UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-30279 Summary Calendar
JERRALD WILSON,
Petitioner-Appellee,
versus
BURL CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary,
Respondent-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana No. 97-CV-1551-LLM
October 20, 1999
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The respondent appeals from the judgment of the district court
granting Jerrald Wilson’s application for habeas corpus relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and remanding Wilson’s petition to the
State either to re-try Jerrald Wilson or to release him from
custody. The respondent argues that the judgment should be
reversed because this case is controlled by the standard of review
in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), as applied in Muhleisen v. Ieyoub, 168 F.3d 840 (5th Cir.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. 1999). Under Muhleisen, prisoners whose convictions were final at
the enactment of the AEDPA had one year from April 24, 1996 to file
petitions for habeas relief and avoid the heightened standard of
review under the AEDPA, which precludes relief if a state court's
determination of law was consistent with United States Supreme
Court precedent existing when the prisoner was convicted. See
Muhleisen, 168 F.3d at 844. Because Wilson's claim is barred by an
adequate and independent state procedural rule, the district court
could not grant habeas relief, and we reverse the district court
without reaching this issue.
Wilson's petition was timely filed. The district court deemed
the petition to have been filed within the 1 year limitations
period of the AEDPA because it was dated April 22, 1997, and
stamped as tendered for filing on April 24, 1997, on the date of
the deadline for prisoners whose convictions were final at the
AEDPA's passage. We review the district court's findings of fact
for clear error. See Amos v. Scott, 61 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir.
1995). The court's finding that the petition was filed on April 24
is not clear error. Furthermore, this court applies the "mail box
rule" for pleadings submitted by prisoners acting pro se, and the
date on which prison officials receive the pleading is deemed the
time of filing for limitations purposes. See Cooper v. Brookshire,
70 F.3d 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1995).
In Muhleisen we applied the AEDPA standard of review to affirm
the district court’s denial of relief to a petitioner whose state-
court conviction became final before a challenged jury instruction
2 was declared unconstitutional in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39
(1990). Muhleisen, 168 F.3d at 844-45. In doing so, the Muhleisen
opinion implies that the Cage issue was adjudicated on the merits
in the state court. However, in Wilson’s case the district court’s
judgment was not based on the AEDPA standard of review. The
district court concluded that the AEDPA standard of review did not
apply to Wilson’s petition, because the state court had determined
that Wilson’s Cage claim was procedurally barred and thus the claim
was not “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” for
purposes of the AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Since the state
courts did not adjudicate the merits of Wilson's petition, federal
review is not precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state procedural bar to habeas review resting on the failure
to lodge a contemporaneous objection constitutes an adequate and
independent state ground that forecloses federal habeas review.
See, e.g, Amos v. Scott, 61 F.3d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 1995).
Louisiana's contemporary objection rule constitutes an adequate and
independent state ground for denying federal habeas review of a
Cage claim that a "reasonable doubt" jury instruction ran afoul of
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Muhleisen
v. Ieyoub, 168 F.3d 840, 843 (5th Cir. 1999). The Louisiana
Supreme Court denied Wilson's application for post-conviction
relief without explanation, and the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeal denied his application on the ground that his Cage claim
was procedurally barred because his defense counsel failed to lodge
a contemporaneous objection at his trial in 1988. Cage was decided
3 in 1990. Since the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Wilson's
application without explanation, the last reasoned state court
decision on the matter was that of the Louisiana Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeal, which applied the state procedural bar. When a
state court does not give grounds for its decision, a federal court
should assume that the court relied on the same grounds as the last
reasoned state court decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.
797,803 (1991). Accordingly, we presume the Louisiana Supreme
Court denied Wilson's application on the basis of the procedural
bar.
Federal review is available in spite of a prior decision's
resting on adequate and independent state grounds if the petitioner
can show cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result.
Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); Amos, 61 F.3d at 339. The
cause requirement is satisfied when petitioner's defense counsel
failed to raise a constitutional objection for which there was "no
reasonable basis in existing law" at the time, the novelty of the
potential claim depriving counsel of a reasonable basis to assert
the claim. Reed, 468 U.S. at 14-15. This court has determined
that habeas relief on the basis of Cage error is available for
prisoners whose convictions were final when Cage was decided. See
Humphrey v. Cain, 138 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 1998)(en banc).
Wilson has not shown cause for his procedural default. The
Supreme Court has found that "[w]here the basis of a constitutional
claim is available, and other defense counsel have perceived and
litigated that claim, the demands of comity and finality counsel
4 against labeling alleged unawareness of the objection as cause for
procedural default." Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1981).
The constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard was
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-30279 Summary Calendar
JERRALD WILSON,
Petitioner-Appellee,
versus
BURL CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary,
Respondent-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana No. 97-CV-1551-LLM
October 20, 1999
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The respondent appeals from the judgment of the district court
granting Jerrald Wilson’s application for habeas corpus relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and remanding Wilson’s petition to the
State either to re-try Jerrald Wilson or to release him from
custody. The respondent argues that the judgment should be
reversed because this case is controlled by the standard of review
in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), as applied in Muhleisen v. Ieyoub, 168 F.3d 840 (5th Cir.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. 1999). Under Muhleisen, prisoners whose convictions were final at
the enactment of the AEDPA had one year from April 24, 1996 to file
petitions for habeas relief and avoid the heightened standard of
review under the AEDPA, which precludes relief if a state court's
determination of law was consistent with United States Supreme
Court precedent existing when the prisoner was convicted. See
Muhleisen, 168 F.3d at 844. Because Wilson's claim is barred by an
adequate and independent state procedural rule, the district court
could not grant habeas relief, and we reverse the district court
without reaching this issue.
