Willian Antonio Belandre Gonzalez v. Todd Blanche, et al.

Opinion

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

4 WILLIAN ANTONIO BELANDRE Case No. 2:26-cv-00674-ART-EJY 5 GONZALEZ, 6 ORDER GRANTING HABEAS Petitioner, PETITION 7 v. (ECF No. 8) 8 TODD BLANCHE, et al., 9 Respondents. 10 11 Petitioner Willian Antonio Belandre Gonzalez brings this action against 12 Respondents in habeas, seeking release or a hearing on the basis that his 13 summary re-detention after release on parole violates due process. Mr. Gonzalez’s 14 habeas petition is currently pending before the Court. (ECF No. 8.) On May 14, 15 2026, the Court held oral argument on this matter. The Court now grants the 16 Petition and orders Mr. Gonzalez released from detention. 17 I. Factual Background 18 Mr. Gonzalez applied for admission into the United States at the Paso Del 19 Norte port of entry in El Paso, Texas on or about July 4, 2024, without the 20 documents required to legally enter the United States. (ECF No. 10-2.) That same 21 day, Mr. Gonzalez was issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) and placed in removal 22 proceedings, and then subsequently paroled into the United States via the CBP 23 One application, pending a hearing in removal proceedings. (Id.) 24 On February 14, 2026, Mr. Gonzalez was arrested by local police in Montana 25 for domestic violence. (ECF No. 10-1.) That same day, Mr. Gonzalez was re- 26 detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and he has remained 27 28 1 in detention since. (ECF No. 8; 10-1.) There is no argument that Mr. Gonzalez’s 2 parole expired before he was detained. 3 II. Jurisdiction 4 The Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Gonzalez’s case under 28 U.S.C. § 5 2441, regardless of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) 6 and 1252(b)(9). Neither of those rules deprive district courts of jurisdiction to hear 7 challenges to confinement, as distinct from challenges to removal and actions 8 taken in furtherance of a removal proceeding. 9 First, the Supreme Court has limited the reach of § 1252(g). That section 10 deprives courts of jurisdiction to review “any cause or claim by or on behalf of an 11 alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to [1] commence 12 proceedings, [2] adjudicate cases, or [3] execute removal orders against any alien 13 under this chapter.” The Supreme Court has named these factors the “three 14 discrete events along the road to deportation.” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti- 15 Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). Petitioner challenges the 16 lawfulness of his detention only, and detention is not one of the three events. A 17 request for a bond hearing is “independent of, and collateral to, the removal 18 process.” Ozturk v. Hyde, 136 F.4th 382, 397 (2d Cir. 2025). 19 Second, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that Section 20 1252(b)(9) is a jurisdictional bar to district court review of immigration detention. 21 That section provides that “judicial review of all questions of law . . . including 22 interpretation and application of statutory provisions . . . arising from any action 23 taken . . . to remove an alien from the United States” is only proper before the 24 appropriate federal court of appeals in the form of a petition for review of a final 25 removal order. Id. The Supreme Court has squarely held that Section 1252(b)(9) 26 does not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to decide whether certain statutory 27 provisions require detention without a bond hearing. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 28 1 U.S. 281, 292 (2018). Once again, “claims challenging the legality of detention 2 pursuant to an immigration detainer are independent of the removal process.” 3 Gonzalez v. U.S. Immig. and Cust. Enf't, 975 F.3d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 2020); see 4 Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 402 (2019). 5 III. Legal Standards 6 A. Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2441 7 The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to 8 every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 9 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus 10 is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the 11 traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser 12 v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted 13 to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 14 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of 15 habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive 16 detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. 17 v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a district court's habeas 18 jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration-related detention. Zadvydas v. 19 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 20 (2003). 