Cite as 2020 Ark. App. 399 Reason: I attest to the accuracy ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS and integrity of this document Date: 2021-07-09 09:01:06 Foxit PhantomPDF Version: DIVISION II 9.7.5 No. CR-20-120
Opinion Delivered: September 16, 2020
WILLIE ANTONE MATLOCK APPEAL FROM THE MISSISSIPPI APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, CHICKASAWBA DISTRICT V. [NO. 47BCR-16-281]
STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE HONORABLE RALPH WILSON, JR., JUDGE
AFFIRMED
BART F. VIRDEN, Judge
A Mississippi County jury convicted appellant Willie Antone Matlock of rape, and
he was sentenced to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. This court affirmed his conviction
on direct appeal in Matlock v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 470, 588 S.W.3d 152. Matlock
subsequently filed a pro se petition seeking postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim.
P. 37.1, which the trial court denied without holding an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the
trial court’s denial of Matlock’s petition for postconviction relief.
I. Background
In Matlock’s pro se petition, he alleged three grounds for postconviction relief. First,
he argued that he was denied a fair and impartial trial and that his trial counsel did not call
witnesses who could prove his case. Second, he argued that he was denied due process of law because his trial counsel did not introduce “evidence and much more.” Third, Matlock
argued that he was denied his right to a speedy trial because his trial counsel sought six
continuances over two years. In a handwritten attachment to the petition, Matlock asserted
only two grounds: (1) he was improperly detained for fourteen days between his arrest and
first appearance, and (2) trial counsel was ineffective.
The trial court concluded that Matlock’s petition was without merit and thus
summarily denied and dismissed it. The trial court found that Matlock had made only
conclusory and general allegations, that some of his claims were not cognizable in Rule 37
proceedings, and that his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel involved matters of trial
strategy and tactics.
II. Standard of Review
When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a Rule 37 petition, we will not reverse the
trial court’s decision granting or denying postconviction relief unless it is clearly erroneous.
Draft v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 171, 596 S.W.3d 585. A finding is clearly erroneous when,
although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court after reviewing the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id.
III. Discussion
As an initial matter, Rule 37 provides that all grounds for postconviction relief must
be asserted in the original petition. Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(b); Williams v. State, 2019 Ark.
App. 58, 569 S.W.3d 361. On appeal, Matlock lists seven points but makes six arguments
in his brief, which do not perfectly correspond with each other. Matlock includes two points
involving the trial court’s denial of his request for leave to file an amended or supplemental
2 petition for postconviction relief. After his pro se petition was denied, Matlock requested
leave to file an amended or supplemental petition to identify grounds that he was unaware
of at the time he filed his pro se petition for relief. The trial court denied his request.
Matlock’s notice of appeal indicates that he appeals the denial of his petition for
postconviction relief, not the denial of his request for leave to file an amended or
supplemental petition. We will not address the points involving his request to file an
amended petition.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Matlock argues that the jury did not hear how the victim’s “story” had changed and
that witnesses failed to testify about the conclusion reached by a sexual-assault nurse
examiner who said that an assault did not occur. Matlock also argues that the victim’s mother
was motivated to lie because he had broken off their relationship shortly before the victim’s
allegations. Matlock’s argument challenging the witnesses’ credibility and the sufficiency of
the evidence was addressed in his direct appeal by this court when we affirmed his
conviction. Matlock, supra. Further, sufficiency is not cognizable in Rule 37 proceedings.
Henson v. State, 2015 Ark. 302, 468 S.W.3d 264.
B. Detainment Before First Appearance
In his Rule 37 petition, Matlock argued that he should not have been detained in
Craighead County for fourteen days on a misdemeanor charge before his first appearance
on a felony charge in Mississippi County because the felony should have taken precedence
over the misdemeanor. The trial court assumed Matlock’s argument pertained to a speedy-
trial issue. Matlock raises no speedy-trial issue on appeal.
3 Further, Matlock’s argument on appeal has changed in that he now asserts that the
trial court stated incorrect dates for his arrest and first appearance in an attempt to hide the
fact that he had been improperly detained for fourteen days. The appellate courts do not
address arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal. Williams v. State, 2019 Ark.
129, 571 S.W.3d 921. Appellants are bound by the arguments raised in the trial court and
the scope and nature of those arguments as presented to the trial court. Id.
C. Discovery Violation
Matlock contends that the prosecutor was required to turn over any information that
could negate his (Matlock’s) guilt but that the prosecutor was permitted to introduce “an
updated note” allegedly written by the victim that had not been given to his counsel until
the second day of trial. Matlock did not make this specific argument below; however, with
respect to his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Matlock argued that trial counsel did
not give him a copy of a motion for discovery, and he mentions a note from the victim that
was introduced at trial, which allegedly contradicted the victim’s earlier statement. To the
extent Matlock’s argument is preserved, an allegation that the State violated discovery rules
is not cognizable in Rule 37 proceedings. Flemons v. State, 2016 Ark. 460, 505 S.W.3d 196.