Wilson's petition was timely filed. The district court deemed
the petition to have been filed within the 1 year limitations
period of the AEDPA because it was dated April 22, 1997, and
stamped as tendered for filing on April 24, 1997, on the date of
the deadline for prisoners whose convictions were final at the
AEDPA's passage. We review the district court's findings of fact
for clear error. See Amos v. Scott, 61 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir.
1995). The court's finding that the petition was filed on April 24
is not clear error. Furthermore, this court applies the "mail box
rule" for pleadings submitted by prisoners acting pro se, and the
date on which prison officials receive the pleading is deemed the
time of filing for limitations purposes. See Cooper v. Brookshire,
70 F.3d 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1995).
In Muhleisen we applied the AEDPA standard of review to affirm
the district court’s denial of relief to a petitioner whose state-
court conviction became final before a challenged jury instruction
2 was declared unconstitutional in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39
(1990). Muhleisen, 168 F.3d at 844-45. In doing so, the Muhleisen
opinion implies that the Cage issue was adjudicated on the merits
in the state court. However, in Wilson’s case the district court’s
judgment was not based on the AEDPA standard of review. The
district court concluded that the AEDPA standard of review did not
apply to Wilson’s petition, because the state court had determined
that Wilson’s Cage claim was procedurally barred and thus the claim
was not “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” for
purposes of the AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Since the state
courts did not adjudicate the merits of Wilson's petition, federal
review is not precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state procedural bar to habeas review resting on the failure
to lodge a contemporaneous objection constitutes an adequate and
independent state ground that forecloses federal habeas review.
See, e.g, Amos v. Scott, 61 F.3d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 1995).
Louisiana's contemporary objection rule constitutes an adequate and
independent state ground for denying federal habeas review of a
Cage claim that a "reasonable doubt" jury instruction ran afoul of
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Muhleisen
v. Ieyoub, 168 F.3d 840, 843 (5th Cir. 1999). The Louisiana
Supreme Court denied Wilson's application for post-conviction
relief without explanation, and the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeal denied his application on the ground that his Cage claim
was procedurally barred because his defense counsel failed to lodge
a contemporaneous objection at his trial in 1988. Cage was decided
3 in 1990. Since the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Wilson's
application without explanation, the last reasoned state court
decision on the matter was that of the Louisiana Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeal, which applied the state procedural bar. When a
state court does not give grounds for its decision, a federal court
should assume that the court relied on the same grounds as the last
reasoned state court decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.
797,803 (1991). Accordingly, we presume the Louisiana Supreme
Court denied Wilson's application on the basis of the procedural
bar.
Federal review is available in spite of a prior decision's
resting on adequate and independent state grounds if the petitioner
can show cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result.
Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); Amos, 61 F.3d at 339. The
cause requirement is satisfied when petitioner's defense counsel
failed to raise a constitutional objection for which there was "no
reasonable basis in existing law" at the time, the novelty of the
potential claim depriving counsel of a reasonable basis to assert
the claim. Reed, 468 U.S. at 14-15. This court has determined
that habeas relief on the basis of Cage error is available for
prisoners whose convictions were final when Cage was decided. See
Humphrey v. Cain, 138 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 1998)(en banc).
Wilson has not shown cause for his procedural default. The
Supreme Court has found that "[w]here the basis of a constitutional
claim is available, and other defense counsel have perceived and
litigated that claim, the demands of comity and finality counsel
4 against labeling alleged unawareness of the objection as cause for
procedural default." Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1981).
The constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard was
well established long before Wilson's trial. See In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In re Winship provided defense counsel
with a legal basis for challenging jury instructions that defined
"reasonable doubt" on the grounds that the instructions reduced the
state's burden of proof, violating the defendant's right to due
process of law. Decisions in a variety of procedural contexts in
federal and Louisiana courts demonstrate that objections to jury
instructions defining "reasonable doubt" were raised during the
late 1980s, when Wilson was tried. See, e.g., Bumpus v. Gunter,
635 F.2d 907, 909-10 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1003
(1981); Lanigan v. Maloney, 853 F.2d 40, 42 (1st Cir.), cert
denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989); Rogers v. Carver, 833 F.2d 379, 382-
83 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 937 (1988); People v. Yang,
800 F.2d 945, 947-48 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Love, 767
F.2d 1052, 1060 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986);
State v. Cage, 554 So.2d 39, 41 (La.), rev'd, 498 U.S. 39 (1990);
State v. West, 552 So.2d 478, 480 (La. Ct. App.), rev'd, 568 So.2d
1019 (La. 1990); State v. Flank, 537 So.2d 236, 241 (La. Ct. App.
1988); State v. Miller, 489 So.2d 268, 274 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
That many of these efforts were unsuccessful is of no consequence:
"the futility of presenting an objection to the state courts cannot
alone constitute cause for failure to object at trial." Engle, 456
U.S. at 130.
5 Absent a showing of cause and prejudice, habeas review is
barred in federal courts when an adequate and independent state
procedural ground precludes review of a claim. Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, (1977). Since Wilson has not shown cause for
his procedural default, the district court erred in granting him
habeas relief.
REVERSED.