Wilson v. Coughlin

147 N.W.2d 175, 259 Iowa 1163, 1966 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 927

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: December 13, 1966
• Docket: 52273
• Status: Published

Opinions

Larson, J.

When William Clifford Wilson, age 16, was ordered transferred from the Training School for Boys to the Men’s Beformatory under the provisions of section 218.91, Code 1966, he filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this court on May 27, 1966. On June 13 we granted a writ to review this order but denied the request that petitioner be returned to the Training School for Boys.

Petitioner contends the Hardin County District Court was without jurisdiction and acted illegally in granting an order transferring him from the Training School for Boys to the Men’s Beformatory for custodial care, and that section 218.91 of the 1966 Code of Iowa, under which it purported to act, is unconstitutional, being in violation of the due process clauses of both the State and Federal Constitutions, i.e., Amendment 14 to the United States Constitution, and Article I, sections 9 and 10, of the Iowa Constitution, and of the equal protection clause of Amendment 14 to the United States Constitution. We find no merit in these contentions.

There was more than ample justification for the order. From the record we learn petitioner was determined a juvenile delinquent by the Polk County Juvenile Court and was duly committed to the Training Sehool for Boys at Eldora. After considerable custodial difficulty with him at the school and, while on parole, the State Director of Correctional Institutions and the superintendent of the school instituted proceedings under the provisions of section 218.91 of the Code to have him transferred to the State Men’s Beformatory at Anamosa.

It appears petitioner’s juvenile history dates back to August 1963 when he was involved in a breaking and entering. The juvenile court then placed him in Boys Town, Nebraska. Three weeks later he ran away and stole an automobile. When apprehended, he was restrained for some time in the Omaha, Nebraska, Juvenile Home, and when later released to a married brother, he again became involved in a breaking and entering. His commitment to the Iowa Training School for Boys followed on December 31, 1963.

At the training school he was first placed in a cottage, then removed to the medium security unit called the Health Center. His behavior, or misbehavior, caused him to be sent to this Center on five different occasions, and during that period he ran away from the school three separate times, and caused trouble among the other inmates.

In August 1965, after nineteen and a half months at the school, petitioner was paroled to his parents. This parole was revoked and he was returned to the school in October 1965 when he would not attend school and became involved in the theft of an automobile and some old coins. On March 11, 1966, a special leave was granted him to find employment in the Waterloo area. Tins “leave” was to terminate in a parole if he made a satisfactory adjustment at his employment. However, he found no employment and was returned to the training school at FJdora some twenty days later when he was involved in a drunkenness episode, assisted in stealing two ears, and helped cut up convertible tops on other automobiles.

Being convinced petitioner’s presence at the school would not be conducive to his welfare or the welfare of the other inmates of the school, the authorities decided he should be transferred to the reformatory for custodial care and treatment. On the 12th day of May, 1966, this application for such transfer was granted, and since that time he has been cared for in that correctional institution. Apparently the change of place of confinement is not to his liking and he asks us to find the transfer invalid.

Section 218.91, as now found in the 1966 Code of Iowa, being in effect on May 12, 1966, provides as follows:

“The board of control or the director of corrective institutions may order the transfer of inmates of the training school for boys to the men’s reformatory for custodial care whenever it is determined that such action will be conducive to the welfare of the other inmates of the school. Such transfer shall be effected by application in writing to the district court, or any judge thereof, of the county in which the said training school is situated. Upon the granting of the order of transfer, the transfer shall take place. The county attorney of the said county shall appear in support of such application. The cost of the transfer shall be paid from the funds of the training school for boys. Subsequent to a transfer made under this section, the person transferred shall be subject to all the provisions of law and regulations of the institution to which he is transferred, and for the purposes of chapter 745 such person shall be regarded as having been committed to the institution.”

This section does not violate the fundamental law, federal or state.

