Lewis v. Department of Public Welfare

2 Mass. L. Rptr. 577
CourtMassachusetts Superior Court
DecidedMay 31, 1994
DocketNo. 93-06472-E
StatusPublished

This text of 2 Mass. L. Rptr. 577 (Lewis v. Department of Public Welfare) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lewis v. Department of Public Welfare, 2 Mass. L. Rptr. 577 (Mass. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

Doerfer, J.

Plaintiff Donna Lewis (“Lewis”) brings this action seeking judicial review of a decision rendered by the Department of Public Welfare (the “Department”) denying her and her child Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”) benefits retroactive to the date of her application.1 For the reasons outlined below, the decision of the hearing officer is MODIFIED so as to provide for retroactive benefits.

BACKGROUND

On May 25, 1993, the plaintiff applied for AFDC benefits for her and her child. On the application, the plaintiff identified Enright Marshall as the father of her child. The plaintiff also provided the Department with Mr. Marshall’s social security number, address, phone number, and place of employment. This information is relevant because an AFDC recipient is required, pursuant to 106 Code Mass. Reg. §303.710, to assign his or her right to child support to the Department. Additionally, pursuant to §303.700, an applicant is required to assist the Department in locating the absent parent.

In a prior application for benefits, however, the plaintiff had identified a different man as the father of her child. On June 30, 1993, the Department sent the plaintiff a notice that the department was denying the application for benefits due to “inconsistent-contradictory information.”2 A department case worker contacted Lewis by phone and told her to come into the office to clear up the inconsistencies. Lewis did not go to the office but instead filed a timely appeal of the denial.

On September 9, 1993, a hearing was held on the denial of benefits. The plaintiff testified at the hearing that the information contained in her current application was correct. On October 12, 1993, the hearing officer issued a decision in which he upheld the Department’s initial denial of benefits but ordered that benefits be provided from the date of the hearing forward. The hearing officer reasoned that the denial was correct because of the inconsistent information provided by the plaintiff, but that the plaintiffs testimony at the hearing cured the inconsistencies. The hearing officer, however, refused to order benefits retroactive to the date of application finding that the plaintiff had, until the hearing date, refused to cooperate with the Department in resolving the inconsistencies.

DISCUSSION

Under G.L.c. 30A, §14(7), this court may affirm, remand, set aside or modify the respondent’s decision if it is determined that the rulings are, inter alia, unsupported by substantial evidence, based upon an erroneous interpretation of law, made upon unlawful procedure, or are arbitrary or capricious. Id.; Pyramid Co. of Hadley v. Architectural Access Bd., 403 Mass. 126, 130 (1988); Winn v. Architectural Access Bd., 25 Mass.App.Ct. 41, 42 (1987). “Substantial evidence” is that evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Vaspourakon Ltd. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n, 401 Mass. 347, 351 (1987).

The court, however, defers to the respondent’s fact finding role and its knowledge and expertise. See School Comm’n of Brookline v. Bureau of Special Education Appeals, 389 Mass. 705, 716 (1983). Accordingly, this court does not make a de novo determination of the facts, make different credibility choices, or draw different inferences from those found by the agency. Pyramid, supra, at 130 (citations omitted).

In the present case, the department originally denied the plaintiffs application for benefits citing “inconsistent-contradictoiy information.”3 On appeal, the fair hearing officer held that the original denial had been proper but that the plaintiff had — at the hearing — removed the impediment to receiving benefits by virtue of her testimony. Accordingly, the hearing officer ordered that the plaintiff be awarded benefits from the hearing date forward. The plaintiff now argues that the hearing officer’s decision not to award the plaintiff benefits retroactive to her date of application was arbitrary and capricious, based on insubstantial evidence and based on an erroneous interpretation of law.

A review of the transcript of the hearing shows that the plaintiff provided no information at her hearing that was not supplied on her May 18, 1993 application. At the hearing, the plaintiff did little more than testify that she had told the truth on her application. The hearing officer seems to reason in his decision that the plaintiffs very appearance (at the hearing) and reaffirmation of the information provided in her application cleared up whatever verification problems existed prior to the hearing. Given that the testimony offered by the plaintiff contained no information which was not already contained in the plaintiffs applica[578]*578tion, the court does find the hearing officer’s distinction between cooperation and a failure to cooperate to be somewhat arbitrary and capricious.4

There is, however, an even more compelling reason for the court to order a modification of the hearing officer’s decision; when the department first decided to deny the plaintiff AFDC benefits, based on the plaintiffs alleged failure to cooperate, it failed to follow its own procedures for such a denial. According to 106 Code Mass. Reg. 303.720(c)(2):

[w]hen an applicant... is denied ... for failure to cooperate in obtaining support . . . the applicant shall receive a notice informing him or her of the dollar amount the assistance unit would have received if he or she had cooperated ... The applicant . . . shall also be provided with the reason for the decision, the continuing right to cooperate (which shall result in either a retroactive or prospective effective date for reinstating benefits, dependent on both the date of the applicant’s . . . written notice that he or she shall cooperate and the date of cooperation), and the right to appeal the denial or termination . . .

Additionally; 106 Code Mass. Reg. 303.720(c)(3) provides that:

[p]rior to sending a denial notice to the applicant . . . alleging failure to cooperate in obtaining support, the AFDC worker shall send a warning notice that specifically sets forth the way(s) in which the applicant . . . has failed to cooperate and the fact that he or she has 15 days from the date of the notice to cooperate or demonstrate to the AFDC worker why he or she is unable to cooperate in the way(s) requested.5

In the present case, aside from the notice of denial, the plaintiff was provided with no written notice which would satisfy the requirements of §303.720(c)(2). Nor was the plaintiff provided with a warning notice as required by §303.720(c)(3).6 These procedures are clearly designed to alert an applicant to the reasons for the denial and to give the applicant every opportunity to correct whatever deficiencies exist in her application. Indeed, 106 Code Mass. Reg. 303.700 specifically provides that “(e]ach applicant for and recipient of AFDC will be given every opportunity, at any time, to cooperate in obtaining child and spousal support of child support.” Regardless of which section the Department based its denial, it was required to provide the plaintiff with written notice which would have allowed her to correct the alleged deficiencies in her application. The written notice which was provided gave no indication to the plaintiff how she should go about remedying the problem.

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Related

Amherst-Pelham Regional School Committee v. Department of Education
381 N.E.2d 922 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1978)
School Committee v. Bureau of Special Education Appeals
452 N.E.2d 476 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1983)
Vaspourakan, Ltd. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission
516 N.E.2d 1153 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1987)
O'Brien v. Director of the Division of Employment Security
472 N.E.2d 253 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1984)
Pyramid Co. v. Architectural Barriers Board
403 Mass. 126 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1988)
Winn v. Architectural Access Board
514 N.E.2d 860 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1987)

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Bluebook (online)
2 Mass. L. Rptr. 577, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lewis-v-department-of-public-welfare-masssuperct-1994.