Wilson v. New York Corrections Department

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 3, 2023
Docket1:22-cv-08863
StatusUnknown

This text of Wilson v. New York Corrections Department (Wilson v. New York Corrections Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilson v. New York Corrections Department, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ELECTRONICALLY FILED SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DOC #: DATE FILED: 3/3/2 023 RAMEE D. WILSON, Plaintiff, -against- 22-CV-8863 (VEC) NEW YORK CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT, ORDER OF SERVICE RIKERS ISLAND; NEW YORK CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT MEDICAL STAFF E.M.T.C., Defendants. VALERIE CAPRONI, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently detained at the Eric M. Taylor Center (“E.M.T.C.”) on Rikers Island, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that correction officials were deliberately indifferent to his health and safety. By order dated October 25, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. DISCUSSION A. New York City Department of Correction Plaintiff names the “New York Corrections Department” as a Defendant. Because Plaintiff is in the custody of the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”), the Court assumes for the purpose of this order, that Plaintiff intends to assert claims against DOC. Plaintiff’s claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740

F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and clear intention to assert claims against the City of New York, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against the City of New York and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption of this action to replace the New York Corrections Department with the City of New York. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. This amendment is without prejudice to any defenses the City of New York may wish to assert. B. Rikers Island and New York Corrections Department Medical Staff E.M.T.C. Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants must be dismissed. Section 1983 provides that an action may be maintained against a “person” who has deprived another of rights under the

“Constitution and Laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rikers Island and the New York Corrections Department Medical Staff E.M.T.C. are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. See generally Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (state is not a “person” for the purpose of § 1983 claims); Zuckerman v. Appellate Div., Second Dep’t Supreme Court, 421 F.2d 625, 626 (2d Cir. 1970) (court not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Whitley v. Westchester Cnty. Corr. Fac. Admin., No. 97-CV-420 (SS), 1997 WL 659100, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1997) (correctional facility or jail not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim against Rikers Island and the New York Corrections Department Medical Staff E.M.T.C. must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). C. Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Plaintiff asserts that he was exposed to COVID-19 and forced to take the COVID-19 vaccine, but he does not name the individuals responsible for the alleged deprivation of his rights. The Clerk of Court is therefore directed, under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Bennie Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc.
877 F.2d 170 (Second Circuit, 1989)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Emerson v. City of New York
740 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D. New York, 2010)
Jenkins v. City of New York
478 F.3d 76 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)

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Bluebook (online)
Wilson v. New York Corrections Department, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilson-v-new-york-corrections-department-nysd-2023.