s presence.
The very nature of police work and fire fighting is to confront danger. The purpose of these professions is to protect the public. It is this relationship between police officers, fire fighters, and society which distinguishes safety officers from other employees. Thus, safety officers are not “second-class citizens,” but, rather, are “different” than other employees.
Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Electric Supply, 429 Mich. 347, 415 N.W.2d 178, 186-87 (1987).
For similar policy reasons, we declare that the fireman’s rule applies in Idaho. By this declaration we do not, however, intend to indicate that the plaintiffs are barred from recovery in this case. The outcome of this case must be determined by the litigation of the remaining issues before the trial court, including whether [504]*504the fireman’s rule will ultimately be held to prevent recovery by the plaintiffs. These questions we leave to the parties and the trial court to resolve upon remand.
V.
CONCLUSION.
We declare that the fireman’s rule is in effect in Idaho. We reverse the order of the trial court denying the motion for summary judgment of the defendants and remand the case for further proceedings in light of this opinion.
Costs to appellants. No attorney fees were requested.
SHEPARD, C.J., and HUNTLEY, J„ concur.