Wilson v. Commissioner

44 B.T.A. 1274, 1941 BTA LEXIS 1199
CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals
DecidedAugust 28, 1941
DocketDocket Nos. 101464, 101465.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 44 B.T.A. 1274 (Wilson v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilson v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 1274, 1941 BTA LEXIS 1199 (bta 1941).

Opinion

[1276]*1276OPINION.

Leech :

Petitioners contend that the distribution in 1936 was a liquidation of their canceled stock in the West Co. and that they sustained [1277]*1277losses, respectively, measured by the difference between the cost of the stock and the payments received in its liquidation. Secs. 115 (c) and (i), Revenue Act of 1936.1 Respondent determined the present deficiency and now maintains that the contested distribution to the petitioners was taxable to them as an ordinary dividend, on the premise of fact that it occurred “at such time and in such manner as to [be] * * * essentially equivalent to the distribution” of such a dividend, under section 115 (g) of the same revenue act.2 Petitioners cite and rely particularly upon Kelly v. Commissioner, 97 Fed. (2d) 915. Whether or not the facts in that case and this are effectively distinguishable, it is true that the Second Circuit in the Kelly case stated that “section 115 (g) was intended to cover a situation where there is capitalization of earnings with no honest business object but merely to avoid taxes.” Petitioners therefore argue that the purpose of distribution here was an honest business one and not to evade taxes. But here an admitted purpose of the distribution was to avoid the corporate surtax on undistributed profits. Sec. 14, Revenue Act of 1936.

Did the premise exist upon which the disputed tax was imposed? In its last analysis, section 115 (g), supra, itself, has been said to be as “dispositive” of this question of fact as the decisions construing that section. A. E. Levit, 43 B. T. A. 1077 (on appeal, C. C. A., 9th Cir.).

[1278]*1278The officers of the West Co. had been advised, since 1930, that their capitalization was too high. Despite this repeated advice nothing was done about its reduction until 1986. Then it was reduced although the volume of its business had consistently increased from 1932 and, in 3936, was more than double the amount of that earlier year.

However, of more significance, is the situation of the West Co. in 3936. Prior to that year the company had accumulated a capital deficit. During 1936, it enjoyed net earnings, though not in an amount sufficient to repair its deficit. Because of that situation no ordinary dividend could be paid under Missouri law, sec. 5347, Revised Statutes of Missouri 1939; Shields v. Hobart, 172 Mo. 491; 72 S. W. 669, and if the earnings were not distributed the company would be liable for surtaxes on those undistributed profits. Sec. 14, Revenue Act of 1936; Helvering v. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 311 U. S. 46. The officers and stockholders of the West Co., upon advice of counsel, met this dilemma by declaring and paying the dividend in question. True, it was designated in the authorizing resolution as a “liquidating dividend.” Stock of petitioners was delivered to the company and was canceled upon its receipt of the stock. The stated capital of the company was formally reduced in the amount of the canceled stock. But, the real reason for all this, we think, was not a belated intent to reduce capital. It was done to legalize the distribution as a liquidating dividend under Missouri law. But that characterization is not effective here. See Gunby, Inc. v. Helvering, 122 Fed. (2d) 203, reversing 41 B. T. A. 884. The alleged price per share at which the stock is said to have been liquidated is not fixed upon any basis of its value, book or otherwise. This “price” was computed solely by dividing substantially all the net earnings for 1936, which it was desired to distribute, among the outstanding shares of capital stock. Thus, net earnings of the company for 1936, alone, were intended to be and' were distributed to petitioners. The company did avoid the imposition of surtax on these earnings, under section 27 of the Revenue Act of 1936. And, each of the three shareholders of the company owned the same proportion of its business and assets after the “liquidation” as before.

We think the distribution in dispute occurred “at such time and in such manner as to [be] * * * essentially equivalent to the distribution” of a taxable dividend. Respondent is sustained.

Decisions will be entered under Bule 50.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Vesper Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
131 F.2d 200 (Eighth Circuit, 1942)
Wilson v. Commissioner
44 B.T.A. 1274 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1941)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
44 B.T.A. 1274, 1941 BTA LEXIS 1199, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilson-v-commissioner-bta-1941.