2025 IL App (1st) 241020-U No. 1-24-1020 Order filed September 30, 2025 Sixth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
LAVERNEDRA WILSON, VIRGINIA CARR, ) SANDRA CARR TAYLOR, and MARIE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court CARR, ) of Cook County. ) Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ) No. 22 L 1707 v. ) ) SPENCER LEAK & SONS FUNERAL HOME ) The Honorable LTD., SPENCER LEAK SR., and ANTHONY ) Thomas More Donnelly, LEFLORE, ) Judge, presiding. ) Defendants-Appellees. )
JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Pucinski and Gamrath concurred in the judgment.
¶1 Held: Affirming order denying motion for new trial on damages where appellants failed to show trial errors, if any, were substantially prejudicial or affected the outcome.
¶2 When Chorsie Ray died in March 2020, her daughters entrusted Leak & Sons Funeral
Home to carry out her wish for cremation. Instead, because the funeral home failed to obtain a
death certificate as required by law, Ray was not cremated. Before admitting fault, Leak & 1-24-1020
Sons blamed Ray’s physician for the delay. The sisters then chose burial, distrusting the funeral
home and fearing they might not receive the correct remains. They sued Leak & Sons, its
owner, and the funeral director, alleging negligent interference with their right to control the
time, place, and manner of their mother’s final disposition, causing them emotional distress.
¶3 The trial court granted summary judgment on negligence against the defendants
(collectively “Leak & Sons”) and held a two-day jury trial limited to proximate cause and
damages. The jury found that Leak & Sons’ negligence proximately caused injury and awarded
each sister $10,000, plus costs. The sisters moved for a new trial on damages, citing multiple
trial errors, which the trial court denied, concluding that the sisters received a fair trial and that
any errors were either cured or harmless.
¶4 The sisters argue that repeated violations of orders in limine, erroneous evidentiary rulings,
improper jury instructions, and the court’s refusal to strike two jurors for cause, individually
and cumulatively, deprived them of a fair trial. We affirm. The sisters fail to show substantial
prejudice or that the outcome would have been different absent the claimed errors.
¶5 Background
¶6 Chorsie Ray died on March 19, 2020, in the emergency room at St. Bernard Hospital. After
her memorial service, Leak & Sons told the daughters they could pick up the ashes in about
two weeks. When Marie Carr, one of Ray’s daughters, called two weeks later, a funeral home
employee said cremations were backed up due to COVID-19. Weeks after that, daughter
Sandra Carr Taylor called and learned that the cremation had not occurred because Ray’s
treating physician had not returned the death certificate. By statute, the physician must sign
within 48 hours, and the funeral home must file it within seven days and before cremation. See
410 ILCS 535/18(1), (2) (West 2022).
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¶7 Carr Taylor asked the employee to confirm the physician’s contact information; the
employee said she did not have it, though the family had supplied it. Realizing the funeral
home had never sent the certificate to the doctor, Taylor asked to speak with owner Spencer
Leak, Sr. He, too, blamed the physician. Carr Taylor challenged that explanation. Leak, Sr.
apologized and said he would send the certificate for signature, which he did.
¶8 Later that day, the funeral home’s vice president, Spencer Leak, Jr., called Taylor. She
testified that he was aggressive and rude, and again blamed the physician despite his father’s
admission of error. Leak, Jr. denied yelling at Taylor and also testified he could not remember
speaking with her.
¶9 After Carr Taylor reported these events, the sisters elected burial. They no longer trusted
Leak & Sons and feared receiving the wrong remains if cremation went forward. The funeral
home offered a refund, which the sisters declined.
¶ 10 The sisters sued Spencer Leak & Sons, Spencer Leak, Sr., funeral director Anthony
LeFlore, and Ray’s medical providers, alleging negligent interference with their right to
possess their mother’s remains and seeking emotional-distress damages for the delay and
resulting burial, which did not honor her preference for cremation. The sisters voluntarily
dismissed their claims against all defendants except Leak & Sons, Leak, Sr., and LeFlore.