21 B. Due Process 22 Noncitizens present in the United States are entitled to due process 23 protections. See, e.g., Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670 (internal citations and 24 quotations omitted) (“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles 25 aliens to due process of law in the context of removal proceedings.”); Zadvydas, 26 533 U.S. at 693 (applying due process in the context of detention). The rights of 27 noncitizens include rights to “notice and opportunity to be heard ‘appropriate to 28 1 the nature of the case.’” J.G.G., 604 U.S. at 673 (quoting Mullane v. Central 2 Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)); see also Mathews v. 3 Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 4 To determine whether detention violates procedural due process, courts in 5 the Ninth Circuit typically apply the Mathews test. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 6 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022) (observing that the Ninth Circuit and other 7 circuits continue to apply the Mathews test notwithstanding the Government’s 8 heightened interest in detaining immigrants.) Under that three-part test, the 9 court weighs (1) the private interest at stake, (2) the risk of an erroneous 10 deprivation of that private interest and the value of additional safeguards, and (3) 11 the Government’s countervailing interests. Id. 12 Several courts in the Ninth Circuit have also concluded that when a 13 noncitizen is paroled under 8 U.S.C. § 1182, the government cannot summarily 14 revoke that parole without offending due process. See Velasquez-Chinga v. Noem, 15 No. 3:26-cv-00105-RBM-KSC, 2026 WL 311507, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 16 2026) (collecting cases). Instead, “due process for parole terminations requires (1) 17 a decision by an appropriate official on whether the purpose of parole has been 18 served; (2) written notice of the reasons for termination; and (3) an opportunity 19 to rebut the reasons given for termination.” Oreilly v. Blanche, No. 2:26-CV- 20 00278-GMN-EJY, 2026 WL 1031192, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 16, 2026) (internal 21 quotations and citations omitted). 22 IV. Discussion 23 A. Class Membership 24 As a preliminary matter, Mr. Gonzalez asserts that he is a member of the 25 Jacobo Ramirez class. (See ECF Nos. 11; 12.) The Jacobo Ramirez class is defined 26 as “[a]ll noncitizens in the U.S. without lawful status (1) who are or will be 27 arrested or detained by ICE; (2) who are or will be in removal proceedings before 28 1 an Immigration Court within the District of Nevada; (3) whom DHS alleges or will 2 allege to have entered the United States without inspection or parole; (4) who are 3 not or will not be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c), 1225(b)(1), or 4 1231 at the time they are scheduled for or request a bond hearing; and (5) whose 5 most recent arrest by ICE occurred inside the United States and not while arriving 6 in the United States.” Jacobo Ramirez v. Mullin, No. 2:25-CV-02136-RFB-MDC, 7 2026 WL 879799, at *33 (D. Nev. Mar. 30, 2026) (emphasis added). The Court 8 finds that Mr. Gonzalez meets all but the third parameter for Jacobo-Ramirez 9 class membership. 10 While Mr. Gonzalez is (1) actively being detained by ICE, (2) is currently in 11 removal proceedings, and (3) is not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. §§ 12 1226(c), 1225(b)(1), or 1231, the Court finds DHS does not allege that Petitioner 13 entered the United States without inspection or parole. (See ECF Nos. 10-1; 10- 14 2.) To the contrary, Mr. Gonzalez’s Notice to Appear, which sets forth the basis 15 for his ongoing removal proceedings, charges him as inadmissible because he 16 was not in possession of a valid entry document when he applied for admission 17 and was inspected and paroled at the El Paso, Texas Port of Entry, on July 4, 18 2024. Additionally, at oral argument, Respondents stated their belief that Mr. 19 Gonzalez was validly paroled into the United States. As a result, the Court finds 20 that Mr. Gonzalez is not a Jacobo Ramirez class member, because he was lawfully 21 inspected by immigration officers and paroled when he entered the country on 22 July 4, 2024. 23 B. Due Process 24 The Court concludes that Respondents violated Mr. Gonzalez’s procedural 25 due process rights. As a person who had been previously released from detention 26 on parole, Mr. Gonzalez was owed prior notice, individualized assessment, and 27 an opportunity to be heard before re-detention. To reach this conclusion, it is not 28 1 necessary to decide whether Mr. Gonzalez was subject to mandatory detention. 2 The subject of this analysis is not Respondents’ authority to detain, but the 3 adequacy of the process by which they detained Mr. Gonzalez. See Caisa 4 Telenchana v. Hermosillo, No. 2:26-CV-00363-GJL, 2026 WL 696806, at *10; 5 Rodriguez Cabrera v. Mattos, 808 F. Supp. 3d 1159, 1178 (D. Nev. 2025). 6 1. The Private Interest 7 Having earlier been granted parole, Mr. Gonzalez has a liberty interest in 8 his release. “Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the 9 liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.” 