PD-1618-15
PD-1618-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 12/11/2015 2:29:27 PM Accepted 12/15/2015 1:27:53 PM ABEL ACOSTA
No. 07-13-00399-CR CLERK
_________________________________________
IN THE CRIMINAL
COURT OF APPEALS
_______________________________________________
ANTHONY BERNARD WINGFIELD PETITIONER,
VS.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
____________________________________________________
PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
__________________________________________________
Appeal from the District Court of Wilbarger County, Texas 46TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
HONORABLE DAN MIKE BIRD, JUDGE DISTRICT COURT CASE NO. 11,825
_______________________________________________________
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:
December 11, 2015 /s/ Earl Griffin Jr.
EARL GRIFFIN, JR.
SBOT# 08471000
Attorney for Appellant
P.O. Box 730
December 15, 2015 Childress, Texas 79201
(940) 937-6474
(940) 937-6020 Fax.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following listed person(s) or entities have rights which may be adversely affected by the outcome of these appeals in this Court so that the Justice of this Court may review the same to determine the need for refusal or disqualification, if necessary, herein:
1. The Appellant, ANTHONY BERNARD WINGFIELD, currently resides at TDC# 01896078, Polunsky Unit, 3872 F.M. South, Livingston, Texas 77351, and may be served with process herein at the address of his Court Appointed Attorneys and he is represented herein by the undersigned attorneys whose addresses are shown on the front cover of this brief. The Appellant was represented at trial herein by the same attorney;
2. The Appellee, The State of Texas, is represented herein by its Criminal District Attorney for Wilbarger County, Texas, Mr. Staley Heatly, and his address is 1700 Wilbarger Street, Suite 32 Vernon, Texas 76384, and may be served with process at his address.
3. The State Prosecuting Attorney is Ms. Lisa C. McMinn and her address is P.O. Box 12405, Capital Station, Austin, Texas 78711-2405, and she may be served with process at this address.
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Respectfully submitted by,
/s/ Earl Griffin, Jr.
EARL GRIFFIN, JR.
Attorney for Appellant
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUBJECT INDEX
SUBJECT: PAGE: Certificate of Interested Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . … . . . 2-3 Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ….. . . .4-7 Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . …... ..4-5 Index of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……. . . . . . . .6-7 Statement of the Procedural History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Grounds for Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . …... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Statement of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ……. . . . . . . . . .10-13 Summary of the Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . …... . . . . . . .13-14 Reasons for Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . …. .. . . . . . . . ……..14-18
GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER ONE . .. . . . . . . . . …. . . . . . . . 14-16
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT LEGAL EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY OR RECKLESSLY CAUSED BODILY INJURY TO A MEMBER OF PETITIONER’S FAMILY OR A PERSON PETITIONER HAS HAD A DATING RELATIONSHIP BY STRIKING SUCH PERSON WITH PETITIONER’S HAND (ENTIRE RECORD).
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GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER TWO . . . . . . …… . . . . . . . . . .16-18
THE STATE VIOLATED PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ENGAGED IN A VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO FOLLOW ITS PLEA BARGAIN AGREEMENT WITH PETITIONER (R.R. VOL. 1; R.R. VOL. 3 & 4; CLERK’S RECORD; ENTIRE RECORD).