I. The burden resting upon one alleging a provision of the Code unconstitutional is a heavy one, for there is a presumption that all legislative acts are constitutional. Petitioner must show to the court exactly which constitutional provisions are infringed upon and in what manner. Cook v. Hannah, 230 Iowa 249, 252, 297 N.W. 262; Spurbeck v. Statton, 252 Iowa 279, 283, 106 N.W.2d 660 (1960).

In Cook, we said: “The power to declare legislation unconstitutional is one which courts exercise with great caution, and only when such conclusion is unavoidable. [Citing eases] And the presumption in favor of constitutionality is especially strong where the statute, like the one before us, was enacted to promote a public purpose, * #

In Spurbeck, we said: “At the outset we state some well-established general principles pertinent in all considerations of constitutional questions. Thus, all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; he who attacks the constitutionality must prove invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; the fact that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; if any reasonable basis which supports the statute may be coneeivecl it will be upheld; the courts have no concern with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute, and are not responsible for the presence or absence of those elements in an Act of the legislature. These rules have been stated over and over again in many cases, some of them quite recently.”

With these rules well in mind, the District Court of Hardin County agreed with the state authorities that there was no showing section 218.91 of the Code clearly, plainly, palpably, and without doubt, infringed upon the fundamental laws, state or federal, and granted this transfer. We affirm its action.

II. Title XI of the Code 1966 relating to Social Welfare and Rehabilitation, including chapter 218, provides that the board of control or its designee shall have the control, management and operation of certain custodial institutions of the State, including the Training School for Boys and the Men’s Reformatory. Section 218.1, Code, 1962-1966. Sections 218.77 and 218.78 provide for the appointment and duties of a director of corrective institutions under the board, including penal, reformatory and correctional institutions. Among his duties he shall “Establish and maintain acceptable standards of treatment, training and education in the various state penal and corrective institutions” and “Develop a program in corrective institutions for juveniles designed to rehabilitate the inmates and patients, and institute a program of placement and parole supervision for all parolees of said corrective institutions for juveniles.” Section 218.91, supra, provides for transfers from the training school to the reformatory.

There is no contention made here that the authorities did not comply with these provisions. In other words, petitioner was properly committed to the Training School for Boys and the prescribed procedure was followed in making the transfer. Petitioner, as a delinquent child, ivas committed to the state board of control for placement at a state training school under provisions of section 232.34 of the Code. Section 232.35 ■ provides: “Commitment to the state board of control shall vest guardianship of the person of the child so committed in the board and shall terminate the court’s jurisdiction.”

Petitioner was not charged or convicted of a crime, and his confinement in a state institution under the board of control is for the purpose of education, discipline and rehabilitation. Section 242.2, Code. Petitioner’s detention is custodial, not penal in nature, but the security provisions necessary for his detention are, in the first instance, strictly up to the boy. If he cannot be detained at the school, the board is given permission to transfer him to a more secure facility. By doing so, he is not being punished and is not treated as a prisoner. He has no term to serve, has no record placed against him, and must be classified as a juvenile in parental custody. He is not permitted association with older prisoners. Section 246.36. His commitment or detention is not that of a convict.

III. Due process does not require an indictment or jury trial in a proceeding to commit a delinquent and incorrigible child to a state institution. Wissenburg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 816, 229 N.W. 205, 67 A. L. R. 1075. Also see annotations commencing on page 1082 of 67 A. L. R. This decision apparently settled that proposition in this jurisdiction, for we find no later pronouncement on it.

In Wissenburg on pages 816 and 817 we point out a juvenile committed to the custody of the board of control is not being tried or punished for any crime. “The action is, in a sense, a special proceeding provided by statute, wherein the state, by virtue of its authority as parens patriae, takes jurisdiction of the incorrigible child, and commits it, not to jail for punishment, but to a reformatory, for its care, education, and training. That such a statute and such a proceeding, without a trial by jury, does not violate either the Federal or the state constitutional provisions, has been repeatedly held.” We further stated such statutes relating to confinement and custody are not criminal or penal. “They are not intended as a punishment, but are calculated to save the child from becoming a criminal.” They are characterized by the courts generally as progressive and humanitarian. Many cases are cited for this proposition. We concluded there: “The statute not being criminal in its nature, nor designed for punishment, and the commitment being for the benefit of the child and for its education and reformation, * * # the due process of law clause does not, in such a case, require a jury trial.” (Citing many cases in many jurisdictions)

Here, in a civil proceeding, the State simply assumed its function as personal guardian of petitioner, and undertook his custody and care.

