Williamson v. Barnhart

350 F.3d 1097, 60 F. App'x 729, 60 Fed. Appx. 729, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 4914, 2003 WL 22203754
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedMarch 17, 2003
Docket02-7067
StatusPublished
Cited by83 cases

This text of 350 F.3d 1097 (Williamson v. Barnhart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williamson v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1097, 60 F. App'x 729, 60 Fed. Appx. 729, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 4914, 2003 WL 22203754 (10th Cir. 2003).

Opinion

*730 ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

McKAY, Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Jimmy L. Williamson appeals from an order issued by a United States magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and (3) affirming the denial of his application for Supplemental Security Income Benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Mr. Williamson contends on appeal that the administrative law judge (ALJ) did not properly consider his treating physician’s opinion, and also erred in determining that Mr. Williamson does not have a severe impairment. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 636(c)(3), and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we affirm.

I.

We review the Commissioner’s decision (here expressed as the ruling of the ALJ, see Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir.1991)), to determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the entire record and to determine whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Castellano v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir.1994). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotations omitted). In the course of our review, we may “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir.1991).

II.

Mr. Williamson, who is 5 feet six inches tall and has weighed between ninety and 120 pounds his whole life, claims disability due to low weight (103 pounds at the time of the hearing) and hypertension. His low weight is not caused by a diagnosed medical condition, and he testified that he has no injuries or ailments. ApltApp. at 57. At the time of the hearing, Mr. Williamson had been successfully treated for a year for hypertension by Dr. Davis. Dr. Davis prepared a medical statement, however, that limited Mr. Williamson’s ability to work to lifting only ten pounds frequently and twenty pounds occasionally, pushing and pulling less than fifty pounds, standing and walking only four hours/day and sitting continuously for only six hours/day, and climbing, kneeling, stooping, and crawling only occasionally. Id. at 180-81. Dr. Davis based these findings on the following clinical and laboratory findings and symptoms or allegations: hypertension, anxiety/depression, and frailty. Id. at 181.

Because of the paucity of medical records, the ALJ requested that Mr. Williamson undergo a comprehensive medical and psychological examination. The physical examination revealed no muscle weakness, atrophy, or substantial loss of strength and no evidence of injury or illness except for hypertension. Id. at 142. The psychiatric evaluation made no psychiatric diagnosis and noted that, although he looked malnourished, Mr. Williamson reported being able to exercise regularly and having ade *731 quate energy. Id. at 119. The report concluded, “Mr. Williamson presents himself as healthy in mind and body.” Id. at 120.

The ALJ found Dr. Davis’s assessment to be “deficient, [and] without supportive medical documentation,” and noted that there was no “medically determinable impairment that could reasonably cause such limitations.” Id. at 33. The ALJ also noted that no clinical findings supported Dr. Davis’s medical conclusions. In response to the ALJ’s questions, Mr. Williamson testified that he regularly lifted a forty-pound bag of dog food and that he “suppose[d]” he could lift up to twenty pounds “over and over again during the day.” Id. at 57. The ALJ declined to give Dr. Davis’s assessments controlling weight.

The ALJ determined that, although Mr. Williamson has always been a very small man and that he would naturally have some lifting limitations because of his size, neither Mr. Williamson’s “impairment” of low weight nor his controlled hypertension “cause significant vocational limitations.” Id. at 36. Accordingly, the ALJ determined at step two of the five-step sequential process, see Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir.1988), that Mr. Williamson does not have a severe impairment and is not disabled.

III.

A. We first address the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Davis’s assessment. The Commissioner must accord “substantial weight to the testimony of a claimant’s treating physician, unless good cause is shown to the contrary.” Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir.1987). “[A] treating physician’s opinion might be rejected if it is brief, conclusory, and unsupported by medical evidence,” as long as the ALJ sets forth “specific, legitimate reasons” for such rejection. Id. Here, the ALJ set forth specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Davis’s assessment, and these reasons are supported by the medical record. The Commissioner’s decision to accord little weight to Dr. Davis’s report must be upheld.

B. At step two, Mr. Williamson bore the burden to demonstrate an impairment or combination of impairments that “significantly limits [his] physical ... ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). An impairment giving rise to disability benefits is defined as one which “results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

The step two severity determination is based on medical factors alone, and “does not include consideration of such vocational factors as age, education, and work experience.”

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350 F.3d 1097, 60 F. App'x 729, 60 Fed. Appx. 729, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 4914, 2003 WL 22203754, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williamson-v-barnhart-ca10-2003.