¶ 11 Summary Judgment
¶ 12 Before trial, the sisters sought summary judgment on negligence, arguing that Leak &
Sons’ failure to meet statutory death certificate deadlines established a prima facie case. The
court initially denied the motion, reasoning that the sisters also had to show unreasonableness
under the circumstances. On reconsideration, the court entered a directed liability finding for
the sisters, leaving proximate cause and damages for trial.
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¶ 13 Pretrial Motions in Limine
¶ 14 The parties presented multiple pretrial motions in limine. The sisters sought to bar evidence
or innuendo that they were at fault. Specifically, they wanted to exclude “[e]vidence regarding
other potential options [the sisters] theoretically had short of burying their mother *** in part,
because Defendants have not asserted any affirmative defense putting [the sisters’] conduct at
issue.” They also sought to bar evidence that they “could have hired a different funeral home
to perform the cremation.” Because Leak & Sons had not asserted an affirmative defense of
mitigation of damages, the trial court granted the motion.
¶ 15 The parties offered competing motions in limine as to the admissibility of evidence about
the impact of COVID-19 on the funeral industry. The trial court allowed COVID-19 evidence
relevant to proximate cause but not to excuse negligence. The court also granted a motion in
limine barring Leak & Sons from arguing that the sisters were contributorily negligent or failed
to mitigate damages.
¶ 16 The trial court granted the sisters’ motions barring personal attacks on their counsel and
evidence of Leak & Sons’ community standing or good deeds. But the trial court found that
the sisters opened the door to character evidence when their attorney stated during opening
statements that “it is never acceptable to lie to your customers” and detailed instances when
Leak & Sons’ employees had lied to or repeated lies to his clients.
¶ 17 Trial
¶ 18 During jury selection, the sisters asked to remove two prospective jurors for cause based
on their support for a cap on damages. The court denied the challenges, finding that one juror
misunderstood the question and the other had affirmed that she would follow the law and
evidence. The sisters used peremptory challenges on these prospective jurors.
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¶ 19 Before opening statements, the trial court sustained the sisters’ objection to a defense
PowerPoint slide stating “the Plaintiffs had other choices that they could have gone to another
funeral home,” as inconsistent with the in limine ruling that barred evidence that the sisters
were at fault. Nonetheless, during his opening statement, defense counsel displayed the slide
until the trial court ordered him to “move on.” Defense counsel also suggested “the Plaintiffs
had other choices” and “could have gone to another funeral home,” followed by a rhetorical
question, “Why didn’t they go elsewhere?” The trial court sustained the sisters’ objections to
those statements.
¶ 20 The first witness, Carr Taylor, testified that when Ray died, she and her sisters intended to
cremate her and divide her ashes. Carr Taylor planned to put some ashes in a necklace and
keep some in an urn. But after the funeral home lied about the delay with the cremation, she
and her sisters no longer trusted Leak & Sons and were not “confident that if we allowed them
to cremate my mom, we would have her remains.” She and her sisters were “devastated” that
they had to bury their mother, but they did not think they had the option to go to another funeral
home for cremation.
¶ 21 Carr Taylor testified she felt terrible knowing her mother wanted cremation but they
wanted to give her a resting place. She was saddened not to have her mother “near me *** at
all times,” and visits her mother’s grave five to six times a year. She still feels pain because
Leak & Sons did not honor their mother’s wishes, but her pain has reduced over time.
¶ 22 On cross, Carr Taylor acknowledged Leak & Sons’ reputation and that her family had used
them before. She also said that her mother never put her wishes in writing or expressed negative
views about burial. Nor did she know if her mother wanted her ashes to be placed in a necklace.
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Twice, the trial court sustained objections after the defense asked whether the sisters sought
other funeral homes or crematoriums.
¶ 23 Lavernedra “Catrice” Wilson testified that she and her mother were close, and she, too,
wanted to wear the ashes. Burial felt like a violation and caused a family “breakdown,” as their
mother had told them since childhood, she wanted cremation. The sisters decided to bury their
mother so they could feel safe knowing where she was. Wilson felt betrayed, angry, and sad
that they had not received the same treatment the family had previously received from the
defendants. Wilson has a cousin’s ashes and finds it hurtful not to have her mother’s. On cross,
she agreed their mother had no will, did not document her preference for cremation, and never
said burial was impermissible.
