Opinion of the Court by
LEVINSON, J.
The plaintiff-appellant Shilo Willis appeals from the July 24, 2003 judgment of the circuit court, the Honorable Eden Elizabeth Hifo presiding, (1) ruling in favor of Willis and against the defendant-appellee Craig Swain in immaterial part and (2) dismissing all other claims.
On appeal, Willis contends that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee First Insurance Company of Hawaii, Ltd. (First Insurance) inasmuch as she was entitled to assigned claims coverage pursuant to Hawaii’s Motor Vehicle Insurance Law, Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) ch. 431, art. 10C (1993 & Supp.1998),
see infra
note 2.
For the reasons discussed
infra
in section III.B, we vacate the circuit court’s July 24, 2003 judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
BACKGROUND
On July 1 or 2, 1998, Willis received from the Department of Human Services (DHS) a “certificate of eligibility for ... motor vehicle insurance through the Hawai[’]i Joint Underwriting Plan [(JUP)] Bureau [(JUPB)].” (Capitalization altered.) The certificate identified Willis as a recipient of an unspecified type of “public assistance[
] as of [May 12, 1992] consisting of direct ca[sh] payments.” Willis was therefore “eligible for basic motor vehicle insurance coverage at no cost, in accordance with [HRS §] 431:100-407(b)(2[) ].”
Willis enrolled in a “certificate
policy” administered by First Insurance,
which was effective from July 2, 1998
through July 2,1999. Willis’s certificate policy did not include uninsured motorist (UM) coverage, but her certificate of eligibility stated: “If you desire ... [UM] ... coverage ] ..., contact an insurance agent to assist you in obtaining th[is] coverage upon payment of the appropriate premium.” The record on appeal is silent as to whether Willis actually contacted First Insurance or any other insurer regarding UM coverage.
On February 10,1999, Willis was a passenger in an uninsured vehicle owned and operated by Swain when Swain rear-ended another vehicle, injuring Willis.
Even after her certificate policy expired on July 2, 1999, Willis “continued to see [her] doetor[ ] for the injuries [that she] sustained in the ... collision” and “to incur medical bills ... relating to] and ailising] out of the ... collision.”
At some point after the accident, Willis filed an “application for benefits under the Ha-wai[’]i Assigned Claims Plan,”
which the JUPB assigned to First Insurance on August 11,1999.
On December 28, 1999, First Insurance informed Willis that it would grant her no benefits pursuant to the assigned claim because, First Insurance maintained, she was covered under her certificate policy on the date of the collision. (Citing HRS § 431:100-408.) Accordingly, on February 9, 2001, Willis filed a complaint in the circuit court of the first circuit, the Honorable Eden Elizabeth Hifo presiding, praying,
inter alia,
for damages from First Insurance for “breach of contract,” “bad faith refusal to pay liability coverage,” “misrepresentation,” and “unfair and deceptive acts or practices.” (Capitalization omitted.) On March 31, 2003, First Insurance moved for summary judgment. In its memorandum in support, First Insurance argued that
[t]he Certificate Policy issued to [Willis] explicitly states that [UM] coverage is available to certificate policyholders by
contacting an insurance agent and paying the “appropriate premium.” [Willis] did not elect to purchase [UM] coverage during the time that she was a First Insurance certificate policyholder. The current claim by [Willis] ... is nothing less than a deliberate attempt to obtain free [UM coverage] when [Willis] elected not to purchase such coverage.
Willis responded:
If the legislature had intended to exclude the bodily injury [ (BI) ] coverage in the assigned claims policy, it would have done so just like it did under [HRS §] 431:10[C]-103.5 where it specifically excluded a person from receiving [personal injury protection (]PIP[) ] benefits in a certificate policy.... [T]he key element that the legislature intended was that people should have coverage, and for that reason they specifically stated in the statute that it had to be liability coverage in 2001.[
] In 1999, ... it used the word “benefits[”;] it did not exclude even in 1999 the [BI]. The whole purpose ... of the no-fault law is remedial in nature and in purpose.
