Willis v. New York City Department of Homeless Services

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided December 11, 2024·No. 1:24-cv-00735·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK RODNEY WILLIS, Plaintiff, -v- CIVIL ACTION NO. 24 Civ. 735 (JGLC) (SLC)

CITY OF NEW YORK, KEVIN PERDOMO, and ORDER DENISE TURNER, Defendants.

SARAH L. CAVE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pro se Plaintiff Rodney Willis (“Mr. Willis”) initiated this action by filing a complaint alleging that the City of New York (the “City”), Kevin Perdomo (“Mr. Perdomo”), and Denise Turner (“Ms. Turner”) (collectively “Defendants”) violated his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. L. § 297 et seq., by (1) discriminating against him on the basis of his race, color, sex, and age; (2) creating a hostile work environment; and (3) retaliating against him. (ECF No. 1 (the “Complaint”)). For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Mr. Willis leave to file an amended complaint by Friday, January 10, 2025. I. BACKGROUND On January 29, 2024, Mr. Willis filed the Complaint, raising the claims identified above. (ECF No. 1). The Court directed the United States Marshals Service to effect service on Defendants (ECF No. 7), who jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on June 28, 2024 (ECF No. 24 (the “MTD”)). On July 2, 2024, Mr. Willis filed an Opposition to the MTD, which consisted of a two-page written statement and roughly 180 pages of documentary evidence, including, inter alia, emails, paystubs, and correspondence from the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (See generally ECF No. 27). Since that date, Mr. Willis has filed at least eleven additional letters and sets of documents he appears to believe support

his claims. (See ECF Nos. 30, 34, 36, 39, 44, 47, 50, 51, 58, 61, 65). In response to these submissions, some of which the Court explicitly construed as supplemental oppositions to the MTD (see, e.g., ECF Nos. 32, 35), Defendants sought and were granted additional time to file a reply in support of the MTD (see ECF Nos. 29, 31, 37). On September 24, 2024, counsel for Defendants filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Ms. Turner (ECF No. 43 (the “MTW”)) and an accompanying Letter-Motion for Leave to File

an Amended Motion to Dismiss on behalf of only the City and Mr. Perdomo (ECF No. 45 (the “Motion to Amend”)). The Court administratively terminated the MTD and denied the Motion to Amend without prejudice to Defendants’ right to refile it pending a decision as to the MTW. (ECF No. 46). On October 16, 2024, the Court granted the MTW and stayed this action to allow Ms.

Turner to find new representation. (ECF No. 59). Attorney Stewart Lee Karlin later filed an appearance on behalf of Ms. Turner (ECF No. 68), and the Court thus issued an order lifting the stay and directing Defendants to answer or oppose the Complaint by January 5, 2024. (ECF No. 69 (the “Dec. 6 Order”)). Since the Court issued the Dec. 6 Order, however, Mr. Willis has filed yet another letter containing new allegations and supporting documents. (See ECF No. 70). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

District courts within the Second Circuit are obliged to construe pro se drafted pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and to interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474–75 (2d Cir. 2006). The “special solicitude” owed to pro se pleadings, however, Ruotolo v. IRS, 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994), is not without limits. Indeed, every complaint, whether drafted by an attorney

or an individual proceeding pro se, must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (“Rule 8”) requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, a complaint’s statement of claims should not be overly lengthy or contain unnecessary details. See Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). In addition, a plaintiff—even one proceeding pro se—cannot “simply dump a stack of exhibits on the court and expect [it] to sift

through them to determine if some nugget is buried somewhere in that mountain of papers, waiting to be unearthed and refined into a cognizable claim.” Carmel v. CSH & C, 32 F. Supp. 3d 434, 436 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). Doing so “places an unjustified burden on the court and the party who must respond to [the complaint] because they are forced to select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage[.]” Salahuddin, 861 F.3d at 42.

When a complaint does not comply with Rule 8, a district court is empowered to strike any portions that are redundant or immaterial, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), or to dismiss the complaint entirely. Salahuddin, 861 F.3d at 42; see also The Annuity, Welfare and Apprenticeship Skill Improvement & Safety Funds of the Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 15, 15A, 15C & 15D, AFL-CIO v. Tightseal Constr. Inc., No. 17 Civ. 3670 (KPF), 2018 WL 3910827, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018) (“[C]ourts in this Circuit have dismissed complaints that are unnecessarily long-winded,

unclear, or conclusory.”). When a court chooses to dismiss a complaint on this basis, however, it normally grants leave to file an amended pleading that conforms to the requirements of the Federal Rules. Salahuddin, 861 F.3d at 42. III. DISCUSSION

Mr. Willis’ original Complaint was thirteen pages long and drafted on a standardized template. (See ECF No. 1). It provided the Court and Defendants a brief and reasonably clear statement of Mr. Willis’ claims and therefore complied with Rule 8. As noted above, however, Mr. Willis has since filed at least eleven additional submissions that the Court could reasonably construe as (1) amended or supplemental complaints or (2) supplemental oppositions to Defendants’ MTD. In total, these submissions amount to roughly 230 pages, the bulk of which

consist of documents that are in some cases illegible. (See, e.g., ECF Nos. 30 at 17–26; 58 at 9).1 Put simply, these submissions do not contain a short and plain statement of the claims before the Court and therefore violate Rule 8. On this basis, the Court concludes that it is neither reasonable nor fair to require Defendants to assess Mr. Willis’ pleadings in their current form. See Carmel, 32 F. Supp. 36 at

434. Aware of its duty to offer Mr. Willis deference in light of his pro se status, see Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 287 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir. 2002), the Court will offer Mr. Willis an opportunity to file an amended complaint that complies with the

Willis v. New York City Department of Homeless Services, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

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Related

Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Carmel v. CSH & C
32 F. Supp. 3d 434 (W.D. New York, 2014)
Thomas v. Baumer
32 F. Supp. 36 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1939)