Prayer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ….... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Certificate of Service . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . …... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Certificate of Compliance………………………………………………………....19 Appendix………………………………………………………………………..20
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASE: PAGES:
1. Edison v. State, 235 S.W. 3rd 303 (Tex. Civ. App. -2008, no pet.)……………15 2. Mitchell v. State, 102 S.W. 3rd 773 (Tex. Civ. App.-2003, pet. Ref’d)………15 3. Weaver v. State, 551 S.W. 2d 419 (Tex. Cr. App.-1977)……………………15 4. Franklin v. State, 659 S.W. 2d 831, 834 (Tex. Cr. App. -1983)………………15 5. Taylor v. State, 637 s.W. 2d 929 (Tex. Cr. App. -1982)………………………15 6. Sieffert v. State, 501 S.W. 2d 124 (Tex. Cr. App. -1973)……………………15 7. Givens v. State, 2008 WL 2104843 (Tex. Civ. App. -2008: Discretionary Review Dismissed)……………..16 8. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 318-319 (U.S. -1979)……………………16 9. Mason v. State, 905 S.W. 2d 570, 574 (Tex. Cr. App. -1995)…………………16 10. Johnson v. State, 43 S.W. 3d 1, 10-1 (tex. Cr. App. -2001)…………………16 11. Dorsey v. State, 55 S.W. 3d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. -2001, no pet.)………….17 12.Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 104 S. Ct. 2543 (1984)…………………18 13. Moore v. State, Id……………………………………………………..18 14. ExParte Williams, 637 S.W. 2d 943, 948 (Tex. Crim. App. -1982)………18 15. State vs. Moore, 240 S.W. 3d 248,251 (Tex. Crim. App.-2007)……………17
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CODES AND STATUTES
Texas Penal Code §22.01 (b) (2) (A) ……………………………………………………. 15
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No. 07-13-00399-CR
ANTHONY B. WINGFIELD }{ IN THE COURT OF PETITIONER, }{ }{
VS. }{ CRIMINAL APPEALS }{
THE STATE OF TEXAS }{ APPELLEE }{ OF TEXAS
PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
COMES NOW, ANTHONY BERNARD WINGFIELD, the Petitioner in the above-styled and numbered cause, by and through his counsel of record on appeal herein, and submits in and to this Court his Petition For Discretionary Review on appeal herein complaining of errors of fact and law in the trial court below as follows:
For convenience, the Petitioner, ANTHONY BERNARD WINGFIELD, and THE STATE OF TEXAS will hereinafter be referred to as the “Petitioner” and the “State” respectively throughout this petition hereinafter:
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STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY In Cause No. 11,825, Wilbarger County, Texas, Appellant pled Not Guilty to the charge of Assault Against A Family Member With Prior Conviction (R.R. Vol. 4: P. 17, L. 8- P. 18, L. 12) and submitted his case to the jury. Appellant was found guilty and sentenced to 45 years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division (C. R.88 -89). Appellant timely filed a Motion for New Trial and Notice of Appeal (C.R. 90-91; 100). On November 24, 2015, the Seventh Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court’s Judgment, Appendix 1 hereto.
GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER ONE
THERE IS INSUFFIECIENT LEGAL EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY OR RECKLESSLY CAUSED BODILY INJURY TO A MEMBER OF PETITIONER’S FAMILY OR A PERSON PETITIONER HAS HAD A DATING RELATIONSHIP BY STRIKING SUCH PERSON WITH APPELLANT’S HAND (ENTIRE RECORD).
GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER TWO
THE STATE VIOLATED PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTUION AND ENGAGED IN A VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO FOLLOW ITS PLEA BARGAIN AGREEMENT WITH PETITIONER (R.R. VOL. 1, R.R. VOL. 3 & 4; CLERK’S RECORD; ENTIRE RECORD)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At a pre-trial hearing the State, on the record, informed Petitioner that the State’s “plea offer” of two years in the TDCJ-ID would remain “open” until October 10, 2013 (R.R. Vol. 1: P. 8, L. 4-10: “Mr. Heatly: Judge, we have made a plea bargain offer of two years RDCJ and we’ll make that offer available until October the 10th.) (emphasis added)
On October 1, 2013 Petitioner sent a letter to his Court Appointed Counsel, Earl Griffin, Jr., that he was accepting the two years TDCJ-ID plea offer (R.R. Vol 3: P. 20, L. 1-8; CR. 41.) and the District Attorney sent a letter to the same defense counsel that it was withdrawing its “plea offer” (R.R. Vol. 3: P. 20, L. 5-8; CR. 48). On March 7, 2013 defense counsel sent a letter to the District Attorney that Appellant was accepting the two years TDCJ-ID plea deal (R.R. Vol. 3: P. 30, L. 9- 11; CR. 41, 46.) The State refused to honor its promise to allow Petitioner until October 10, 2013 to enter his plea to the two year deal (R.R. Vol. 3: P. 22, L. 14-P. 23, L. 8; P. 24,L. 25-P. 25, L. 13; CR. 48). Petitioner filed a Motion To Quash Indictment For Vindictive Prosecution (C.R. 49-66) and the Trial Court heard this motion pre-trial (R.R. Vol. 3: P. 19, L. 21-P. 28, L. 13). The Trial Court denied Appellant’s Motion To Quash Indictment (R.R. Vol. 3: P. 28, L. 8-L. 21).