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Matlock argues that his trial counsel was ineffective. The benchmark for judging a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Pursuant to Strickland,
we assess the effectiveness of counsel under a two-prong standard. First, a petitioner raising
4 a claim of ineffective assistance must show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Douglas v. State, 2019 Ark. 57, 567 S.W.3d 483. A petitioner
making an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must show that counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. A court must indulge in a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance. Id.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Cite as 2020 Ark. App. 399 Reason: I attest to the accuracy ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS and integrity of this document Date: 2021-07-09 09:01:06 Foxit PhantomPDF Version: DIVISION II 9.7.5 No. CR-20-120
Opinion Delivered: September 16, 2020
WILLIE ANTONE MATLOCK APPEAL FROM THE MISSISSIPPI APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, CHICKASAWBA DISTRICT V. [NO. 47BCR-16-281]
STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE HONORABLE RALPH WILSON, JR., JUDGE
AFFIRMED
BART F. VIRDEN, Judge
A Mississippi County jury convicted appellant Willie Antone Matlock of rape, and
he was sentenced to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. This court affirmed his conviction
on direct appeal in Matlock v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 470, 588 S.W.3d 152. Matlock
subsequently filed a pro se petition seeking postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim.
P. 37.1, which the trial court denied without holding an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the
trial court’s denial of Matlock’s petition for postconviction relief.
I. Background
In Matlock’s pro se petition, he alleged three grounds for postconviction relief. First,
he argued that he was denied a fair and impartial trial and that his trial counsel did not call
witnesses who could prove his case. Second, he argued that he was denied due process of law because his trial counsel did not introduce “evidence and much more.” Third, Matlock
argued that he was denied his right to a speedy trial because his trial counsel sought six
continuances over two years. In a handwritten attachment to the petition, Matlock asserted
only two grounds: (1) he was improperly detained for fourteen days between his arrest and
first appearance, and (2) trial counsel was ineffective.
The trial court concluded that Matlock’s petition was without merit and thus
summarily denied and dismissed it. The trial court found that Matlock had made only
conclusory and general allegations, that some of his claims were not cognizable in Rule 37
proceedings, and that his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel involved matters of trial
strategy and tactics.
II. Standard of Review
When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a Rule 37 petition, we will not reverse the
trial court’s decision granting or denying postconviction relief unless it is clearly erroneous.
Draft v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 171, 596 S.W.3d 585. A finding is clearly erroneous when,
although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court after reviewing the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id.
III. Discussion
As an initial matter, Rule 37 provides that all grounds for postconviction relief must
be asserted in the original petition. Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(b); Williams v. State, 2019 Ark.
App. 58, 569 S.W.3d 361. On appeal, Matlock lists seven points but makes six arguments
in his brief, which do not perfectly correspond with each other. Matlock includes two points
involving the trial court’s denial of his request for leave to file an amended or supplemental
2 petition for postconviction relief. After his pro se petition was denied, Matlock requested
leave to file an amended or supplemental petition to identify grounds that he was unaware
of at the time he filed his pro se petition for relief. The trial court denied his request.
Matlock’s notice of appeal indicates that he appeals the denial of his petition for
postconviction relief, not the denial of his request for leave to file an amended or
supplemental petition. We will not address the points involving his request to file an
amended petition.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Matlock argues that the jury did not hear how the victim’s “story” had changed and
that witnesses failed to testify about the conclusion reached by a sexual-assault nurse
examiner who said that an assault did not occur. Matlock also argues that the victim’s mother
was motivated to lie because he had broken off their relationship shortly before the victim’s
allegations. Matlock’s argument challenging the witnesses’ credibility and the sufficiency of
the evidence was addressed in his direct appeal by this court when we affirmed his
conviction. Matlock, supra. Further, sufficiency is not cognizable in Rule 37 proceedings.
Henson v. State, 2015 Ark. 302, 468 S.W.3d 264.
B. Detainment Before First Appearance
In his Rule 37 petition, Matlock argued that he should not have been detained in
Craighead County for fourteen days on a misdemeanor charge before his first appearance
on a felony charge in Mississippi County because the felony should have taken precedence
over the misdemeanor. The trial court assumed Matlock’s argument pertained to a speedy-
trial issue. Matlock raises no speedy-trial issue on appeal.
3 Further, Matlock’s argument on appeal has changed in that he now asserts that the
trial court stated incorrect dates for his arrest and first appearance in an attempt to hide the
fact that he had been improperly detained for fourteen days. The appellate courts do not
address arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal. Williams v. State, 2019 Ark.
129, 571 S.W.3d 921. Appellants are bound by the arguments raised in the trial court and
the scope and nature of those arguments as presented to the trial court. Id.
