Williamson v. United States

152 F. Supp. 716, 139 Ct. Cl. 183, 51 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 987, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 1
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 12, 1957
DocketNo. 161-54
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 152 F. Supp. 716 (Williamson v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williamson v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 716, 139 Ct. Cl. 183, 51 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 987, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 1 (cc 1957).

Opinion

MaddeN, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiffs, husband and wife, bring this suit to recover income taxes which they were required to pay and which, they say, should not have been collected from them because the income to which the taxes were attributable was not their income, but that of their three children. It is a family partnership income tax case, and concerns the tax years 1943 through 1949.

The plaintiff, Otis Harold Williamson, has been successfully engaged in the veneer manufacturing business for most of his adult life. From 1921 to 1929, he and his brother, Marion, conducted such a business in corporate form. From 1930 through 1936 he operated through another corporation. Between 1936 and June 30,1941, he operated as an individual, and leased, for use in his business, a warehouse from his wife, [185]*185the plaintiff Virginia, who was a woman of independent means.

On July 1,1941, a partnership agreement was executed between Harold and Virginia, to conduct a veneer manufacturing business under the name of “Veneers”, the name which Harold had used when he operated as an individual. The wife contributed the warehouse, having a stated value of $57,000 and the husband contributed the assets of his going business, having a stated value of $167,414.64. The agreement provided for a salary of $12,000 a year for Harold,. $4,000 a year for Virginia, a 5 percent return to each on their capital accounts and equal division of the profits above those fixed charges. This partnership operated the business in accordance with the agreement.

On December 31,1942, the plaintiffs executed a declaration of gift which stated that they were transferring to their three children certain named amounts of their capital accounts in the partnership. Harold gave $5,000 to each of the children. Virginia gave $7,100 to Margaret, and $3,000 each to Nancy and John. The recited reason for the larger gift to Margaret was that Virginia had already, during the year, made gifts of $4,100 each, of other property to Nancy and John.

Also, on December 31, 1942, the plaintiffs and their three children executed an “Agreement .of Partnership”. This document adopted by reference the partnership agreement of the parents of July 1, 1941, and made amendments to it to make it applicable to the children. The provision that each partner was to devote substantially all his time to the partnership business was made inapplicable to the children. The agreement designated the parents as the “managing partners” and provided that only the parents would be authorized to draw checks on the partnership bank account. At the time of the execution of the December 31, 1942 agreement, Margaret was 20 years old, Nancy 18, and John 15. All were in school.

In connection with the declaration of gift, executed on the same date as the partnership agreement, it is relevant that, back in the 1927-1929 period, when Harold was operating the business in corporate form with his brother, there [186]*186had been entered on the books of the corporation items transferring credits owing by the corporation to Harold to the three children all of whom were, in 1927, less than six years old. Interest was credited on the corporation’s books up to September 1, 1929, and on that date the books showed that the corporation owed each of them $16,402.96. In September 1929, the corporation sold its assets to an outside party for some $160,000. The corporation ceased to be active, but Harold used the money which he received for his one-half interest in it to continue in the veneer manufacturing business. The credits to the children on the books of the corporation disappeared for some years, and, no doubt, Harold got the money represented by those credits. In 1942, the children then being quite mature, there was family discussion of these old obligations. It was agreed that interest on the amounts of some $16,000 credited to each of the children in 1929 would be some $28,000 in all, and that the children should be given interests in their parents’ partnership in that amount. In the December 31,1942, declaration of gift, Margaret was given $12,100 and Nancy and John $8,000 each. In the September discussion it was agreed that Harold, the father, would, during the year 1943, pay the children the principal amounts owing to them in 1929, a total of $49,208.58. He paid them these amounts mostly in 1943 and the rest in 1944. Those payments were invested by or for the children in enterprises other than the veneer business.

A question of importance, though not, we think, decisive, is whether the sums, totaling some $28,000, which were credited to the children as shares in the five-member partnership, were gifts made to them at that time, or were payments to them of interest on preexisting debts. The “declaration of .gift” stated that, under the gift tax law as it was on the date of the declaration, but would not be on the following day, the gifts of the amounts involved in the declaration, plus the other amounts given during the year, would be tax-free. That being so, the donors may well have been advised that, in view of the rather vague past history of the debt to the children, it would make the transaction more clean-cut, and cost nothing, to put it in the form of a gift. They could not possibly have thought that their situation in an [187]*187income tax case such as the instant one would be improved by calling the transaction a gift, rather than the payment of a debt, since it has been frequently urged by the Government that gifts by parents to children of shares in a partnership do not relieve the parents from paying the taxes on all of the partnership income.

We do not, however, think the transaction was a gift. The entries in the corporation’s books in 1927-1929 said, in substance, “Pay these sums which are due to me, Harold, to my three children.” The debtor, the corporation, assented to the novation. The transaction being a pure benefit to the children, their assent was presumed and the transaction was complete. When one-half of the sale price of the corporation’s assets came, in 1929, into the hands of Harold, and he, as a half-owner of the corporation, did not see to it that the debt to the children was paid, he became responsible to them for it, and for interest upon it until it was paid. He used the money to develop his veneer manufacturing business and it was not only just but also legally obligatory that the children be paid as they were paid in 1942 and 1943. We think the five-member partnership, formed on December •31, 1942, started with contributions of capital which was owned by the several partners before that date.

The partnership agreement provided for salaries of $12,000 and $4,000, respectively, to Harold and Yirginia; for a 5 percent return on the capital standing to the account of each partner; for an apportionment of the profits according to the capital shares of the partners, except that the proportion attributable to the shares of Harold and Virginia should be divided equally between them. As we have said, Harold and Virginia were designated as the managing partners and checks on the partnership account were to be signed only by them. The agreement contained conventional detailed provisions about dissolution, etc.

Upon the formation of the five-member partnership, notices of the formation of the firm and the identity of the partners were given to the bank, several insurance companies, and Dun and Bradstreet. A federal gift tax return was filed.

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Bluebook (online)
152 F. Supp. 716, 139 Ct. Cl. 183, 51 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 987, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 1, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williamson-v-united-states-cc-1957.