¶ 24 Virginia Carr cried when she learned her mother had not been cremated. She described her
mother as her best friend, protector, and provider, and said not having ashes to keep close was
painful. Similarly, Marie Carr described her mother as her best friend and confidante, her
“rock,” and the funeral home’s actions compounded her grief. She planned to keep ashes in a
locket and urn, felt she failed her mother by not having her cremated, and did not trust Leak &
Sons to return the correct remains: “It could have been anybody.”
¶ 25 Other witnesses corroborated the emotional impact. For instance, Carr Taylor’s son, Derell
Lawless, testified he heard his mother scream on learning of the delay, which was unlike
anything he had heard before. On Ray’s birthday, the first year after she died, he saw his aunt
Virginia Carr crying that her mother was “in the ground instead of around her neck.”
¶ 26 Leak & Sons called Spencer Leak, Jr. He traced the funeral home’s history since 1933 and
its 2,900 annual funerals, which reached 3,800 in 2020 due to COVID-19. Over objection, he
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described staffing shortages, fear of contact with bodies, quarantines, and gaps in office
personnel, requiring janitors and drivers to answer phones.
¶ 27 Leak, Jr. acknowledged that the funeral home made a mistake with Ray’s paperwork, and
he felt bad about it. He agreed that grieving families deserve accurate information and that
lying is unacceptable. He denied lying or being rude to Carr Taylor. Once the delay was
realized, he apologized and offered a full refund, which the sisters declined.
¶ 28 In closing, defense counsel accused the sisters’ counsel of calling Leak, Jr. a liar, calling it
“galling” for Leak, Jr. to sit silently while a “young man” attacked his character, called him a
liar, and accused him of treachery and fraud. The sisters repeatedly objected that these remarks
violated the in limine order, which barred personal attacks. The trial court sustained the
objections.
¶ 29 The jury awarded each sister $10,000 (total $40,000), plus costs. The sisters moved for a
new trial on damages, arguing the trial court erred in (i) allowing Leak & Sons to violate
motions in limine repeatedly, (ii) allowing Leak & Sons to introduce evidence about COVID-
19 to garner sympathy and to suggest that they were not negligent, (iii) allowing Leak & Sons
to bolster their reputation improperly, (iv) refusing a proposed jury instruction, and (v) failing
to excuse two jurors for cause. The sisters also argued that cumulatively these errors deprived
them of a fair trial.
¶ 30 After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding a fair trial and that any errors did
not substantially affect the result. The court described the sisters’ damages case as “pretty
weak,” found their testimony unpersuasive, and noted “complications with the story,”
including why cremation did not proceed after the delay, an aspect the court believed the jury
did not understand. The court concluded the award reflected credibility issues, not in limine
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rulings or juror seating. As to COVID-19 testimony, the court ruled that any potential prejudice
was cured by its instruction that the jury not decide based on sympathy, prejudice, or bias.
¶ 31 Analysis
¶ 32 As a preliminary matter, two days after filing their reply brief, the sisters moved to file an
amended reply brief. We took the motion with the case. The sisters stated that the amendment
acknowledged contrary authority on the new trial standard and made other substantive edits,
but that Leak & Sons would not be prejudiced given the prompt filing.
¶ 33 Although our rules do not expressly address amended reply briefs, Supreme Court Rule
343 permits extensions for good cause. Ill. S. Ct. R. 343 (eff. July 1, 2008). The sisters showed
good cause and no prejudice to Leak & Sons. Accordingly, we grant the motion.
¶ 34 Turning to the merits, the cause of action for tortious interference with the right to possess
a dead body rests on the principle that “ ‘while in the ordinary sense, there is no property right
in a dead body, a right of possession of a decedent’s remains devolves upon the next of kin in
order to make appropriate disposition thereof, whether by burial or otherwise.’ ” Cochran v.
Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 2017 IL 121200 ¶ 12 (quoting Leno v. St. Joseph
Hospital, 55 Ill.2d 114, 117 (1973). For more than a century, Illinois courts have recognized
that interference with this right is an actionable wrong and a plaintiff is entitled to recover
damages for the mental suffering proximately caused by the defendant’s misconduct. Id.
