Sklarsky v. United States

159 F. Supp. 840, 139 Ct. Cl. 395, 52 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 241, 1 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1774, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 36
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 12, 1957
DocketNo. 49934
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 159 F. Supp. 840 (Sklarsky v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sklarsky v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 840, 139 Ct. Cl. 395, 52 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 241, 1 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1774, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 36 (cc 1957).

Opinion

MaddeN, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff sues to recover income taxes and interest thereon, collected from him for the years 1944, 1945, and 1946. During those years he was a member of two successive partnerships, in the first of which his wife and his son Danny, [397]*397together with the widow of his deceased brother and two of her children were also partners, and in the second of which his wife and four of his sons were partners. This case is concerned only with the partnership relations of the plaintiff and his wife and sons.

The partnerships made substantial profits in the years in question, and various parts of those profits were reported by the plaintiff’s wife and sons as their income. The Government’s tax authorities took the position that all of the profits included in the wife’s return and a large part of the profits included in the returns of the four sons should have been included, instead, in the plaintiff’s own returns. If they had been, they would have been in brackets carrying higher tax rates.

The business carried on by the partnerships was that of manufacturing dolls, under the trade name Uneeda. The plaintiff Morris and his wife Jennie, before and after their marriage, worked in the toy industry. In 1918 they bought, with funds supplied largely by Jennie from savings and borrowings, a $2,500 interest in a doll and toy manufacturing firm, and went to work for that firm.

Morris’ brother Benjamin had a doll factory, the Uneeda Doll Co. Benjamin invited Morris and Jennie to change their investment and employment to his firm and on Jennie’s insistence they did so, in 1922, Morris receiving 25 percent of Uneeda’s capital stock. Jennie was talented in designing and styling dolls and selecting materials for doll dresses, and her work contributed substantially to the large increase in the firm’s business. In recognition of her services, Benjamin in 1925 transferred 15 percent more of the capital stock of Uneeda to Morris, so that thereafter Benjamin owned 60 percent and Morris 40 percent of the stock. Benjamin died in December 1942.

The corporation continued to carry on the business until it was dissolved at the end of 1943. At that time a limited partnership was formed, with Morris and Dora, the widow and administratrix of Benjamin, as general partners and two daughters of Benjamin, and Jennie, and Danny, the eldest son of Morris and Jennie, as limited partners. The partnership had a capital of $100,000, each family having a [398]*398combined share of $50,000. The partnership agreement stated the capital contributions of Morris, Jennie, and Danny to be $25,000, $10,000, and $15,000, respectively. The plaintiff says that before the dissolution of the corporation he had given some of his shares in it to Jennie and Danny, the number of shares to each being in substantially the proportions which their contributions to capital were stated to be in the partnership agreement. Whether he made the gifts of the corporate stock, or the gifts of shares in the partnership which now had the assets of the corporation, is not of vital importance. In Williamson v. United States, ante, p. 183, this day decided, we have discussed the subject of gifts creating shares in family partnerships.

As to Jennie, at least, she well deserved to have a share in this dollmaking enterprise since her funds and initiative and talents had contributed largely to its success, and to the size of the share which Morris had in it.

The partnership agreement made careful provision for several ways in which the partnership might be terminated. Under these provisions, the equal interests of the families of Morris and Dora were each to be kept intact inside the respective family. The Dora interests agreed that upon termination or dissolution they would sell their interests to Morris at their book value, thus charging nothing for the name and goodwill of the enterprise.

There was no provision permitting a limited partner to withdraw his capital contribution. The agreement provided for distribution of profits to the partners, but it was tacitly understood that Danny would conserve his profits so as to provide the funds necessary for the eventual participation of his brothers, Bernard, Irwin, and Samuel in the business as partners.

The business made enormous profits in the year 1944, $327,350.97 on the stated capital of $100,000. The Government urges, in relation to this and the other years in question, that these profits prove that the capital represented by the shares of the limited partners contributed little to the profit-making capacity of the business; that the trade name, goodwill, and other intangibles were of great value and Morris, in the partnership agreement, retained the ownership of these [399]*399by retaining the right to buy the shares of the limited partners on his side of the family for the book value of the assets other than these intangibles.

In September of 1944 Dora desired to withdraw $50,000 from the partnership funds for herself and her daughters. That was done, and at the same time the Morris family withdrew a similar amount, in checks of $25,000, $10,000, and $15,000 to Morris, Jennie, and Danny, respectively. All three of these checks were deposited in Morris’ personal bank account. Danny was, at the time, in the military service in California. His $15,000 was, in accordance with the prior understanding which we have referred to above, used as a part of the capital contribution of his brothers, Bernard, and Samuel, to the succeeding partnership, which will be discussed in its turn. Jennie’s $10,000 withdrawal was used by Morris with her consent as a part of the price for the purchase by the partnership of a corporation which owned the building in which the partnership business was carried on.

We think the $15,000 withdrawn by Danny from the 1944 partnership, which was intended to be later used to pay for the shares of his brothers, Bernard and Samuel, was taxable to Morris. The gifts of shares in the partnership to the brothers were really to come from Morris, not from Danny, and until the gifts were completed the money belonged to Morris, though the checks were written to Danny.

In the autumn of 1944 Morris decided to terminate the partnership which included Dora and her family and form a partnership including only members of his own family. Dora and her daughters were paid what they were entitled to under the 1944 partnership.

The new partnership was a limited partnership with Morris as the only general partner and Jennie, Danny, Bernard, and Samuel, and Morris as trustee for Irwin, as limited partners. Morris’ capital contribution was stated as $40,000, Jennie’s $20,000, and each of the others, $10,000, a total of $100,000. The agreement provided that, if the general partner so requested, the limited partners would have to contribute 50 percent of their profits to the capital of the partnership. It provided that no limited partner could assign his interest but that the general partner had the right, [400]*400on thirty days’ notice, to buy the interest of a limited partner.

The partnership commenced operations under this agreement as of January 1, 1945, and continued until March 2, 1946, at which time it was succeeded by a corporation, the stock in which was owned by Morris, Jennie, and the four sons. The instant suit involves only the period of the two partnerships. The 1945 partnership made large profits, as had the earlier one.

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Related

Ramos v. United States
260 F. Supp. 479 (N.D. California, 1966)

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Bluebook (online)
159 F. Supp. 840, 139 Ct. Cl. 395, 52 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 241, 1 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1774, 1957 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 36, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sklarsky-v-united-states-cc-1957.