10 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529; see also 11 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696. Even when an individual is subject to conditions of 12 parole or release, they have “relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will 13 be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions,” and their liberty 14 interest “is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the [Due Process 15 clause]” such that termination of parole “calls for some orderly process.” 16 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). District courts in this circuit have 17 applied this principle to parole from immigration detention. See, e.g., Ramirez 18 Tesara v. Wamsley, No. 2:25-CV-01723-MJP-TLF, 800 F.Supp.3d 1130 (W.D. 19 Wash. Sept. 12, 2025) (collecting cases). 20 Following his initial release from detention, Mr. Gonzalez acquired a 21 significant liberty interest entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause. In 22 reasonable reliance on this liberty interest, Mr. Gonzalez obtained a work permit, 23 secured employment at Costco, and build connections in his community. (ECF 24 No. 8, 10-1.) He further states, and Respondents do not dispute, that he applied 25 for relief, like asylum, outside of removal proceedings in reliance on his continued 26 liberty. Telenchana, 2026 WL 696806, at *11; Musaev v. Hermosillo, No. 2:26-CV- 27 28 1 00522-RAJ, 2026 WL 925611, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 6, 2026). Accordingly, the 2 first Mathews factor weighs heavily in his favor. 3 2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 4 Because Respondents failed to comply with the regulatory requirements for 5 revoking humanitarian parole, the risk of the erroneous deprivation of Mr. 6 Gonzalez’s liberty is high. Flores Torres v. Hermosillo, No. 2:25-CV-02687-LK, 7 2026 WL 145715, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 20, 2026). This is particularly true 8 where the government need only show that the “purpose of [Petitioner's] parole 9 has been served” to revoke that parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). This standard 10 affords the government considerable discretion to re-detain Mr. Gonzalez, which 11 compounds the risk of erroneous deprivation. See Escobar Salgado v. Mattos, 809 12 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1161 (D. Nev. 2025) (finding in the bond hearing context that 13 “unreviewable” government direction to detain creates a high risk of erroneous 14 deprivation). It therefore follows that the value of additional procedural 15 safeguards, such as notice and an opportunity to be heard, is also high. 16 Humanitarian parole may be terminated in two ways. First, parole 17 terminates automatically and without notice if the noncitizen departs from the 18 United States or “at the expiration of the time for which parole was authorized.” 19 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1). The Government admits that they have no evidence that 20 Mr. Gonzalez’s parole status automatically terminated before his encounter with 21 ICE on February 14, 2026. Second, if parole is not terminated automatically, 22 either “the purpose for which parole was authorized” must have been 23 accomplished or a DHS official with authority must decide that “neither 24 humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued presence of the 25 alien in the United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i); see also 8 U.S.C. § 26 1182(d)(5)(A) (“[W]hen the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the 27 Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served the alien shall forthwith return 28 1 or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled[.]”). Except in cases of 2 automatic termination, the noncitizen must be provided written notice. 8 C.F.R. 3 § 212.5(e)(2)(i). 4 Whether automatic or with notice, once a noncitizen's parole has been 5 terminated, implementing regulations require that “any order of exclusion, 6 deportation, or removal previously entered shall be executed.” 8 C.F.R. § 7 212.5(e)(2)(i) (emphasis added); see also 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1). “If the exclusion, 8 deportation, or removal order cannot be executed within a reasonable time, the 9 [noncitizen] shall again be released on parole unless in the opinion of [a DHS 10 official with authority] the public interest requires that the [noncitizen] be 11 continued in custody.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i) (emphasis added). 12 Respondents generally argue that Mr. Gonzalez’s parole was terminated 13 through a proper process when he was re-detained by immigration authorities in 14 February 2026. While Respondents point to the Notice to Appear of July 4, 2024, 15 as a possible “charging document” that may serve as notice of parole revocation, 16 they otherwise concede that Mr. Gonzalez was not provided any written notice 17 terminating his parole. However, the Notice to Appear was issued when Mr. 18 Gonzalez was initially paroled and so could not have terminated it. (See ECF No. 19 10-2.) 