In an early case of , Wisconsin Industrial School v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651, 664, 79 N.W. 422, 426, the Wisconsin court stated: “The power to place children under proper guardianship has been exercised by chancellors and judges exercising chancery powers from time immemorial.”

It must, therefore, be concluded petitioner’s commitment to the state board of control for care and treatment was perfectly legal, was not criminal in nature, and left it in the position of his parent. Section 218.91 permitted the board, as such, to transfer an incorrigible child to the reformatory for his own benefit and protection, and in order to guard against any hasty or arbitrary action requiring approval of the district court before the transfer was completed.

In making this transfer, the board is presumed to be performing a duty imposed upon it, that of restraint, education and reformation. It is not restraining the natural liberty of the child, but is placing him under a natural restraint, a restraint so far as is practicable as should be exercised by a parent. In other words, the severity of the restraint is governed entirely by the actions of the child resisting parental authority. It is not like the unnatural restraint of one convicted of a crime where the restraint is punishment. Bather it is only for so long as the child needs a firm restraining hand, and it may end anytime the child shows a willingness to behave.

Here we are told the state board has tried every other way to exercise proper parental authority, with no appreciable effect. There was no other place of custodial care where he could receive proper education, care, and rehabilitative training. While we may not feel restraint in a place generally used and occupied by convicted felons is quite proper for a child of 16 years, yet this seems to be a policy question for the legislature, not the courts. Perhaps an intermediate facility should be provided, but that is not our problem here. There is no constitutional prohibition known to us which bans association between persons convicted of crimes and others, even children. We have been cited no recent legal authority which holds an institution usually housing criminals is an improper institution for the restraint of a minor delinquent, or that due process is violated by his care and retention in such an institution. On the other hand, several state cases and many Federal decisions seem to reach the opposite conclusion. See Long v. Langlois, 93 R. I. 23, 170 A.2d 618 (1961) ; In re Darnell, 173 Ohio St. 335, 182 N.E.2d 321 (1962); Cope v. Campbell, 175 Ohio St. 475, 196 N.E.2d 457 (1964) ; Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D. C. 1960) ; Arkadiele v. Markley, 186 F. Supp. 586 (S. D. Ind. 1960); Clay v. Reid, 173 F. Supp. 667 (D. C. 1959) ; United States v. McCoy, 150 F. Supp. 237 (M. D. Pa. 1957); and Suarez v. Wilkinson, 133 F. Supp. 38 (M. D. Pa. 1955). In each case the contention was made that the statute which permitted a minor child, previously committed to a training school as a delinquent, to be transferred to a reformatory confining felons without an indictment or trial, was a violation of Amendments 5, 6 and 14 to the United States Constitution or the State Constitution relating to due process. In every instance the contention was rejected.

In Long v. Langlois, supra, where plaintiff applied for a writ of habeas corpus after being transferred to the state reformatory from the Training School for Boys, the court rejected the application and ruled the place of confinement of the child was not in violation of the Federal or State constitution. The Rhode Island transfer statute was much like our own. The court there said at page 27 of 93 R. I., page 620 of 170 A.2d: “This statute, far from defeating the purpose of the juvenile court which is to reform minors brought before it, is designed to aid by giving the right to the assistant director of social welfare to transfer from the school those who, by their actions, are failing to reform and are hurting the rest of the school * * *. After commitment to the school a boy is, in a sense, on his own and his conduct must to a degree determine where he shall remain. If removal of a boy by reason of his conduct is determined upon as a means of saving him or the rest of the school or both, such determination, would appear to be in harmony with the purposes of the juvenile court.”

