Calhoun, Judge:
In this proceeding in mandamus, the petitioners, Amos C. Wilson and Horace England, as members of the board of ballot commissioners of Logan County, filed in this Court on April 19, 1966, their petition in which the County Court of Logan County, a public corporation, W. E. Bivens and W. C. Dingess, as commissioners, and Raymond Chafin, as clerk of the county court, were named as respondents.
The prayer of the petition is that a peremptory writ of mandamus be issued to require the County Court of Logan County to reconvene in special meeting and, at such meeting, enter an order “voiding” its prior order of April 5, 1966, by which Logan County was redistricted so as thereafter to be composed of four magisterial districts instead [546]*546of the three magisterial districts into which the county had theretofore been divided; to require Raymond Chafin, in his capacity as clerk of the county court, to deliver to the petitioners “voting machine labels or other ballots” in his possession which contemplated that the primary election in Logan County thereafter to be held on May 10, 1966, would be on the basis of four rather than three magisterial districts; and further commanding the respondents to attach to the voting machines for the primary election the “voting machine ballot labels certified and ordered by Petitioners,” and which were formulated on the basis of three rather than four magisterial districts.
The basic question which was presented for decision in this case was whether the upcoming primary election should be held in Logan County on the basis of three magisterial districts, in accordance with the contention of the petitioners, or on the basis of four magisterial districts, in accordance with the contention of the respondents. A determination of that basic question involved a determination of the validity of the county court’s redistricting order of April 5, 1966.
On April 25,1966, the Court awarded a rule in mandamus returnable on May 3, 1966. On the latter date the case was submitted for decision upon the petition; upon the answer of the respondents to the petition; upon the motion of the petitioners to exclude the answer; upon the demurrer of the petitioners to the answer; and upon briefs and oral arguments of counsel.
On May 5, 1966, the Court entered an order by which the motion to exclude the answer and the demurrer to the answer were severally overruled and by which the Court held and adjudged that the petitioners had not shown a clear legal right to the relief sought by them in their petition and by which the prayer of the petition accordingly was denied. By that order the Court reserved the right later to file a written opinion setting forth its reasons for the decision. This opinion has been prepared and is filed pursuant to the reservation in the order of the right to do so. [547]*547On the day of the entry of the order by which the Court set forth its decision of the legal questions arising in the case, Judge Browning filed a dissenting opinion in writing in which he set forth the reasons for his disagreement with the Court’s decision.
The procedure in this case is unusual in that the dissenting opinion was prepared and filed in advance of the preparation and filing of the majority opinion. Normally a dissenting opinion is in the nature of an expression of disagreement with matters decided and views stated in the majority opinion. In the unique circumstances of this case, the majority opinion necessarily, to some degree, must assume the nature of a reply to views expressed in the dissenting opinion.
In the dissenting opinion, the disagreement of its author has been stated in language which may be appropriately characterized as scathing and harshly denunciatory, rather than moderate and restrained. We of the majority are charged with having stubbornly emphasized Code, 1931, 7-2-2, and with having refused to give any consideration to applicable constitutional provisions and other pertinent statutes. We are charged with having raised “in hauteur” our “august judicial robes;” with having figuratively stepped over “the feuding politicians” of Logan County; and with having acted “pontifically.” If we properly comprehend the effect of this spectacular verbiage, it amounts to a charge that we of the majority have assumed an attitude of hautiness and arrogance; that we have comported ourselves with unbecoming pomposity; and that we have heedlessly flaunted pertinent statutes and constitutional provisions. We are content to rely upon the Court’s decision for our vindication.
The dissent seems to imply that this case arises from maneuvering of hostile political factions for personal reasons and for the purpose of avoiding an honest election in Logan County. The opinion states that the people who are responsible for this political maneuvering and consequent flood of litigation constitute a “minute portion” of the citizens and voters and that ninety-nine percent of the sixty-five thousand citizens of Logan County “are law-[548]*548abiding, patriotic men and women striving constantly to establish better government” and to elect better men and women to political offices. We do not challenge the correctness of these percentages, though it may be that this and other cases recently in court serve to emphasize the disproportionate influence and potency of the one percent and to furnish a basis for a challenge to the ninety-nine percent, including the author of the dissenting opinion, to exert an influence for good in proportion to their numbers in the political and official life of the county.