[[Image here]]
... [T]he purpose of the assigned claims ... was to provide the indigent the opportunity to have coverage. And, in essence, to say that a person who has a certificate policy is not entitled to the assigned claims policy would be, in effect, punishing an individual for having had the certificate policy issued....
... [HRS §] 431:10[C]-301 ... very clearly says a motor vehicle insurance policy shall include liability coverage.... So ... the intent of the legislature was to afford the indigent the opportunity to have liability coverage, and that is why ... in 2001 they made the specific qualification in [HRS § 431:10C-408(a)(l) ], which tells us specifically that if there is [“[n]]o liability or [UM] insurance benefits,[”] ... the assigned claim policy is applicable.
[See supra
note 7.]
The circuit court granted First Insurance’s motion and, on July 24, 2003, entered final judgment in favor of First Insurance and against Willis.
Seven minutes later, Willis filed her notice of appeal to this court.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the circuit court’s grant or denial of summary judgment
de novo. Hawai’i C[m]ty[.] Fed[.] Credit Union v. Keka,
94 Hawai'i 213, 221, 11 P.3d 1, 9 (2000). The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is settled:
[S]ummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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Opinion of the Court by
LEVINSON, J.
The plaintiff-appellant Shilo Willis appeals from the July 24, 2003 judgment of the circuit court, the Honorable Eden Elizabeth Hifo presiding, (1) ruling in favor of Willis and against the defendant-appellee Craig Swain in immaterial part and (2) dismissing all other claims.
On appeal, Willis contends that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee First Insurance Company of Hawaii, Ltd. (First Insurance) inasmuch as she was entitled to assigned claims coverage pursuant to Hawaii’s Motor Vehicle Insurance Law, Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) ch. 431, art. 10C (1993 & Supp.1998),
see infra
note 2.
For the reasons discussed
infra
in section III.B, we vacate the circuit court’s July 24, 2003 judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
BACKGROUND
On July 1 or 2, 1998, Willis received from the Department of Human Services (DHS) a “certificate of eligibility for ... motor vehicle insurance through the Hawai[’]i Joint Underwriting Plan [(JUP)] Bureau [(JUPB)].” (Capitalization altered.) The certificate identified Willis as a recipient of an unspecified type of “public assistance[
] as of [May 12, 1992] consisting of direct ca[sh] payments.” Willis was therefore “eligible for basic motor vehicle insurance coverage at no cost, in accordance with [HRS §] 431:100-407(b)(2[) ].”
Willis enrolled in a “certificate
policy” administered by First Insurance,
which was effective from July 2, 1998
through July 2,1999. Willis’s certificate policy did not include uninsured motorist (UM) coverage, but her certificate of eligibility stated: “If you desire ... [UM] ... coverage ] ..., contact an insurance agent to assist you in obtaining th[is] coverage upon payment of the appropriate premium.” The record on appeal is silent as to whether Willis actually contacted First Insurance or any other insurer regarding UM coverage.
On February 10,1999, Willis was a passenger in an uninsured vehicle owned and operated by Swain when Swain rear-ended another vehicle, injuring Willis.
Even after her certificate policy expired on July 2, 1999, Willis “continued to see [her] doetor[ ] for the injuries [that she] sustained in the ... collision” and “to incur medical bills ... relating to] and ailising] out of the ... collision.”
At some point after the accident, Willis filed an “application for benefits under the Ha-wai[’]i Assigned Claims Plan,”
which the JUPB assigned to First Insurance on August 11,1999.
On December 28, 1999, First Insurance informed Willis that it would grant her no benefits pursuant to the assigned claim because, First Insurance maintained, she was covered under her certificate policy on the date of the collision. (Citing HRS § 431:100-408.) Accordingly, on February 9, 2001, Willis filed a complaint in the circuit court of the first circuit, the Honorable Eden Elizabeth Hifo presiding, praying,
inter alia,
for damages from First Insurance for “breach of contract,” “bad faith refusal to pay liability coverage,” “misrepresentation,” and “unfair and deceptive acts or practices.” (Capitalization omitted.) On March 31, 2003, First Insurance moved for summary judgment. In its memorandum in support, First Insurance argued that
[t]he Certificate Policy issued to [Willis] explicitly states that [UM] coverage is available to certificate policyholders by
contacting an insurance agent and paying the “appropriate premium.” [Willis] did not elect to purchase [UM] coverage during the time that she was a First Insurance certificate policyholder. The current claim by [Willis] ... is nothing less than a deliberate attempt to obtain free [UM coverage] when [Willis] elected not to purchase such coverage.
