Winn v. Architectural Access Board

514 N.E.2d 860, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 41
CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
DecidedNovember 9, 1987
DocketNo. 86-1037
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 514 N.E.2d 860 (Winn v. Architectural Access Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Winn v. Architectural Access Board, 514 N.E.2d 860, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 41 (Mass. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinion

Dreben, J.

In violation of a regulation of the Architectural Access Board (board) which requires that “[e]ach floor [of a restaurant] ... be of a common level or be connected by ramps,”3 the Seasons Restaurant of the Bostonian Hotel was constructed so that approximately a third of the patrons dine on a raised platform unconnected by a ramp. After receiving a letter from the board stating that it had received information that the restaurant was in violation of the regulation, the plaintiff sought a variance. When, subsequent to a hearing, the variance was denied, he sought judicial review of the agency action in the Superior Court. A judge of that court affirmed the board’s decision.

In his appeal to this court, the plaintiff argues that the board’s decision failed to comply with G. L. c. 30A, § 11(8), which requires that every agency decision be accompanied by a statement of reasons, and that the application of the board’s regulation to the plaintiff conflicts with another regulation, 521 Code Mass. Regs. § 17.6 (1982), with which he has complied. We agree with the plaintiff that the board’s findings are inadequate, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment and order the case remanded to the board for additional findings and for any revision of its decision that may be appropriate in light of those findings.

1. Applicability of G.L.c. 30A to the board’s proceedings. Although the parties acted on the assumption that the appeal from the denial of the variance was pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, §14, that assumption is not obvious. The governing statute was G. L. c. 22, § 13A, as in effect prior to St. 1986, c. 267, [43]*43& c. 642, § 2.4 5The former § 13A5 did not provide for a hearing on a petition for a variance from the board’s regulations. The only provision allowing a deviation from the regulations was found in the fourth paragraph of former § 13 A. That paragraph prohibited construction or alteration prior to receiving board approval of plans showing compliance with the board’s regulations. The paragraph also contained the following proviso:

“[I]f the . . . board determines that compliance with said rules and regulations is impracticable in the particular case, it may provide for modification of, or substitution for, such rule or regulation.”

Since the statute which allowed, in certain cases, noncompliance with board regulations did not require that the applicant be given an agency hearing, and since such a hearing does not appear constitutionally required, see Lotto v. Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 775 (1976); cf. Allen v. Board of Assessors of Granby, 387 Mass. 117,121 (1982), the board’s hearing and decision was not an “adjudicatory proceeding” as defined by c. 30A, § l.6 See School Comm. of Franklin v. Commissioner of Educ., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 683, 689 & n.6 (1984), S.C., 395 Mass. 800, 806 & n.5 (1985).

The board, however, by regulation, recognized the advantages of affording the applicant a hearing. See Yerardi’s Moody St. Restaurant & Lounge, Inc. v. Selectmen of Randolph, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 302 (1985). The regulations in effect at the [44]*44time of the hearing, 521 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.1.1.4 and § 4.2 (1982), provided that “the applicant may initiate an adjudicatory proceeding before the Board” and that such a hearing shall be conducted in accordance with c. 30A.7 Thus the board, by its regulations, bound itself to conduct the hearing pursuant to c. 30A. Northbridge v. Natick, 394 Mass. 70, 76 (1985) (agency must follow its own regulations).

2. Inadequacy of findings. Chapter 22, § 13 A, provided that the board shall make rules “designed to make public buildings accessible to, functional for, and safe for use by physically handicapped persons,” and, as we have indicated, also allowed for the modification of, or variance from, such rules when application was “impracticable in the particular case.” The board by regulation8 explained the factors it would weigh in determining whether to grant a variance.

The decision of the board, insofar as it gives reasons for denying the variance, is set forth in the margin.9

[45]*45The only ground mentioned is the fact that the plans submitted by the plaintiff, on the basis of which a letter of compliance was issued, did not show a change in level in the restaurant. As matter of policy, the board could determine that a hardship created by a failure to submit accurate plans requires more to persuade the board of the need for a variance, cf. DiGiovanni v. Board of Appeals of Rockport, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 348-349 (1985), than does a request for a deviation preceding construction. Title 521 Code Mass. Regs. § 5.11 (1982), however, see note 8, supra, at least in a situation where the violation is due to an honest mistake,10 indicates that other factors are also to be weighed. Indeed, a review of the transcript, particularly the questions asked by members of the board, reveals that the board considered options other than ramps at the hearing.

By ordering a remand to the board for findings in accordance with c. 30A, § 11(8), we do not imply that the decision must be changed, although the board may, of course, do so or allow the plaintiff to submit a substitute plan to provide more access. What the board is required to do is to articulate its reasons for the denial of the variance. The reasons should include taking into account the facts which bear on the concept of “impracticability” set forth in the board’s regulations.

3. Possible conflict with 521 Code Mass. Regs. § 17.6. There is no merit to the plaintiff’s argument that the board could not apply the regulation mandating that the restaurant be constructed on one level or that ramps be provided because [46]*46another regulation, 521 Code Mass. Regs. § 17.6 (1982),11 provided for a required number of accessible tables according to a formula. We see no necessary conflict between the two provisions. It does not appear that compliance with the accessibility regulation is intended to be a substitute for compliance with the floor level requirement.

For the reasons stated in part 2 of this opinion, the judgment is reversed and a new judgment is to be entered annulling the decision of the board and remanding the case to the board for further proceedings consistent herewith.

So ordered.

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Bluebook (online)
514 N.E.2d 860, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 41, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/winn-v-architectural-access-board-massappct-1987.