We regard with indulgence and charity the fact that the author of the dissenting opinion saw fit to direct such harsh language toward his four associates on the Court because, as the dissenting opinion discloses, he is a native son of Logan County. If one stands too close to a mountain, it is impossible for him to view it in its broad outline and expanse. It may conceivably be that we of the majority, who are not natives or residents of Logan County, have been able to approach a decision of this case in a more objective way than can be expected of a mere human being who, through the years, has lived so close to the situation which gives rise to the series of court cases of a political or factional nature which have arisen in recent months in Logan County.
The motion to strike the answer is based on the fact that the verification of the answer is dated April 2, 1966. This is an obvious typographical error, because the answer replies in detail to allegations of the petition and the petition was verified on April 16, 1966. It is reasonably apparent that, as a matter of fact, the verification should have been dated May 2, 1986, the day before the case was argued and submitted for decision. We are of the opinion that this irregularity is not of such critical character as to require us to exclude the answer from our consideration, especially without giving the respondents leave to correct the obvious error. This is especially true, we believe, because of the fact that the petitioners demurred to the answer and because of the fact that the case was orally argued before the Court on. its merits before the motion to exclude was [549]*549actually filed. Since-this objection-was not raised by demurrer, it must be regarded as waived. See State ex rel. Bika v. Ashworth, 128 W. Va. 1, 3, 35 S. E. 2d 351, 352; Code, 1931, 56-4-36 and 56-4-65; 71 C.J.S., Pleading/Section 564 (2),'page 1137. ■ .
The Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to proceedings in mandamus. R. C. P. 81 (a) (5). The demurrer, therefore, was á proper pleading by which to test the legal sufficiency of the allegations of the answer. Code, 1931, 56-4-36. The demurrer must be treated as having admitted .the truth of all' matters of fact which were well pleaded in the answer. 6 M.- J., Demurrers, Section 28, page 26.
The demurrer charges (1) that all voting precincts in Logan-County were abolished by the county court’s redistricting order of April 5, 1966, and that no voting precincts were thereafter recreated by the county court in accordance with the provisions of Code, 1931, 3-1-5 and 7, as amended; (2) that the county court could not by its redistricting order, under the provisions of the statute, recreate election precincts because the redistricting order was entered in less than ninety days before the May 10, 1966, primary election; and (3) that the averments of the answer disclose that respondent Raymond Chafin, in his official position as clerk of the county court, did not comply with the laws pertaining to the printing of official ballots for the reason that the answer admits the ordering and receipt by his office of ballots not certified by the board of ballot commissioners and that he intends to use such allegedly improper ballots in the primary election.
The county court’s redistricting order of April 5, 1966, was made and entered pursuant to Code, 1931, 7-2-2, which, subject to omission of part thereof which is not deemed to be material, is as follows:
“Each county shall be laid off by the county court into magisterial districts, not less than three nor more than ten in number, and as nearly equal as may be in territory and population. The districts as they now exist shall remain until changed by the county court. The county court may, from time [550]*550to time, increase or diminish the number of such districts, and change the boundary lines thereof as necessity may require, in order to conform the same to the provisions of the Constitution of the State.
“Whenever the county court shall deem it advisable to change the boundary line between two or more districts, or to establish a new district out of another or two or more districts, or to consolidate two or more existing districts into one, it may make such change, establishment or consolidation by an order entered of record. * * * But before such districts shall be increased or diminished, or the boundary lines thereof changed, the court shall cause a notice of its intention to do so to be posted on the front door of the courthouse of the county, and at some public place in each district affected thereby, for at least thirty days prior to the term of court at which such action is proposed to be taken.”
The statute quoted immediately above grants to county courts, in clear and unqualified language, the power to diminish or to increase the number of magisterial districts and to change the boundary lines of existing districts. The statute does not limit the power of a county court to non-election years. It does not prohibit a county court from taking action under its provisions within any specified time before a primary or general election. On the contrary, Code, 1931, 3-1-7, as amended, authorizes county courts to “change the boundaries of any precinct within such county, or divide any precinct into two or more precincts, or consolidate two or more precincts into one, or change any place of holding elections;” but the statute provides additionally: “No order effecting such change, division, or consolidation shall be made by the county court within ninety days next preceding an election * * *.” There is no similar time limitation upon the power of county courts under the statute which deals with changes of magisterial districts. We must assume that the legislature had a reason for placing a time limitation in one statute and not in the other. It is not for us to question the wisdom or expediency of this difference in the two statutes. We cannot read into the magisterial district statute a time restriction on the [551]*551power of a county court which was not written into the statute by the legislature.