Willis responded:
If the legislature had intended to exclude the bodily injury [ (BI) ] coverage in the assigned claims policy, it would have done so just like it did under [HRS §] 431:10[C]-103.5 where it specifically excluded a person from receiving [personal injury protection (]PIP[) ] benefits in a certificate policy.... [T]he key element that the legislature intended was that people should have coverage, and for that reason they specifically stated in the statute that it had to be liability coverage in 2001.[
] In 1999, ... it used the word “benefits[”;] it did not exclude even in 1999 the [BI]. The whole purpose ... of the no-fault law is remedial in nature and in purpose.
[[Image here]]
... [T]he purpose of the assigned claims ... was to provide the indigent the opportunity to have coverage. And, in essence, to say that a person who has a certificate policy is not entitled to the assigned claims policy would be, in effect, punishing an individual for having had the certificate policy issued....
... [HRS §] 431:10[C]-301 ... very clearly says a motor vehicle insurance policy shall include liability coverage.... So ... the intent of the legislature was to afford the indigent the opportunity to have liability coverage, and that is why ... in 2001 they made the specific qualification in [HRS § 431:10C-408(a)(l) ], which tells us specifically that if there is [“[n]]o liability or [UM] insurance benefits,[”] ... the assigned claim policy is applicable.
[See supra
note 7.]
The circuit court granted First Insurance’s motion and, on July 24, 2003, entered final judgment in favor of First Insurance and against Willis.
Seven minutes later, Willis filed her notice of appeal to this court.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the circuit court’s grant or denial of summary judgment
de novo. Hawai’i C[m]ty[.] Fed[.] Credit Union v. Keka,
94 Hawai'i 213, 221, 11 P.3d 1, 9 (2000). The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is settled:
[S]ummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. In other words, we must view all of the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
Id.
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Querubin v. Thronas,
107 Hawai'i 48, 56, 109 P.3d 689, 697 (2005) (quoting
Durette v. Aloha Plastic Recycling, Inc.,
105 Hawai'i 490, 501, 100 P.3d 60, 71 (2004) (quoting
Simmons v. Puu,
105 Hawai'i 112, 117-18, 94 P.3d 667, 672-73 (2004) (quoting
Kahale v. City & County of Honolulu,
104 Hawai'i 341, 344, 90 P.3d 233, 236 (2004) (quoting
SCI Mgmt. Corp. v. Sims,
101 Hawai'i 438, 445, 71 P.3d 389, 396 (2003) (quoting
Coon v. City &
County of Honolulu,
98 Hawai'i 233, 244-45, 47 P.3d 348, 359-60 (2002)))))).
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
The Parties’Arguments
On appeal, Willis contends that there was no other BI insurance for her to turn to and that the legislature intended for her to be covered. (Quoting HRS §§ 431:10C-102, -103.5, and -408,
see supra
note 2;
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaneshiro,
93 Hawai'i 210, 998 P.2d 490 (2000);
Estate of Doe v. Paul Revere Ins. Co.,
86 Hawai'i 262, 273, 948 P.2d 1103, 1114 (1997);
Neumann v. Ramil,
6 Haw.App. 377, 380, 722 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1986);
Washington v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos.,
68 Haw. 192, 201, 708 P.2d 129, 135 (1985);
Barcena v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co.,
67 Haw. 97, 101, 678 P.2d 1082, 1085 (1984).) (Citing HRS § 431:100-407;
Dawes v. First Ins. Co.,
77 Hawai'i 117, 121, 883 P.2d 38, 42 (1994).) (Some citations omitted.)
First Insurance counters that Willis did not qualify for assigned claims coverage “because she was the named insured under her own Certificate Policy with First Insurance and therefore had identifiable motor vehicle insurance coverage on the date of the subject accident.” (Quoting
Neumann,
6 Haw.App. at 383-85, 722 P.2d at 1053-54; HRS § 431:10C-407(b)(3).) (Citing HRS § 431:10C-408(b).) First Insurance essentially argues that certificate policies are not required to include UM coverage to comply with 431:10C-301(b)(4) and Willis, by disregarding First Insurance’s “offer” of supplemental UM coverage, forewent her eligibility for assigned benefits. (Quoting HRS § 431:10C-407(b)(3).) First Insurance’s position is meritless.
