Willie Langford v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 11, 2018
• Docket: 49A05-1711-CR-2653
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Dec 11 2018, 9:27 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Brian A. Karle Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Lafayette, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Angela Sanchez Lee M. Stoy, Jr. Deputy Attorneys General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Willie Langford, December 11, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1711-CR-2653 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Anne Flannelly, Appellee-Plaintiff. Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49G04-1609-F5-35289

Pyle, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 1 of 9 Statement of the Case [1] Willie Langford (“Langford”) appeals his conviction for operating a vehicle

with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least 0.08 grams of alcohol but

less than 0.15 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood,1 which was

enhanced to a Level 5 felony based upon his previous conviction for operating a

vehicle while intoxicated (“OVWI”) causing death (“OVWI death conviction”).

He contends that the trial court abused its discretion during the enhancement

phase of his bifurcated trial when it admitted into evidence a booking report

from Langford’s OVWI death conviction. Because the booking report was

admissible under the public records exception to hearsay, the trial court

properly admitted the evidence, and we affirm Langford’s conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Issue Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a booking report into evidence during the enhancement phase of Langford’s bifurcated trial.

Facts [3] On September 6, 2016, an officer from the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police

Department (“IMPD”) pulled over Langford’s vehicle based upon Langford’s

failure to use his turn signal when making a turn. When speaking with

1 IND. CODE §§ 9-30-5-1; 9-30-5-3.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 2 of 9 Langford at his car window, the officer smelled a “very strong” odor of alcohol

and noticed that Langford had “red glossy eyes” and “slowed slurred speech.”

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 22). IMPD officers administered various field sobriety tests,

which Langford failed, and ultimately obtained a warrant for a blood test,

which revealed that Langford had a blood alcohol concentration of .085 grams

of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood.

[4] The State ultimately charged Langford with Count 1, Class C misdemeanor

OVWI, which was enhanced to a Level 5 felony based on his OVWI death

conviction that had occurred in 1989; and Count 2, Class C misdemeanor

operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent to at least 0.08

grams of alcohol but less than 0.15 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood,

which was also enhanced to a Level 5 felony based on his OVWI death

conviction.

[5] The trial court held a bifurcated jury trial on September 28, 2017. Following

phase one of the trial, the jury found Langford guilty of Count 2 and not guilty

of Count 1. During phase two, the enhancement phase, the State presented

testimony from Andrew Calderon (“Calderon”), who testified as a fingerprint

analyst and keeper of the records for IMPD. Calderon testified that he had

compared Langford’s thumbprint on State’s Exhibit 3, which was a fingerprint

card upon which Calderon had personally obtained Langford’s thumbprint just

prior to the enhancement phase of the trial, to a thumbprint contained on

State’s Exhibit 4, which was a document titled “Officer’s Arrest Report/Book-

In Slip” (“booking report”) and was the booking report from Langford’s OVWI

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 3 of 9 death conviction. (State’s Ex. 4). Calderon testified that a booking report, such

as contained in State’s Exhibit 4, was a “report filled out by an arresting officer

subsequent to an initial arrest” and that, in addition to the fingerprint and

general arrest information, it contained “various demographics” of the arrested

individual. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 168). For example, State’s Exhibit 4 contained

Langford’s name, address, date of birth, gender, race, and Social Security

number. The exhibit also contained procedural and ministerial information

relating to Langford’s arrest and booking for the OVWI causing death offense,

including the date and location of his arrest, the arresting officer, the booking

officer, the case cause number, and the statute citation for the offense charged.

Calderon testified that the booking report was filled out by an officer who had a

duty to accurately complete it and that the report was kept in the ordinary and

routine course of business. When the State moved to admit State’s Exhibit 4,

Langford objected based on hearsay. The State argued that the exhibit was

admissible under the public records exception to hearsay, and the trial court

agreed and admitted the exhibit into evidence. Calderon then testified that the

thumbprint on State’s Exhibit 3 and the thumbprint on State’s Exhibit 4 were

made by “one in the same person[,]” specifically Langford. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 173).

Additionally, the State offered into evidence certified copies of the charging

information and abstract of judgment from Langford’s OVWI death conviction

case.

[6] The jury determined that the State had proven that Langford had a previous

conviction for purposes of enhancing Count 2, and the trial court entered

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 4 of 9 judgment of conviction for Count 2 as a Level 5 felony. The trial court imposed

a four (4) year sentence for Langford’s Level 5 felony conviction and ordered

that it be served in Community Corrections. Langford now appeals.