The magisterial district statute requires a county court to give a prescribed notice “for at least thirty days prior to the term of court at which such action is proposed to be taken.” Notice was given by the county court in this instance in conformity with the statutory requirement before the magisterial districts were changed by the county court on April 5, 1966. Nobody appeared before the county court at its meeting held on that date, or at any other time or place, to protest or object in any manner to the entry of the redistricting order. Specifically, neither of these petitioners appeared, no candidate for public office appeared and no member or chairman of any political party executive committee appeared to object to the proposed change or to the timeliness of the. proposed change of magisterial districts. The statute contemplates that objections or protests, if any, should have been made on or before April 5, 1966, the date designated for the proposed change of magisterial districts. So far as the record discloses, no objection whatsoever was made at any time, in any manner, by anybody until after the change was made by the entry of the county court’s redistricting order. The propriety or legality of the change in magisterial districts is challenged in this proceeding only by the two petitioners as members of the board of ballot commissioners of Logan County. The dissenting opinion assumes to take up the cudgel in behalf of four candidates for justice of the peace. The record does not disclose that they, themselves, are dissatisfied with the redistricting. The dissenting opinion assumes also to speak in behalf of the “65,000 citizens of Logan County,” asserting that their rights “have been flagrantly violated.” None of that vast number of citizens appeared to protest or to object to the entry of the county court’s order of April 5, 1966.
It may be true that the county court chose an inappropriate time for redistricting the county in the light of the nearness to the date for holding the May 10 primary election. This Court has held that the action of a county [552]*552court in changing magisterial -districts constitutes per-, formance of a legislative or governmental function, rather than a judicial function. County Court of Mingo County v. Bailey, 97 W. Va. 351, 125 S. E. 253; State ex rel. Collier et al. v. Mingo County Court, 97 W. Va. 615, 125 S. E. 576. It is not for us to question the exercise of the county court’s discretion or to impugn the motives of its members. We can appraise the county court’s action only from the standpoint of its legality. Section 27, Article VIII of the Constitution of West Virginia requires that each coiinty shall be- laid off in magisterial districts not less than three nor more than ten in number, “and as nearly equal as may be- in territory and population.” It is conceded that, prior to April 5, 1966, there was a gross disparity or inequality in the population of the three magisterial districts and that the redistricting has created four magisterial districts fairly equal in population. Whatever else may be said of the action of the county court in redistricting the county, it is undeniable that the effect has been to conform to the constitutional provision which contemplates, as nearly as may be, equality in population among the several magisterial districts of Logan County. To this extent, at least, it cannot be denied that the county court has acted in obedience to the command of the Constitution.
■Logan County has adopted voting machines for use at all voting precincts within the county, pursuant to the provisions of Code, 1931, Chapter 3, Article 4, as amended. Section 10 provides that the ballot commissioners in any county in which voting machines are to be used in any election shall cause to be printed “ballot labels” for use in the voting machines; and that- all such ballot labels “shall be delivered to the clerk of the county court at least fifty days prior to the day of the election in which such labels are to be used.” Concerning the nature and content of such ballot labels, the same code section provides that the “labels shall contain the name of each candidate and each question to be voted upon and shall be clearly printed or typed in black ink on clear white material of such size as will fit the ballot frames” of the voting machines. Since the primary election was held on May 10, 1966, the ballot labels were [553]*553required to be delivered by the ballot commissioners at least fifty days prior to that date, or not later than March 21, 1966. On March 21, 1966, and thereafter until the petitioners became ballot commissioners on April 1, 1966, Rush Hall and Ray Samson were ballot commissioners for Logan County. During all that period of time, John R. Browning, as clerk of the circuit court, was ex officio a member and chairman of the board of ballot commissioners. See Code, 1931, 3-1-19, as amended.
No meeting of the board of ballot commissioners was called or convened to prepare ballot labels to be delivered to the clerk of the county court, pursuant to the statutory requirement. In these circumstances, according to the answer and its exhibits, on or about March 21, 1966, Glenn R. Jackson, a deputy to the clerk of the county court, went to the office of John R. Browning, and informed him that it was necessary that voting machine labels be prepared and delivered. The two men thereupon checked the records in Browning’s office and determined what persons had properly qualified as candidates for the forthcoming primary election. After the two men had conferred from time to time, Jackson typed the ballot labels and on March 22, 1966, forwarded them to Casto & Harris, Inc., printers, at their place of business .at Spencer, West Virginia, to be printed. The affidavit of Glenn R. Jackson, which is filed as an exhibit with the answer, alleges that this is the same procedure which has always been used in the preparation of voting machine labels in Logan County and the. same procedure used by Browning and Jackson for elections in that county in 1964. It will be noted that, to this point, no action whatsoever had been taken by the board of ballot commissioners in relation to the preparation and delivery of the voting machine labels.
