Wilson 717304 v. Kelley

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Michigan
DecidedOctober 17, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-01094
StatusUnknown

This text of Wilson 717304 v. Kelley (Wilson 717304 v. Kelley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilson 717304 v. Kelley, (W.D. Mich. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Eric Wilson,

Plaintiff, Case No. 24-cv-12063

v. Judith E. Levy United States District Judge Kelley, et al., Mag. Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford Defendants.

________________________________/

ORDER TRANSFERRING THE CASE TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

Plaintiff Eric Wilson filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which he alleges violations of his “rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.1; see id. at PageID.7–9.) Plaintiff is self-represented. (Id. at PageID.1.) He is currently incarcerated at Ionia Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan. (ECF No. 5.) According to the complaint, Defendants “Unknown Captain Kelley,” “Unknown Lt. S. Rykes,” Rebecca Wood, and “Unknown Mahalic” are Michigan Department of Corrections officers who worked at Ionia Correctional Facility at the time of the alleged violations. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Plaintiff indicates in the complaint that each Defendant is sued in their

individual capacity. (Id.) The events giving rise to his claims took place at Ionia Correctional Facility. Having reviewed the complaint, the Court concludes that venue is not proper in this district. The Court

transfers the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).1 “Venue is [generally] governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391.” Fam.

Wireless #1, LLC v. Auto. Techs., Inc., No. 15-11215, 2015 WL 5142350, at *4 n.3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 1, 2015). Section 1391(b)(1) provides for “residential venue,” and § 1391(b)(2) provides for “transactional

venue.”2 14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris.

1 Section 1406(a) states: “The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

2 Section 1391(b)(3) allows a third option for venue that is referred to as “fallback venue.” 14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3804 (4th ed. 2024). Under § 1391(b)(3), if there is no district that meets the requirements of residential or transactional venue, a case may be brought in “any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3); see 14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3804 (4th ed. 2024). “Section 1391(b)(3) applies only if there is no federal district that will satisfy either the residential venue or transaction venue provisions.” 14D Charles Alan Wright, et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3806.1 (4th ed. 2024) (emphasis in original); see 14D Charles Alan Wright § 3804 (4th ed. 2024). “[T]he plaintiff may choose to lay venue in any

district that satisfies either provision.” 14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3806 (4th ed. 2024). Under § 1391(b)(1)—the residential venue provision—a plaintiff

may bring a case in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). An individual is “deemed to reside in the judicial

district in which that person is domiciled.” Id. § 1391(c)(1). Under § 1391(b)(2)—the transactional venue provision—a plaintiff may bring a case in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” Id. § 1391(b)(2). If venue is improper in the district where a case is filed, but would

be proper in a different district, “a district court has the power to sua sponte transfer [the] case” under § 1406(a). Cosmichrome, Inc. v. Spectra Chrome, LLC, 504 F. App’x 468, 472 (6th Cir. 2012); see Flynn

et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3804 (4th ed. 2024) (“Plaintiff can use Section 1391(b)(3) only when it is impossible to use either of the first two options.”). Here, the Western District of Michigan satisfies the transactional venue provision, as set forth below. Thus, “the fallback venue provision is absolutely irrelevant.” 14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3806.1 (4th ed. 2024). v. Greg Anthony Constr. Co., 95 F. App’x 726, 738 (6th Cir. 2003)

(“Congress has enacted a number of statutes”—including § 1406(a)— “that give federal courts the power to transfer cases sua sponte.”). Section 1406(a) provides that “cases should be transferred only when it

is in the interests of justice.” Flynn, 95 F. App’x at 738; see 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The transfer is “to any district or division in which [the case] could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). “Transferring the case is

in keeping with the ultimate goal of allowing cases to be decided on their substantive merits, as opposed to being decided on procedural grounds.” Flynn, 95 F. App’x at 741 (citing Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman,

369 U.S. 463, 466–67 (1962)). Here, venue is not proper in the Eastern District of Michigan. The complaint names four Defendants, all of whom Plaintiff sues in their

individual capacities. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Plaintiff identifies Defendants as Michigan Department of Corrections’ employees who worked at Ionia Correctional Facility “during the time of the[ ] [alleged]

violations.” (Id.) But there is no allegation in the complaint that Defendants are domiciled in the Eastern District of Michigan. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (c)(1). Nor does the complaint allege that “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim[s]

occurred” in the Eastern District of Michigan. See id. § 1391(b)(2). Therefore, the residential and transactional venue provisions are not satisfied with respect to the Eastern District of Michigan.

However, venue is proper under the transactional venue provision in a different district: the Western District of Michigan. See id. Plaintiff’s claims arise from events that occurred at Ionia Correctional

Facility. That facility is located in Ionia County, which is in the Western District of Michigan. See id. § 102(b)(1). In sum, the Eastern District of Michigan is not a proper venue for

this case. Because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims took place in the Western District of Michigan, venue is proper in that district.3

3 The Court would reach the same conclusion even if Plaintiff intended to sue each Defendant in an official capacity. See Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir.

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Related

Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman
369 U.S. 463 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Williams v. Curtin
631 F.3d 380 (Sixth Circuit, 2011)
Cosmichrome, Inc. v. Spectra Chrome, LLC
504 F. App'x 468 (Sixth Circuit, 2012)
Nathaniel Brent v. Wayne Cty. Dep't of Human Servs.
901 F.3d 656 (Sixth Circuit, 2018)
O'Neill v. Battisti
472 F.2d 789 (Sixth Circuit, 1972)
Flynn v. Greg Anthony Construction Co.
95 F. App'x 726 (Sixth Circuit, 2003)

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Wilson 717304 v. Kelley, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilson-717304-v-kelley-miwd-2024.