B.
Analysis
1.
The question on appeal
The core issue as framed by the parties is whether an offer and a tacit refusal of UM coverage render the UM coverage “applicable” and “identifi[able]” so as to relieve the assignee insurer under HRS § 431:10C-408,
see supra
note 2, of the duty to compensate the injured claimant. To address this particular query would require us to construe the terms “applicable” and “identifi[able].” In that regard, we do not believe that the law of this jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction or the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (UMVARA)
or its commentary, § 18(a)(1), (3) & cmt., 14 U.L.A. 82 (2005 & Supp.2006), are illuminating. Fortunately, we need not engage in an exercise in statutory interpretation because an issue of fact is outcome-dispositive. Underlying First Insurance’s argument are two questionable premises: (1) that First Insurance indeed made an effective offer of UM coverage; and (2) that such coverage would have “appli[ed]” to Willis’s status as a passenger in a car that was not her own. We conclude that First Insurance did not, as a matter of law, “offer” Willis “applicable” UM coverage.
2.
First Insurance did not make a legal offer of UM coverage.
We agree with First Insurance that it was not required to furnish UM coverage as an element of Willis’s certificate policy. HRS § 431:100-407(b)(3),
see supra
note 2, provides, in general, that “the required motor vehicle policy coverages as provided in [HRS § ] 431:100-301 shall be offered by every insurer to each eligible applicant assigned by the [JUPB].” However, UM coverage is excluded from this provision when the insured is a member of the “class defined in [HRS § 431:10C-407(b) ](2)(A),”
i.e.,
a public assistance recipient. In fact, HAR § 16-23-73(a),
see supra
note 3, literally
prohibits
the servicing carrier from including UM coverage with a certificate policy. Except “[f]or named insureds who prior to January 1, 1998, elected to purchase [UM] and/or [UIM] coverages,” an unadorned certificate policy incorporates PIP and liability alone.
Id.
Un
less and until the insured can afford to and wishes to augment her certifícate policy by buying UM coverage with her own funds, she carries no UM insurance.
Nevertheless, First Insurance contends that it “offered” Willis supplemental UM coverage, thereby creating an alternative to, hence disqualifying, Willis’s assigned claim. We disagree. The sum total of the evidence that First Insurance offered ÚM coverage to Willis is the statement, set forth in Willis’s certificate of eligibility, that “[i]f you desire ... [UM] ... coverage[ ] ..., contact an insurance agent to assist you in obtaining these coverages upon payment of the appropriate premium.” This is at most an invitation to initiate negotiation, not an offer.
“An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that [the person’s] assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 (1981 & Supp.2006). While particular words and formalities are not required,
Wong Kwai v. Dominis,
13 Haw. 471, 476 (1901), the communication must be sufficiently definite to manifest the maker’s intent to bestow upon the addressee the power of acceptance,
see, e.g.,
Restatement,
supra,
§ 24 reporter’s note cmt. a; 1 Richard A. Lord,
Williston on Contracts
§ 4.7 (4th ed. 1990 & Supp.2006).
As a matter of law, the certificate’s “general expression of willingness to bargain [did] not constitute an offer.”
See
Lord,
supra,
§ 4.7. At most, First Insurance flagged for Willis the fact that no statute or regulation bestowed a UM component on her certificate policy and directed her to an unspecified “insurance agent” to learn about the requisite premiums and procedures. No reasonable reading of the statement could elucidate (1)
which
insurer(s) might underwrite Willis’s UM coverage or (2) the premiums
or any other terms.
