Willie Bell, Jr. v. v. M. Almager

Ninth Circuit

Willie Bell, Jr. v. v. M. Almager

388 F. App'x 672

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJuly 20, 2010

Docket08-56636

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 388 F. App'x 672 (Willie Bell, Jr. v. v. M. Almager) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Willie Bell, Jr. v. v. M. Almager, 388 F. App'x 672 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Willie Bell, Jr., a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s *673 judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 893 (9th Cir.2001), and may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1097 (9th Cir.2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Bell’s claim concerning his failed attempt to mail a package containing a watch before it was confiscated because regulations requiring Bell to pay for postage from his trust account, rather than supply his own stamps, do not implicate a constitutionally protected interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (only deprivations that impose restraint exceeding an inmate’s sentence in an unexpected manner give rise to protection “by the Due Process Clause of its own force” and only “atypical, significant deprivation[s] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” give rise to state-created liberty interests).

The district court properly dismissed Bell’s claim concerning the handling of his grievances because inmates have no protected due process rights in grievance procedures. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988) (order).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bell’s motion for a preliminary class injunction and his motion for class certification because non-attorney plaintiffs may not act in a representative capacity. See Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir.2008). Moreover, to the extent that Bell sought an ex parte injunction on his own behalf, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying it on the ground that Bell failed to meet, or justify not meeting, applicable notice requirements. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 65(b).

The district court also did not abuse its discretion by denying Bell’s motion for appointment of counsel because he failed to establish exceptional circumstances. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.1986).

Bell’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Willie Bell, Jr., a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s *673 judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 893 (9th Cir.2001), and may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1097 (9th Cir.2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Bell’s claim concerning his failed attempt to mail a package containing a watch before it was confiscated because regulations requiring Bell to pay for postage from his trust account, rather than supply his own stamps, do not implicate a constitutionally protected interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (only deprivations that impose restraint exceeding an inmate’s sentence in an unexpected manner give rise to protection “by the Due Process Clause of its own force” and only “atypical, significant deprivation[s] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” give rise to state-created liberty interests).

The district court properly dismissed Bell’s claim concerning the handling of his grievances because inmates have no protected due process rights in grievance procedures. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988) (order).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bell’s motion for a preliminary class injunction and his motion for class certification because non-attorney plaintiffs may not act in a representative capacity. See Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir.2008). Moreover, to the extent that Bell sought an ex parte injunction on his own behalf, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying it on the ground that Bell failed to meet, or justify not meeting, applicable notice requirements. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 65(b).

The district court also did not abuse its discretion by denying Bell’s motion for appointment of counsel because he failed to establish exceptional circumstances. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.1986).

Bell’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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388 F. App'x 672, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/willie-bell-jr-v-v-m-almager-ca9-2010.

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