The indictment in No. 11,825 provides in relevant part: “… that (Petitioner)
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… did … intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause bodily injury to Angela Dickerson,…person with whom the (Petitioner) has or has had a dating relationship,…and…the (Petitioner) had previously been convicted of an offense under Chapter 19 or Chapter 22 or Section 20.03 or Section 20.04 or Section 21.11 or Section 25.11, Penal Code,…to wit: on the 20th day of March 2012, in the County Criminal Court No. 11 of Dallas County, Texas, in cause number MA1233579N,” to which the Petitioner pled “Not Guilty” (R. R. Vol. 4: P.17, L. 8-P. 18, L. 14).
The State called Angela Dickerson, the alleged victim, who testified that she “knew” Petitioner from “June of 2011” (R.R. Vol. 4: P. 24, L. 2-6) off and on until “October 12, 2012 (R.R. Vol. 4; P. 26, L. 2-L.19) when Petitioner moved in “permanently”. She characterized their activity as a “dating” relationship (R.R. Vol. 4: P. 26, L. 19-23) until “December 11, 2011” when she moved in with her mother (R.R.-Vol. 4: P. 25, L. 22-P. 26, L. 11). She further testified that on June 12, 2013 that Petitioner punched her (R.R. Vol. 4: P. 27, L. 10-12; P. 28, L. 3-11).
On cross-examination Angela Dickerson, after having denied that she slapped Petitioner before he “touched her”(R.R. Vol. 4: P. 37, L. 16-22), admitted that on August 12, 2013 she made a statement to law enforcement that she “struck Anthony first” (R.R. Vol. 4: P. 39, L. 1-9), that she did not recall making a
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statement that he grabbed her by the shirt (R.R. Vol. 4: P. 39, L. 10-13) then admitted that she had made that statement and that Petitioner fell on her on the couch, that she bumped her eye on his head (R.R. Vol. 4: P. 39, L. 16-P. 40, L. 3). She testified that Petitioner has an amputated leg (R.R. Vol. 4: P. 40, L. 4-9); that she gave another written statement that she had given yet “a different version” of what had happened (R.R. Vol. 4: P. 40, L. 10-18). Angela Dickerson executed an Affidavit of Non-Prosecution seeking to have all charges against Petitioner dismissed (R.R. Vol. 4: Defendant’s Exhibit1).
Further, while being cross-examined, Angela Dickerson denied giving a statement that a conversation about another woman and text messages had occurred of the incident in question (R.R. Vol. 4: P. 45, L. 5-12) and, again, then admitted on further cross-examination that such a conversation had occurred (Vol. 4: P. 45, L. 15-19).
Ronnie Dickerson testified that on June 12, 2013 he heard a “slap” but did see Petitioner strike Angela Dickerson (R.R. Vol. 4: P. 53, L. 10-12; L. 25-P. 54, L. 5).
On cross-examination Ronnie Dickerson admitted that he did not see a blow struck on that occasion (R.R. Vol. 4: P. 55, L. 23-P. 56, L. 10).
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Petitioner moved for directed verdict that there was no evidence offered as to the prior conviction for family violence which would support a felony conviction under the present indictment because State’s 11 (The per packet offered by the State to prove the prior conviction.) read on its face “no finding of family violence” (R.R. Vol. 4: P. 151, L. 1-15; State’s Exhibit 11).