C. Discovery Violation
Matlock contends that the prosecutor was required to turn over any information that
could negate his (Matlock’s) guilt but that the prosecutor was permitted to introduce “an
updated note” allegedly written by the victim that had not been given to his counsel until
the second day of trial. Matlock did not make this specific argument below; however, with
respect to his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Matlock argued that trial counsel did
not give him a copy of a motion for discovery, and he mentions a note from the victim that
was introduced at trial, which allegedly contradicted the victim’s earlier statement. To the
extent Matlock’s argument is preserved, an allegation that the State violated discovery rules
is not cognizable in Rule 37 proceedings. Flemons v. State, 2016 Ark. 460, 505 S.W.3d 196.
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Matlock argues that his trial counsel was ineffective. The benchmark for judging a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Pursuant to Strickland,
we assess the effectiveness of counsel under a two-prong standard. First, a petitioner raising
4 a claim of ineffective assistance must show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Douglas v. State, 2019 Ark. 57, 567 S.W.3d 483. A petitioner
making an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must show that counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. A court must indulge in a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance. Id.
Second, the petitioner must show that counsel’s deficient performance so prejudiced
petitioner’s defense that he or she was deprived of a fair trial. Id. The petitioner must show
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the fact-finder would have
had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt, i.e., the decision reached would have been different
absent the errors. Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. Unless a petitioner makes both showings, it
cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversarial process that
renders the result unreliable. Id.
First, Matlock contends that trial counsel filed many continuances under the pretense
of preparing for trial and investigating leads but that trial counsel did not put on any defense
at all and did more harm than good.1 Conclusory allegations that are unsupported by facts
do not provide a basis for postconviction relief, and we do not research or develop
arguments for appellants. Shadwick v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 243, 519 S.W.3d 722.
1 Matlock abandoned his argument that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure Matlock’s right to a speedy trial.
5 Second, Matlock argues on appeal that trial counsel should have clarified that
Matlock did not flee the jurisdiction to avoid an arrest warrant and was merely working out
of town. Because Matlock failed to make this particular argument below or get a ruling on
it, it is not preserved for review. Nutt v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 137, 594 S.W.3d 907.
Third, Matlock argues that trial counsel should have used the victim’s initial
statement to police to challenge the victim’s later testimony at trial in order to show that
the victim was not credible. Matters of trial strategy and tactics, even if arguably
improvident, fall within the realm of counsel’s professional judgment and are not grounds
for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Sims v. State, 2015 Ark. 363, 472 S.W.3d
107.
Fourth, Matlock contends that he had given trial counsel a list of witness names but
that counsel did not contact those witnesses or call them to testify. An ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim based on trial counsel’s failure to call a witness requires that a petitioner
name the witness, provide a summary of the testimony, and establish that the testimony
would have been admissible. Boyd v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 592, 534 S.W.3d 732. If a
petitioner fails to provide the trial court with the necessary information, “the allegation [is]
conclusory and [does] not merit further consideration.” Bond v. State, 2013 Ark. 298, at 6,
429 S.W.3d 185, 191. Matlock further contends that trial counsel should have done more
than “halfway cross-examine the State’s witnesses.” Because Matlock does not elaborate on
his conclusory assertion, we need not consider it. Id.
Matlock contends that trial counsel’s failings as set forth above were “done on
purpose” because after Matlock was convicted, trial counsel told him that he does not do
6 appeals and that Matlock had thirty days to hire other counsel to prepare his appeal. Matlock
raised this point below, but because he does not explain how trial counsel’s remarks show
that he purposefully “failed” him, we do not address his conclusory statement. Henington v.
State, 2012 Ark. 181, 403 S.W.3d 55.
E. Collusion of Trial Counsel, Judge, and Circuit Clerk
Matlock states that trial counsel told the judge, “Your Honor, I think I’ve done pleas
in your court and this is the first time trying a case. I think we have got a civil case in about
45 days. It was a pleasure.” Matlock argues that trial counsel’s comment to the judge at the
conclusion of the trial shows that he was “trying to earn points with Judge Wilson by
throwing [Matlock] to the wolves.” Matlock did not make this argument in his Rule 37
petition and thus did not get a ruling; therefore, it is not preserved for review. Nutt, supra.
Matlock makes several other arguments that are either conclusory or not preserved
or both. First, he states that he attempted to introduce evidence that trial counsel would not
seek to introduce at trial but that neither his appellate attorney nor the trial court would
consider the evidence.2 Matlock asserts that this was to cover up the fact that his trial was
unfair. Matlock further maintains that there was false documentation submitted concerning
his court appearances. Matlock also argues that he sent pro se motions to the clerk’s office
that were returned unmarked and had not been filed. None of these arguments were made
in Matlock’s Rule 37 petition; thus, he obtained no ruling on them. The arguments are
neither preserved nor sufficiently developed. Nutt, supra.
2 Matlock referred in his petition to documentation that his trial counsel would not provide to him, “CR-2016-281 and Incident 2016-01253,” but he was not more specific than that.
7 IV. Conclusion
We find no error and affirm the trial court’s denial of Matlock’s Rule 37 petition
because Matlock’s arguments are not cognizable in Rule 37 proceedings, not preserved, or
not developed.
Affirmed.
GLADWIN and WHITEAKER, JJ., agree.
Willie Antone Matlock, pro se appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.