¶ 35 The summary judgment order established Leak & Sons’ negligence. The only issues before
the jury were whether their negligence proximately caused the sisters’ mental suffering and, if
so, the amount of damages. The sisters contend they are entitled to a new trial on damages
based on the individual and cumulative effect of errors, specifically, (i) allowing defendants’
attorney to violate in limine orders repeatedly and intentionally, (ii) allowing evidence of how
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COVID-19 affected Leak & Sons to garner sympathy for them, (iii) allowing evidence about
Leak & Sons character, (iv) overruling for cause objections to two jurors, and (v) failing to
instruct the jury on the law properly. We address each in turn.
¶ 36 Evidentiary Rulings
¶ 37 Generally, we review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and questions of legal
interpretation de novo. Bland v. Q-West, Inc., 2023 IL App (2d) 210683, ¶ 22; Ittersagen v.
Advocate Health & Hospitals Corp., 2020 IL App (1st) 190778, ¶ 75. A new trial requires
substantial prejudice affecting the outcome with the appellant bearing the burden. Simmons v.
Garces, 198 Ill. 2d 541, 566–67 (2002); Ramirez v. FCL Builders, Inc., 2014 IL App (1st)
123663, ¶ 198. Here, the rulings turned on case-specific circumstances rather than broad legal
interpretations, so an abuse-of-discretion review applies. People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 89-
90 (2001).
¶ 38 Violations of Motions in Limine
¶ 39 A motion in limine excludes inadmissible evidence and bars related questioning to avoid
prejudice from objections before the jury. Tucker v. Division Sales, Inc., 315 Ill. App. 3d 472,
476. The violation of an order in limine is reversible error when: (i) the order is specific, (ii)
the violation is clear, and (iii) the opposing party is prejudiced by it. Branum v. Slezak
Construction Co., Inc., 289 Ill. App. 3d 948 (1997).
¶ 40 The sisters contend Leak & Sons’ attorney intentionally and repeatedly violated pretrial in
limine orders during opening and closing by (i) making personal attacks on their attorney and
(ii) suggesting the sisters should have used a different funeral home. The sisters assert the
violations prejudiced them and warrant a new trial on damages.
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¶ 41 As to personal attacks, the sisters assert that during closing arguments, Leak & Sons’
attorney falsely accused their attorney of calling Leak, Jr. a liar, belittled him as “some young
man,” to undermine his credibility, “framed plaintiffs’ closing argument as an unethical choice
made by counsel,” and suggested that the sisters’ attorney failed “to deliver” on the evidence
he promised to show the jurors.
¶ 42 As the sisters’ note, the record does not show that their attorney called Leak, Jr. a “liar,”
during his opening or closing statements. He did, however, repeatedly allege that Leak & Sons,
its employees, and Leak, Jr., “lied” to their clients. We see little distinction between calling
someone “a liar” and saying they “lied.” Thus, the contention that this was a false statement or
a personal attack on plaintiffs’ counsel is without merit. Similarly, the sisters do not explain
how referring to their attorney as “some young man” undermined his credibility. Leak & Sons’
attorney explained that the Leaks had established a reputation over 90 years and that it was
difficult for a younger man to attack their character.
¶ 43 Moreover, the trial court sustained objections to those statements, as well as other
statements in closing to which the sisters objected, namely, that the sisters’ attorney made an
“unethical choice” in framing the case and failed to deliver evidence he promised in opening
statements. “ ‘Generally, the prompt sustaining of an objection by a trial judge is sufficient to
cure any error in a question or answer before the jury.’ ” Allen v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health
Center, 2021 IL App (4th) 200360, ¶ 192 (quoting People v. Mims, 403 Ill. App. 3d 884, 897
(2010)). The law presumes jurors follow the trial court’s instructions. Id.