On April 5, 1966, the day the county court entered its redistricting order, Jackson called Casto & Harris, Inc., and directed a change in the printing of the ballot labels to conform to the change from three to four magisterial districts. The printed ballot labels were shipped by Casto & Harris, Inc., and received in the office of the clerk of the [554]*554county court on April 9, 1966. It is these ballot labels, formulated on the basis of four magisterial districts, which were being placed in the voting machines when this case was decided. Presumably they were used in the voting machines for the May 10, 1966, primary election.
On April 15, 1966, the petitioners, as the new ballot commissioners, delivered to Jackson a “Sample ballot of arrangement on voting machine.” This was formulated on the basis of three magisterial districts, though it will be noted that this was ten days after the county court had entered the redistricting order. The board of ballot commissioners, as it was constituted prior to April 1, 1966, did not prepare or deliver to the county clerk’s office any ballot labels of any kind or description, though the time required for their preparation and delivery had long since passed when these petitioners became ballot commissioners on April 1, 1966.
In counties in which voting machines are used, a limited number of “printed ballots” are required to be prepared and supplied by the ballot commissioners, in accordance with Code, 1931, 3-5-10, as amended. These printed ballots are used in such counties for absentee voters and for challenged ballots. The statute referred to immediately above provides: “Between the sixtieth and thirtieth days next prior to the date of the primary election, the ballot commissioners of each county shall prepare from the lists and certificates of announcements, as provided in this article, a sample official primary ballot for each party, placing thereon the names of all the candidates of the political party, and, as the case may be, the nonpartisan candidates to be voted for at such primary election.” The same section provides for newspaper publication of such sample official primary ballot and that the ballot commissioners shall cause the ballot “to be printed at least thirty days next preceding the date of the election and made ready for delivery to the several precincts along with other election supplies.”
The mandamus petition alleges that the petitioners, as ballot commissioners, on April 1, 1966, “certified the Official Ballot” for the primary election and, on the same date, [555]*555contracted for the printing of such ballots pursuant to Code, 1931, 3-1-21, as amended, which section deals with printed ballots and which has been previously referred to in this opinion. The answer and its exhibits clearly demonstrate the falsity of the allegation that the petitioners on April 1, 1966, contracted for the printing of the “official ballot.” The petitioners and John R. Browning, acting as a board of ballot commissioners, directed an undated letter to Roscoe Spence, Logan News, Logan, West Virginia, requesting that he print a specified number of ballots on the basis of three magisterial districts. A certified mail certificate discloses that the letter to Spence was actually mailed on April 7, rather than on April 1.
The petitioners and John R. Browning, as the board of ballot commissioners, directed an undated letter to Casto & Harris, Inc., at Spencer, West Virginia, by which they undertook to countermand the order for voting machine labels based on four magisterial districts and directed that the labels be printed on a three magisterial district basis. Following is a portion of a reply letter from Casto & Harris, Inc., to John R. Browning which discloses that the petitioners did not contract on April 1, 1966, for the printing of ballot labels:
“This acknowledges with thanks your undated certified letter postmarked April 7 about the Logan County ballot labels.
“However, the revised ballot label copy was approved by phone by Mr. Jackson April 5, the labels were printed April 6 and were mailed from here April 8, the same day your letter was received. * * *
“We are merely election supply printers and have no legal background. In accepting Mr. Jackson’s copy we followed a precedent of 25 years or more and, of course, could not then anticipate your instructions received April 8, after the ballot labels were printed and shipped.”