By bill of exception Petitioner offered and proffered Angela Dickerson’s testimony that she had made other complaints of family violence against other men (R.R. Vol. 5: P. 28, L. 14-P. 29, L. 25). The Trial Court refused to allow this testimony before the jury (R.R. Vol. 5: P. 30, L. 20-22)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There was no evidence, or at best insufficient evidence, to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner intentionally or knowingly or recklessly caused bodily injury to Angela Dickerson, who was a member of Petitioner’s family or a person Petitioner had had a dating relationship by striking her with Petitioner’s hand, after Petitioner had finally been convicted under Chapter 19 or 22 or Section 20.03 or Section 20.04, or Section 22.11 or Section 25.11, Texas Penal Code.
The Trial Court abused its discretion when it denied Petitioner’s Motion For Directed Verdict because there was no evidence that the underlying Dallas conviction involved a family violence offense under Chapter 19, Chapter 22,
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Section 20.03, Section 20.04 or Section 21.11 or Section 25.11 of the Penal Code of Texas.
The State violated Petitioner’s right to due process when it engaged in vindictive prosecution by refusing to follow its plea bargain agreement.
GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER ONE
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT LEGAL EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY OR RECKLESSLY CAUSED BODILY INJURY TO A MEMBER OF PETITIONER’S FAMILY OR A PERSON PETITIONER HAS HAD A DATING RELATIONSHIP BY STRIKING SUCH PERSON WITH PETITIONER’S HAND (ENTIRE RECORD).
REASON FOR REVIEW
For purposes of brevity and convenience that portion of this Brief entitled “Statement of the Case” is resubmitted hereunder in its entirety in support of these claims of error.
The State, in its indictment of Petitioner, asserted, in part, that Petitioner did :
“… that (Petitioner) … did … intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause bodily injury to Angela Dickerson (by striking her with his hand), Angela Dickerson being a person with whom the (Petitioner) has or has had a dating relationship,…and…the (Petitioner) had previously been convicted of an offense under Chapter 19 or Chapter 22 or Section 20.03 or Section 20.04 or Section 21.11 or Section 25.11, Penal Code,…” (C.R. 4-9). The Petitioner pled “Not Guilty” (R.
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R. Vol. 4: P.18, L. 12).
By thus averring the State assumed, accepted and is charged with the burden of proving this – that Petitioner struck Angela Dickerson with Petitioner’s hand after Petitioner had been convicted of one of the enumerated offenses TEXAS PENAL CODE §22.01 (b) (2) (A); SEE Edison v. State, 235 S.W.3rd 303 (Tex.Civ.App.-2008, no pet.); Mitchell v. State, 102 S.W.3rd 772 (Tex.Civ.App.- 2003, pet. ref’d); Weaver v. State, 551 S.W. 2d 419 (Tex. Cr. App. – 1977); Franklin v. State, 659 S.W. 2d 831, 834 (Tex. Cr. App. – 1983); “The allegation in the indictment is descriptive of that which is legally essential to charge a crime because it elaborates on and describes essential elements of the offense that must be plead. The State was bound to prove the allegations in the indictment,” Taylor v. State, 637 S.W. 2d 929 (Tx. Cr. App. – 1982); Sieffert v. State, 501 S.W. 2d 124 (Tx. Cr. App. – 1973).
The State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner struck Angela Dickerson with Petitioner’s hand and (emphasis added) that prior to this that Petitioner had been convicted of an offense under Chapter 19 or Chapter 22 or Section 20.03 or Section 20.04 or Section 21.11 or Section 25.11, Penal Code . There is no legally sufficient evidence that the prior conviction involved family violence, Givens v. State, 2008 WL 2104843 (Tex.Civ.App.-2008; Discretionary
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Review Dismissed).