¶ 44 The trial court immediately sustained objections to the allegedly prejudicial comments in
closing arguments and informed the jury that closing arguments are not evidence, curing any
potential error. “[A] counsels’ misstatement will not deny a party a fair trial where the
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misstatement comprises only a small segment of the closing argument and the jury is instructed
that closing arguments are not evidence. See, e.g., Lagoni v. Holiday Inn Midway, 262 Ill. App.
3d 1020, 1035 (1994).
¶ 45 The sisters also contend the trial court erred by allowing defense counsel to repeatedly
suggest during opening and closing statements and during Carr Taylor’s cross-examination
that the sisters could have mitigated their damages by using a different funeral home for
cremation. They point to defense counsel showing the jury a slide during opening statements,
purportedly stating that “the Plaintiffs had other choices that they could have gone to another
funeral home,” which the trial court had barred, and asking the rhetorical question, “Why didn’t
they go elsewhere?”
¶ 46 In ruling on the motions in limine, the trial court prohibited evidence or argument that the
sisters were negligent or could have mitigated their damages. But the court allowed Leak &
Sons to present evidence to show their negligence was not the proximate cause of the sisters’
injuries. The sisters contend they chose burial over cremation because they lost confidence in
the funeral home. Leak & Sons disputed this because they allowed the funeral home to bury
their mother. In other words, they could have chosen a different funeral, not that they should
have done so. The latter pertains to contributory negligence and mitigation of damages, while
the former concerns proximate cause, which the trial court permitted.
¶ 47 As for the slide defense counsel purportedly showed the jury during opening statements, it
does not appear in the record on appeal. An appellant has the burden of presenting a sufficiently
complete record to support their claim of error and doubts arising from the incompleteness of
the record will be resolved against them. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984).
Absent the slide, we cannot find that it prejudiced the sisters.
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¶ 48 Moreover, the trial court immediately sustained the sisters’ objection to defense counsel
rhetorically asking whether they could have gone to a different funeral home, which cured any
prejudice. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 2021 IL App (4th) 200360, ¶ 192. And, as the
trial court noted, the jury ruled in favor of the sisters on liability; thus, they cannot show
substantial prejudice that would warrant a new trial. Simmons, 198 Ill. 2d at 566-67.
¶ 49 The sisters raise two additional issues with defense counsel’s closing argument. First, they
contend that defense counsel attempted to improperly present the jury with deposition
testimony not admitted into evidence. The sisters acknowledge that the trial court sustained
their objection and that the deposition testimony was not admitted. As noted, the trial court
instructed the jury that closing arguments are not evidence and that “any statement *** made
by the lawyers that’s not supported by the evidence as you heard it or documents *** received
by the Court, you should disregard.” To repeat, a jury is presumed to abide by that instruction.
People v. McCoy, 238 Ill. App. 3d 240, 252 (1992).
¶ 50 Secondly, the sisters contend Leak & Sons mischaracterized Carr Taylor’s and Wilson’s
testimony by suggesting they testified their mother wanted her ashes placed in a necklace. The
sisters are correct that neither made that statement. But Leontyne Ray, their cousin, did testify
that Ray told her she wanted her ashes placed in a necklace or other piece of jewelry. And the
sisters’ attorney said in the closing argument that “Marie [Carr] feels a failure, especially for
announcing [Ray] specifically told [her] *** that she wanted all of her sisters to have necklaces.
The burden she must carry from this is unimaginable.” Even if Leak & Sons’ attorney misstated
which witness testified that Ray said she wanted her ashes placed in a necklace (which the
sisters’ attorney appears to have also misspoken), nothing suggests that the error caused
substantial prejudice or affected the outcome. Simmons, 198 Ill. 2d at 566-67.
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¶ 51 COVID-19 Evidence
¶ 52 The sisters argue that COVID-19 testimony was a sympathy ploy. See Lorenz v. Siano, 248
Ill. App. 3d 946, 953 (1993) (“It has long been the rule in Illinois that appeals to the passion
or sympathy of the jury are improper”). A trial court has broad discretion in deciding which
evidence the jury hears, and its rulings, even if erroneous, are not reversed unless they result
in substantial prejudice. Schultz v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corp., 201
Ill. 2d 260, 296 (2002). Harmless errors do not warrant reversal. Neuhengen v. Global
Experience Specialists, Inc., 2018 IL App (1st) 160322, ¶ 157.
