Williams v. Wasi

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Williams v. Wasi

681 So. 2d 839, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 10794, 1996 WL 590754

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedOctober 16, 1996

DocketNos. 96-1218, 96-1503

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 681 So. 2d 839 (Williams v. Wasi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Williams v. Wasi, 681 So. 2d 839, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 10794, 1996 WL 590754 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant argues that the Department of Corrections (DOC) acted without authority in declaring his basic gain-time forfeited after he was returned to jail as a control release violator. Appellant does not dispute that the DOC had the authority to declare his incentive gain-time forfeited. We find no merit in his distinction between basic gain-time and incentive gain-time, holding that both may be subject to forfeiture by the DOC pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1995).

Section 944.28(1) provides that when a control release violator is returned to jail, the DOC may revoke “all gain-time [previously] earned according to the provisions of law.” As both basic and incentive gain-time derive from legislative grant, both should be considered “earned according to the provisions of law.” See id.

Further, the Legislature specifically refers to all earned gain-time, whether basic or incentive, as a right — one that is granted as a matter of grace and is not automatically retained, but is subject to forfeiture. See § 944.28(2)(b), (c); Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So.2d 687 (Fla.1990); Rice v. State, 563 So.2d 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). As such, the DOC was within its authority and discretion to revoke Appellant’s basic gain-time as well as his incentive gain-time pursuant to section 944.28(1). Accordingly, we find no error and affirm.

GUNTHER, C.J., and POLEN and FARMER, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant argues that the Department of Corrections (DOC) acted without authority in declaring his basic gain-time forfeited after he was returned to jail as a control release violator. Appellant does not dispute that the DOC had the authority to declare his incentive gain-time forfeited. We find no merit in his distinction between basic gain-time and incentive gain-time, holding that both may be subject to forfeiture by the DOC pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1995).

Section 944.28(1) provides that when a control release violator is returned to jail, the DOC may revoke “all gain-time [previously] earned according to the provisions of law.” As both basic and incentive gain-time derive from legislative grant, both should be considered “earned according to the provisions of law.” See id.

Further, the Legislature specifically refers to all earned gain-time, whether basic or incentive, as a right — one that is granted as a matter of grace and is not automatically retained, but is subject to forfeiture. See § 944.28(2)(b), (c); Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So.2d 687 (Fla.1990); Rice v. State, 563 So.2d 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). As such, the DOC was within its authority and discretion to revoke Appellant’s basic gain-time as well as his incentive gain-time pursuant to section 944.28(1). Accordingly, we find no error and affirm.

GUNTHER, C.J., and POLEN and FARMER, JJ., concur.

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681 So. 2d 839, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 10794, 1996 WL 590754, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-wasi-fladistctapp-1996.

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