Thus, the place of his detention and treatment is largely up to the delinquent boy, and the association with those who have been convicted of a crime is not a valid reason for denying the State a place to restrain and rehabilitate him. In fact, such associations under certain conditions are permitted in section 242.6 of the Code, where it is provided that the court may in certain instances commit a minor convicted of a felony to the training school for boys, or for girls, as the ease may be. We conclude, then, the association is not determinative of the petitioner’s rights. It is rather the facilities of the institution to provide the restraint, training, education and opportunity to rehabilitate that must control. There is no showing here that such facilities were not provided.

In the federal cases cited the court is considering the provision of the United States Code which authorizes the Attorney General to order any inmate transferred from one institution to another. Section 4082 of Title 18 provides: “The authority conferred upon the Attorney General by this section shall extend to all persons committed to the National Training School for Boys,” and 18 U. S. Code, section 5034, provides: “If the court finds a juvenile to be a delinquent, it may place him on probation for a period not exceeding his minority, or commit him to the custody of the Attorney General for a like period.” The court, in Suarez v. Wilkinson, supra, 133 F. Supp. 38, 40, in turning down petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus, said: “In order to provide as much flexibility as possible, correctional institutions and ‘training schools’ have been provided for those juveniles who may benefit thereby. Custody is an essential feature in those cases where parole is not feasible and the nature of such custody, in line with the juvenile’s reaction thereto, must necessarily be left to the discretion of those in charge of the problem of rehabilitation.”

Under these decisions it would seem unnecessary for the legislature to require district court approval for a transfer of an incorrigible to the reformatory, for it is the board’s problem of how and where the boy is to be confined and treated for proper rehabilitation. However, as we have noted, the legislature safeguarded the juvenile’s rights by court review of the circumstances making necessary the transfer. We think he cannot complain of this requirement, and it seems unlikely a court would deny an order of transfer if the circumstances would justify it. We do not consider the court’s legal discretion here, but find the court made no mistake in ordering this transfer.

IY. Petitioner further contends there is a conflict between section 218.91 and chapter 687 of the Code, which provides that a person convicted of a felony may be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary or men’s reformatory. Nowhere do we find in this chapter any provision which states that only convicted felons may be restrained or eared for at the men’s reformatory. In the absence of any such provision, we find no conflict here. The men’s reformatory being simply a custodial institution under the board of control, its use for that purpose has not been restricted to felons, and in fact the contrary appears. There is no merit in this contention.

V. Finally, petitioner argues that because one’ restrained at the men’s reformatory is required to obey the rules and regulations of that institution, and is made subject to prosecution for escape from it, as is provided in chapter 745 of the Code, this somehow makes him a prisoner and subjects him to increased punishment without due process of law. The short answer to this contention is, of course, that petitioner is not a prisoner and is not being punished when detained under such paternal custody. His status as a mere delinquent is not changed by this transfer and he is still eligible for parole or release at anytime his conduct convinces the board and directors that he no longer needs that control, and under no circumstances beyond his 21st birthday.

Perhaps the penalty for escape from the men’s reformatory is greater than from the Training School for Boys, but there is a marked distinction. When a boy runs away from the training school, without a judicial hearing he may be punished by the school authorities. Indeed, petitioner on several occasions has been punished for rule infractions and has summarily been confined in the security or Health Center therefor. In the reformatory, before he is punished for escape, he is entitled to a trial in the district court. Furthermore, as an inmate of either institution, he has always been subject to criminal prosecution for any crime committed and certainly could be charged with escape when arrested for one of them. At any rate we fail to see how subjecting petitioner to prosecution for escape is an increase in punishment, for it is not punishment at all until he himself has added the crime of escape to his defections against society and has been tried and convicted of that offense.

YI. Having found no basis for sustaining this writ, the same must be annulled and the order of transfer sustained.— Writ annulled.

Garfield, C. J., and Snell, Moore and Stuart, JJ., concur. Becker, Mason and Rawlings, JJ., dissent. Thornton, J., not sitting.