While the petition alleges that the “Official Ballot” was “certified” by the petitioners on April 1, 1966, their first day in office as ballot commissioners, the petition does [556]*556not allege to whom it was certified. The affidavit of Glenn R. Jackson, filed as an exhibit with and made a part of the answer, states that neither he nor anybody else in the office of the clerk of the county court had in his possession that which petitioners allege- to be the “official ballot,” prepared -on a three magisterial district basis, though affiant stated that he knew that “said document” was being used “by the Circuit Clerk of Logan County for absentee voting * * As has been stated previously in this opinion, the alleged “official ballot,” was not ordered to be printed until April 7, 1966, after the redistricting order was entered by the county court. Nevertheless, the circuit clerk’s office continued to send the three magisterial district ballots to absentee voters, irrespective of and apparently in defiance of the county court’s redistricting order of April 5, 1966. It clearly appears also that the board of ballot commissioners, by a letter of April 7, 1966, directed the printing of the ballots irrespective of and apparently in defiance of the action of the county court in entering its redistricting order. The board of ballot commissionei's had ample opportunity to cause the printed ballots to conform to the redistricting order and also to conform to the ballot labels which had been ordered and printed.
The county court’s order of April 5, 1966, states that “the magisterial districts as in effect prior to this date are abolished and hereafter the magisterial districts and their boundaries shall be as follows: ”. It is asserted by the petitioners that the order “abolished” the three magisterial districts; that the voting precincts were integral parts of the magisterial districts and therefore were also abolished by the county court’s order; and that the voting precincts could not at that time be recreated or reestablished because of the fact that Code, 1931, 3-1-7, as amended, provides that no order changing the boundaries of any precinct, or dividing a precinct into two or more precincts, or consolidating two or more precincts into one, or changing any place of holding elections “shall be made by the county court within ninety days next preceding an election * *■ We do not believe this contention is sound. It apparently assumes that the effect of the county court’s order was [557]*557to cause a hiatus and that there resulted a period of time, however brief, during which there were - no magisterial districts or election precincts in Logan County. The choice of language in the order may have been unwise or inappropriate, but, as a matter of fact, the county court has no right or power to enter an order which would completely abolish all magisterial districts and all voting precincts in the county. The order states that the action of the county court was being taken pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of Article VIII, Section 27 of the Constitution of West Virginia, and Code, 193Í, 7-2-2. Both the statute and the constitutional provision contain a mandatory requirement that each county shall be laid off into magisterial districts. The county court is bound by that mandatory requirement and has no power to abolish all magisterial districts and leave the county for any period of time without any such districts. The obvious purpose and effect of. the county court’s order were merely to redistrict the county.
Prior to the entry of the county court’s redistricting order, Logan County had three magisterial districts as follows: Chapmanville with ten precincts; Triadelphia with thirteen precincts and Logan with forty precincts. As a result of the redistricting the four magisterial districts are as follows: Guyan with nineteen precincts; Triadelphia with thirteen precincts; Logan with thirteen precincts; and Island Creek with eighteen precincts. The voting precincts, as a consequence of the redistricting, were not changed in respect to their total number, their locations or their boundaries. Voters vote at the same precincts and at the same locations as before.
The voting machine labels list the same candidates for office as are listed on the paper ballots. The redistricting did not disfranchise a single voter or result in denial of anybody’s right to be a candidate in the May 10, 1966, primary election. The only material difference between the voting machine labels and the printed ballots is that the former were formulated on the basis of four magisterial districts and the latter were formulated on the basis of three magisterial districts. The basic function of a board [558]*558of ballot commissioners is to determine and properly certify the names of persons who have qualified to be candidates. Concerning that matter, there is no controversy. As we have observed previously, the candidates are the same on the voting machine labels and on the printed ballots.
The dissenting opinion lists eleven constitutional provisions and states that the action of the county court is violative of each of them. At that point the dissenting opinion is lacking in specificity. It does not state precisely how these constitutional provisions have been violated. We have, nevertheless, carefully considered each of the eleven constitutional provisions. We are of the opinion that the action of the county court in redistricting the county is not violative of any constitutional provision.
The action of the county court in redistricting the county was lawful. The board of ballot commissioners has no power or authority to override the county court’s action in this respect. The board of ballot commissioners had the right and power to formulate a proper paper ballot and to have it printed for use in the primary election, but it had no lawful right or authority to formulate such a ballot on the basis of three magisterial districts for the primary election to be held in a county having four magisterial districts. The ballot formulated and printed on the basis of three magisterial districts in a four-district county was not a proper ballot. The petitioners, therefore, have not shown a clear legal right to the relief sought by them in this case.
For reasons stated in this opinion, the Court entered its order of May 5, 1966, by which the motion to exclude the answer and the demurrer to the answer were overruled and by which a peremptory writ in mandamus was denied.
Writ denied.