¶ 53 The trial court allowed limited evidence of COVID-19 on the issue of proximate causation
to support Leak & Sons’ contention that COVID-19 delayed cremations. It was well within the
court’s discretion to allow that evidence. Even if it erred, however, the error was harmless, as
the plaintiffs prevailed on the issue of proximate causation, with the jury returning verdicts in
their favor. Moreover, to the extent that the sisters contend that defense counsel introduced the
COVID-19 evidence to garner sympathy for his clients, the trial court cured any prejudicial
effect by instructing the jury twice that it should not base its verdict on sympathy. Thus,
plaintiffs cannot show prejudice, let alone substantial prejudice.
¶ 54 Character Evidence
¶ 55 Character evidence is generally inadmissible to prove conduct in conformity (Ill. R. Evid.
404(a), but becomes admissible in rebuttal when a party injects reputation or character into the
case. Werdell v. Turzynski, 128 Ill. App. 2d 139, 150–51 (1970). Before trial, the sisters filed
a motion in limine seeking to bar evidence that Leak & Sons has a good reputation in the
community and performed essential services during the pandemic. The trial court provisionally
granted the motion in limine but told Leak & Sons that “If [the sisters’ counsel] does anything
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to open the door, ask for a sidebar outside the presence of the jury and say, Judge, he’s opened
the door.”
¶ 56 During opening statements, the sisters’ attorney addressed Leak & Sons’ reputation in the
community, stating, “It does not matter if you’re an important institution or doing good and
moral work. If you are careless and you harm someone, you are responsible for all the damage
that you have caused.” The sisters’ attorney also told the jury that Leak & Sons lied to their
customers, saying during opening statements that “it is never acceptable to lie to your
customers,” “we’re suing Leak & Sons Funeral Home [because] it chose to break the rule that
you must never lie to your customers,” “Leak & Son lied and this family’s spirit broke.”
¶ 57 After a sidebar, the trial court ruled that the sisters’ attorney had opened the door on
character evidence, allowing Leak & Sons’ attorney to “dump it all in.” We will uphold the
trial court’s rulings on evidentiary issues unless they constitute an abuse of discretion.
Ittersagen, 2020 IL App (1st) 190778, ¶ 75. Based on the sisters’ attorneys’ violation of the in
limine order concerning Leak & Sons’ reputation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the character evidence.
¶ 58 Jury Instructions
¶ 59 The sisters argue the instructions failed to convey that interference with their right to
control disposition was actionable and fault the refusal of their non-IPI 10.04 duty instruction
(“use ordinary care not to interfere ***”). The court declined the instruction because
negligence was not at issue after summary judgment.
¶ 60 Civil litigants are entitled to have the jury instructed on the issues, governing law, and facts
that must be proved to support a verdict. Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 505
(2002). We review for abuse of discretion, asking whether the instructions, as a whole, fairly
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and correctly stated the law without misleading the jury and reverse only for serious prejudice.
Bailey v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, 2021 IL 126748, ¶ 42.
¶ 61 The court instructed that next of kin are entitled to proper interment or cremation and that
the sisters held the right to control time, place, and manner of disposition; defined negligence;
gave an issues instruction stating the sisters claimed defendants interfered with that right; and
told the jury negligence had been determined. Viewed together, the instructions adequately
conveyed that interference tied to negligence was actionable. Declining the sisters’ proposed
non-IPI 10.04 was not an abuse of discretion.
¶ 62 For-Cause Challenges
¶ 63 The sisters argue the court erred in refusing to strike two prospective jurors who favored
damages caps, forcing them to exhaust peremptory challenges and accept an unwanted juror.
¶ 64 We will not reverse a trial court’s determination that a juror is competent unless the ruling
is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Commitment of Trulock, 2012 IL App (3d)
110550, ¶ 43. Reversal for failure to strike for cause requires a showing of prejudice, and
establishing that it was forced to accept the objectionable juror and was unable to excuse the
juror due to a lack of peremptory challenges. Id. ¶ 45. Mere suspicion of bias or partiality is
not enough. Ittersagen v. Advocate Health & Hospitals. Corp., 2020 IL App (1st) 190778,
¶ 57.