Further, because the alleged victim gave testimony to at least three different versions of the events of the date in question (SEE Statement of Facts herein), even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could NOT have found that the Petitioner intentionally or knowingly or recklessly struck Angela Dickerson with Petitioner’s hand; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (U.S. – 1979); Mason v. State, 905 S.W. 2d 570, 574 (Tx. Cr. App. – 1995). Further, viewing all the evidence in a neutral light, the evidence that Petitioner’s intentionally or knowingly or recklessly struck Angela Dickerson with Petitioner’s hand is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the fact finder’s determination, Johnson v. State, 43 S.W. 3d 1, 10-1 (Tx. Cr. App. – 2001).
Therefore, judgment in this cause should be either reversed or rendered in favor of Petitioner or reversed and Petitioner granted a new trial herein and this Court should grant review therefore.
REASON FOR REVIEW NUMBER TWO
THE STATE VIOLATED PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTUION AND ENGAGED IN A VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO FOLLOW ITS PLEA BARGAIN AGREEMENT WITH PETITIONER (R.R. VOL. 1: R.R. VOL 4; CLERK’S RECORD; ENTIRE RECORD)
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REASON FOR REVIEW
For purposes of brevity and convenience that portion of this Brief entitle “Statement of the Case” is resubmitted hereunder in its entirety in support of this claim of error.
The issue involved in one of fundamental fairness in plea negotiation and proceedings thereon. Here, the State made the unsolicited “offer” that the “plea offer” would remain available to Petitioner until October 10th. Prior to October 10th Petitioner, through counsel, informed the State that he accepted the offer. Can the State at that point in good faith, back out on its offer? Fundamental fairness says no.
It is stated in several cases that a “plea offer” is not binding until it is approved by the Trial Court, State vs. Moore, 240 S.W. 3d 248,251 (Tex. Crim. App.-2007); Dorsey v. State, 55 S.W. 3d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. -2001, no pet.); SEE ExParte Williams, 637 S.W. 2d 943,948 (Tex. Crim. App. -1982).
In this case the unanswered question is should the State be allowed to anticipatorily breach its agreement with the Petitioner? The cases which discuss the breach of a plea agreement as being “vindictive prosecution” violative of due process as required by the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution focus on the fundamental unfairness of allowing the State to repudiate its agreement,
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Mabry v. Johnson, 467 US 504,104 S. Ct. 2543 (1984); Moore v. State, ID..
Clearly here the State led to Petitioner to believe that the “plea bargain” was that until October 10th he would receive the benefit of the two year plea recommendation. The State did not honor this plea bargain.
Therefore, this case should be reversed and remanded to the Trial Court for the State to make its recommendation of two years, or reversed and remanded for new trial and this Court should grant review therefore.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court should grant Petitioner’s Petition For Discretionary Review, and upon such review, this case should be reversed and remanded to the Trial Court for the State to make its recommendation of two years, or reversed and remanded for new trial.
Respectfully submitted by,
/s/ Earl Griffin, Jr.
EARL GRIFFIN, JR.
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
P.O. Box 730
Childress, Texas 79201
(940) 937-6474
(940) 937-6020 Fax
State Bar No. 08471000
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Petition For Discretionary Review has been mailed CMRRR# 7011 3500 0002 4075 2272 to the counsel for the state herein, Mr. Staley Heatly, 46th District Attorney, 1700 Wilbarger Street, Suite 32, Vernon, Texas 76384, and CMRRR# 7011 3500 0002 4075 2289 to Ms. Lisa C. McMinn, State Prosecuting Attorney at P.O. Box 12405, Capital Station, Austin, Texas 78711-2405 on this the 11th day of December, 2015, in accordance with the rules governing same.
/s/ Earl Griffin, Jr.
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that the above and foregoing Petition For Discretionary Review is 3,550 words in its completion, signed on this 11th day of December, 2015, in accordance with the rules governing same.
/s/ Earl Griffin, Jr.
Attorney for Appellant
egriffinattorney@yahoo.com
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APPENDIX
1. Opinion and Judgment, Seventh Court of Appeals of Texas