Compare, e.g., Zanakis-Pico v. Cutter Dodge, Inc.,
98 Hawai'i 309, 324 & n. 26, 325-26, 47 P.3d 1222, 1237 & n. 26, 1238-39 (2002);
Honolulu Rapid Transit Co. v. Paschoal,
51 Haw. 19, 23, 449 P.2d 123, 125-26 (1968),
with, e.g., Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Constr., Inc.,
56 Haw. 466, 468, 540 P.2d 978, 981 (1975).
3.
The circuit court erred in granting summary judgment.
First Insurance having made no offer of UM coverage in the first place,
a fortiori,
we cannot say that First Insurance has demonstrated an “applicable” and “identifi[able]” alternative to Willis’s assigned claim. It follows inexorably that First Insurance was not “entitled to judgment as a matter of law” on its March 31, 2003 motion.
4.
Placing financial responsibility on insurers, for the narrow category of accidents within the assigned claims mechanism, comports with public policy.
Finally, First Insurance makes the following public policy argument:
[I]f [Willis] had been injured by a[ UM] while operating her own vehicle, there is absolutely no question that she would not be entitled to Assigned Claims [BI] coverage and that her sole recovery, if any, would be based on whether or not she had [UM] coverage under her own Certificate Policy with First Insurance.
Why should [Willis] be treated any differently ... due to the fortuitous circumstance of having been injured while she was a passenger in another person’s vehicle?
Stated differently, why should [Willis] be relieved of the consequences of choosing not to purchase [UM] coverage simply because she was riding as a passenger in someone else’s vehicle at the time she sustained injury?
[[Image here]]
...
[T]he interpretation of [HRS § 481:100-408, see supra note %,] argued for by [Willis] ... would serve to create universal [UM] coverage for anyone injured in a motor vehicle accident.
If Assigned Claims coverage was truly meant to apply to
anyone
for whom there is no [UM] coverage, then the Assigned Claims Program would make basic [UM] coverage ... completely unnecessary and superfluous. There would be no point in paying a premium for [UM] coverage if all one had to do was apply to the [JUPB] and request that [one’s BI] claim be assigned to a participating insurance carrier ... at no cost.
(Some emphases added and some in original.) (Citing
Bowers v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc.,
88 Hawai'i 274, 965 P.2d 1274 (1998).)
First Insurance distorts Willis’s characterization of the assigned claims program by implying that it would “create universal [UM] coverage for
anyone
injured in a motor vehicle accident” (emphasis added). First Insurance overlooks HRS § 431:10C-408(b), which “disqualifie[s],” for example, a claimant who actually owns or is the registrant of one of the motor vehicles “(2) ... (A) ... involve[d] in the accident.” In other words, UM coverage, far from “superfluous,” protects car owners while driving or riding in their own vehicles and, hence, is far broader than the assigned claim system, which applies only in “residual situations,”
see
UM-VARA § 19 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 85 (2005 & Supp. 2006).
The absurd consequence of First Insurance’s proposition would be that insurers, merely by offering, could compel even people who
do not own cars
to purchase “passenger UM insurance” and “pedestrian UM insurance” to hedge against the risk of injury by an impecunious and uninsured or underin-sured driver or in a hit-and-run collision. Even one who
does
happen to own a motor vehicle but never drives it (such as a parent of a teenage driver) could be hamstrung by an insurer’s mere offer into paying a monthly premium to avoid a financial catastrophe from an injury outside the confines of the car.
In short, Willis
shoidd
“be treated ... differently,” as the legislature made clear by excluding from assigned coverage (1) “[t]he owner or registrant” of an “involve[d]” vehicle and (2) the
knowing
passenger of an uninsured vehicle but not (3) the injured passenger of a vehicle that later turns out to be uninsured.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing analysis, we hold that the circuit court erred in awarding summary judgment in favor of First Insurance and against Willis. Accordingly, we vacate the circuit court’s July 24, 2003 judgment insofar as it dismissed Willis’s action against First Insurance and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, to the extent that the trier of fact finds that Willis’s post-July 2, 1999 medical expenses remain unpaid and her assigned claim complies with the Motor Vehicle Insurance Law in other respects, the circuit court shall order First Insurance to tender the appropriate benefits under the assigned claims program.