¶ 65 The sisters fail to show that the seated juror was not fair or impartial or prejudiced. They
acknowledge the juror’s “views were not sufficient for a ‘for cause’ challenge” but contend
that as a corporate executive, he “could be reasonably expected to subconsciously place
himself in the shoes of the defendants rather than the plaintiffs.” The sisters suspect that the
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juror was pro-defendant, citing nothing in his questionnaire or answers during voir dire to
suggest prejudice or that he would not be an impartial juror. We find no grounds for reversal.
¶ 66 Cumulative Error
¶ 67 The sisters argue cumulative error warrants a new damages trial, citing the closeness of the
evidence on whether their grief stemmed from the death or from Leak & Sons’ negligence and
pointing to in limine violations and sympathy appeals. For support, they cite Tucker v. Division
Sales, Inc., 315 Ill. App. 3d 472 (2000) and Wagner v. Zboncak, 111 Ill. App. 3d 268 (1982),
where the trial courts ruled in favor of the party that violated the orders in limine, resulting in
prejudice to the losing party. Here, the jury ruled against Leak & Sons.
¶ 68 The sisters also contend they should not be penalized for prevailing on proximate cause
and that a low award can reflect prejudice or sympathy, citing Drakeford v. University of
Chicago Hospitals, 2013 IL App (1st) 111366. There, a jury awarded $4.6 million (reduced to
$3 million) to a mother who alleged that the hospital engaged in willful and wanton misconduct
by having her daughter buried in a mass, unmarked grave without her knowledge or consent
and without performing a requested autopsy. Leak & Sons counters that awards under $10,000
have been upheld in remains-handling cases in other jurisdictions.
¶ 69 Illinois courts disfavor cross-case comparisons when assessing damages. Richardson v.
Chapman, 175 Ill. 2d 98, 114 (1997). We decline to do so, particularly considering the record
and the trial judge’s steady and responsible stewardship of the trial. The plaintiffs’ award is
not against the manifest weight and denying a new damages trial was not an abuse of discretion.
¶ 70 “Inherent Prejudice”
¶ 71 In their amended reply brief, the sisters urge a new trial standard based on “inherent
prejudice,” relying on Kroft v. Viper Trans, Inc., 2025 IL App (1st) 240220. In Kroft, the
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plaintiffs’ attorney made a social media post during trial titled, “What Jurors Should Know But
Don’t,” revealing information excluded from evidence, namely that a prior jury had awarded
his clients $43 million, that the trial court ordered a new trial, and that his clients’ injuries had
worsened in the interim. The appellate court found that (i) the post was improperly intended to
reach the jury and influence its verdict and (ii) the trial court abused its discretion in
questioning jurors to determine if they had read the post by posing questions “suggestive
toward a negative answer and [that] may have primed the jurors away from being publicly
forthcoming about whether the social media posts” coming to their attention. Id. ¶ 55.
¶ 72 Because of this “clear abuse of discretion” in questioning the jurors, the appellate court did
not need to decide whether the posts were “inherently prejudicial to the defendants’ right to a
fair trial.” Id. ¶ 59. Nonetheless, the court stated, “We believe also that it is important to
establish a clear precedent that the appellate court will not tolerate any attempts by attorneys,
litigants, or those acting on their behalf to use social media or the Internet to communicate
information to jurors outside the normal courtroom process.” Id. We agree that attempts to
influence jurors through social media require a strong judicial response. Yet, Kroft expressly
declined to hold that a new trial based on “inherent prejudice.”
¶ 73 The sisters’ reliance on Browning v. Advocate Health & Hospital Corp., 2023 IL App (1st)
221430 is also not persuasive. The sisters urge us to adopt Browning dissent’s notion that a
new trial can be given for “inherent prejudice,” although they acknowledge that Browning
reaffirmed the standard for granting a new trial. As the Browning majority found, “inherent”
prejudice is a “fanciful” theory unsupported by case law. Id. at ¶ 81.
¶ 74 Affirmed.
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