20 Additionally, as stated above, due process for parole terminations requires 21 “(1) a decision by an appropriate official on whether the purpose of parole has 22 been served; (2) written notice of the reasons for termination; and (3) an 23 opportunity to rebut the reasons given for termination.” Oreilly, No. 2:26-CV- 24 2026 WL 1031192, at *3. Respondents failed to present evidence that an 25 appropriate official made any decision regarding whether the purpose of parole 26 has been served. Even assuming that Mr. Gonzalez was given reasons for 27 termination of his parole, he has not been afforded any opportunity to rebut such 28 1 reasons either before or since his detention, as he has not been given a bond 2 hearing. 3 Altogether, there is nothing to show that Mr. Gonzalez was provided with 4 any process prior to re-detention. The lack of any procedural safeguards 5 whatsoever creates a risk of factual and legal mistakes. Rodriguez Cabrera, 808 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1181; Gaitan Coreas, 2026 WL 1121974, at *7. DHS initially found 7 upon granting parole that Mr. Gonzalez was not a danger or a flight risk, and no 8 evidence has been submitted to show that DHS decided that circumstances 9 changed. Respondents’ failure to follow their own regulations created an undue 10 risk of erroneous deprivation. Due process requires, at minimum, that the 11 government justify the basis for re-detention, and that the noncitizen be given 12 the opportunity to be heard with respect to re-detention at a meaningful time and 13 in a meaningful manner. Telenchana at *12, Dieng, 2026 WL 411857, at *8; see 14 also Gaitan Coreas, 2026 WL 1121974, at *7; O.F.B. v. Maldonado, No. 25-CV- 15 6336 (HG), 2025 WL 3277677, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2025). Accordingly, the 16 second Mathews factor favors Mr. Gonzalez. 17 3. The Government’s Interest 18 The Government has a strong interest in the efficient administration of 19 immigration laws, including those regarding detention of noncitizens. Rodriguez 20 Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208. However, the Government’s interests will still be 21 adequately protected if immigrants are afforded some minimal procedural 22 guarantees. Rodriguez Cabrera, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 1182; see Gaitan Coreas, 23 2026 WL 1121974, at *7 (“[T]he government's interest in detaining Petitioner 24 without a hearing is low”). Respondents have not argued that it is costly for them 25 to provide notice of re-detention and an opportunity to be heard. See Gaitan 26 Coreas, 2026 WL 1121974, at *7 (“[C]ustody hearings are routine and impose a 27 ‘minimal’ cost.”) Finally, the Government does not have an interest in pursuing 28 1 the detention of noncitizens in a manner that violates its own regulations. O.F.B., 2 2025 WL 3277677, at *7. Accordingly, the third Mathews factor also favors Mr. 3 Gonzalez. 4 C. Remedy 5 In similar cases, district courts in the Ninth Circuit have generally granted 6 release on the conditions of the petitioner’s most recent parole. See, e.g. Arias v. 7 Larose, No. 3:25-CV-02595-BTM-MMP, 2025 WL 3295385, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8 25, 2025); Gaitan Coreas, 2026 WL 1121974, at *8. In the ordinary case, “the 9 Constitution requires some kind of hearing before the State deprives a person of 10 liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (emphasis in 11 original). Thus, “because the constitutional violation is the absence of pre- 12 deprivation process, the proper remedy is to restore the status quo ante—that is, 13 to return [Petitioner] to the conditions that existed before his unlawful detention.” 14 Kirykovich v. Hernandez, No. 2:26-cv-00695-JNW, 2026 WL 890459, at *4 (W.D. 15 Wash. Apr. 1, 2026) (emphasis in original). 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 V. Conclusion 2 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Mr. Gonzalez’s Petition for Writ of 3 || Habeas Corpus, (ECF No. 8), is GRANTED. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Gonzalez must be RELEASED from 5 || detention by 4:00 p.m. on May 15, 2026, subject to the conditions of his prior 6 || parole. 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, prior to any re-detention, Mr. Gonzalez is 8 || entitled to (1) notice of the reasons for revocation of his parole and (2) an 9 || opportunity to rebut those reasons in a hearing before an impartial adjudicator. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties must file a Joint Status Report 11 || no later than May 21, 2026, to certify compliance with the Court's order. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Leave to Appear 13 || Telephonically (ECF No. 16) is denied as moot. 14 15 DATED THIS 14th Day of May 2026. 16 17 Ar pod den 18 ANNE R. TRAUM 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11