Decision [7] Langford argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting State’s

Exhibit 4 during the enhancement phase of his trial. Specifically, he argues that

the evidence was hearsay and should have been excluded. The State contends

that State’s Exhibit 4 was a booking report and was admissible under the public

records exception to hearsay contained in Evidence Rule 803(8). Langford

contends, however, that State’s Exhibit 4 should be considered as an

“investigative report[,]” which would make it inadmissible under Evidence

Rule 803(8)(i). (Langford’s Br. 9).

[8] The admission and exclusion of evidence falls within the sound discretion of

the trial court, and we review the admission of evidence only for an abuse of

discretion. Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (Ind. 2002). An abuse of

discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and

effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864,

871 (Ind. 2012), reh’g denied. Where a trial court’s evidentiary ruling rests upon

the interpretation of a rule of evidence, which is a question of law, we conduct a

de novo review. Fansler v. State, 100 N.E.3d 250, 253 (Ind. 2018).

[9] Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at

the trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 5 of 9 asserted. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Generally, “[h]earsay is not admissible

unless these rules [of evidence] or other law provides otherwise.” Evid. R. 802.

One exception to the hearsay rule is for “public records,” which provides as

follows:

(8) Public Records.

(A) A record or statement of a public office if:

(i) it sets out:

(a) the office’s regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities;

(b) a matter observed while under a legal duty to [observe and] report; or

(c) factual findings from a legally authorized investigation; and

(ii) neither the source of information nor other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the following are not excepted from the hearsay rule:

(i) investigative reports by police and other law enforcement personnel, except when offered by an accused in a criminal case;

(ii) investigative reports prepared by or for a public office, when offered by it in a case in which it is a party;

(iii) factual findings offered by the government in a criminal case; and

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 6 of 9 (iv) factual findings resulting from a special investigation of a particular complaint, case, or incident, except when offered by an accused in a criminal case.

Evid. R. 803(8) (emphasis added).

[10] We agree with the State that State’s Exhibit 4 was a booking report, not an

investigative report, and that it was admissible under the public records

exception to hearsay. The public records hearsay exception “is based on the

assumption that public officials perform their duties properly without motive or

interest other than to submit accurate and fair reports.” Allen v. State, 994

N.E.2d 316, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Fowler v. State, 929 N.E.2d 875,

878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied). We have previously discussed the

admissibility of a booking report under the public records exception in Evidence

Rule 803(8) and held that “police records created in connection with routine

booking procedures” are admissible under the public records exception. Fowler,

929 N.E.2d at 879. We recognize that the public records exception in Rule

803(8)(i) “excludes investigative police reports when offered against the accused

in criminal trials.” Fowler, 929 N.E.2d at 879. Investigative police reports are

generally excluded because “the adversarial nature of the confrontation

between the police and the defendant in criminal cases” at the scene of the

crime can lead a police officer to have observations that “are not as reliable as

observations by public officials in other cases[.]” Id. “However, this exclusion

does not bar admission of police records pertaining to ‘routine, ministerial,

objective nonevaluative matters made in non-adversarial settings.’” Allen, 994

N.E.2d at 320 (quoting Fowler, 929 N.E.2d at 879). “‘The rote recitation of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 7 of 9 biographical information in a booking sheet ordinarily does not implicate

the same potential perception biases that a subjective narrative of an

investigation or an alleged offense might.’” Fowler, 929 N.E.2d at

879 (quoting United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 72 (1st Cir. 2010)). “Due to

the lack of any motivation on the part of the recording official to do other than

mechanically register an unambiguous factual matter . . . , such records are, like

other public documents, inherently reliable.” Id. (quoting United States v.

Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1985), reh’g denied).

[11] Here, State’s Exhibit 4 contained biographical information about Langford and

procedural information about his OVWI death case. The exhibit contained

factual, objective information that was obtained and recorded as part of the

ministerial, nonevaluative booking process. Thus, the exhibit was a booking

report admissible under Evidence Rule 803(8). See, e.g., Allen, 994 N.E.2d at

320 (explaining that a State’s exhibit that contained “non-adversarial

information”—including the defendant’s age, address, height and weight, the

jail where he was held, and the charge upon which he was arrested—was “more

appropriately characterized as a booking report” and was not subject to the

investigative police report exclusion); Fowler, 929 N.E.2d at 879 (holding that a

booking card, which contained biographical information and “was obtained

and recorded in the course of a ministerial, nonevaluative booking process[,]”

was admissible under the public records exception of Evidence Rule 803(8)).

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting State’s

Exhibit 4 during the enhancement phase of Langford’s bifurcated trial.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 8 of 9 [12] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Barnes, Sr.J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1711-CR-2653 | December 11, 2018 Page 9 of 9