Williams v. Ward

671 F. Supp. 225, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5913
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 2, 1987
Docket85 CIV. 1045 (CBM)
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 671 F. Supp. 225 (Williams v. Ward) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. Ward, 671 F. Supp. 225, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5913 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).

Opinion

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

MOTLEY, District Judge.

This is a civil rights class action brought by the plaintiffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. This court finds that it has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 and 1343(a)(3).

The action is brought by the named plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the class which is all persons in New York, Bronx, Kings and Queens Counties in the City of New York now or in the future arrested without a warrant and held in detention by defendants prior to having the probable *226 cause bases for their arrest reviewed by a neutral magistrate.

The plaintiffs claim that in violation of rights secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, defendants failed to perform their duty and expeditiously complete the necessary administrative steps incident to the arrests of the plaintiffs and the class and then to promptly have the probable cause bases for these arrests reviewed by a neutral magistrate.

The administrative steps to which the plaintiffs refer are those steps necessarily incident to an arrest and which must be completed in order for a state judge to review the probable cause basis of the arrest.

The plaintiffs allege that in New York, Bronx, Kings and Queens Counties, pursuant to state and local law and custom and practice, the first occasion on which the probable cause basis of a person’s arrest is subject to review by a neutral magistrate is that person’s appearance at his or her arraignment.

Plaintiffs say that by allowing substantial periods of time to elapse during which no arrest processing is performed and by performing tasks which are not necessary administrative steps incident to an arrest, defendants extend the time required to complete the necessary administrative steps incident to an arrest. Therefore, plaintiffs claim, defendants detain plaintiffs for extended periods without having the probable cause bases for their arrests reviewed by a neutral magistrate.

Plaintiffs and the class seek, by this action, a prompt completion of the necessary administrative steps incident to their arrests and prompt judicial review of the probable cause bases for their arrests after those steps have been completed.

In lieu of a trial in this case, the parties have stipulated to certain facts which are hereby incorporated into this opinion. Those stipulated facts are attached hereto as Exhibit A. In addition to the facts stipulated by the parties on November 7, 1986, the court finds that it is undisputed that defendants have added additional police personnel and, at the urging of defendants, New York State has increased the number of courtrooms and court personnel involved in the arrest and arraignment processes. However, the court finds that the time which elapses between arrest and arraignment in New York City, in the four counties involved in this action, greatly exceeds 24 hours. The court also finds that some of the steps taken by defendants are not necessary steps incident to the arrest, but include other steps such as fingerprinting. The court finds that a period of seven hours is sufficient to complete all necessary steps incident to the arrest of plaintiffs and members of their class, except in exceptional circumstances.

The court finds that it should take no more than six or seven hours for steps necessary in connection with the arrest to be completed. However, this period is expanded to as much as 17 hours by taking other steps such as fingerprinting which are not absolutely necessary to complete arrest.

The court finds, in addition, that a period of 24 hours is sufficient for all steps incident to an arrest to be finalized and all steps necessary for the New York arraignment under present procedures.

The court finds that a period of more than 24 hours, except in exceptional cases, to complete the arrest of a person and to make the necessary preparations incident to the New York arraignment procedures should not exceed 24 hours. Any longer period, except in exceptional circumstances, has not been justified by defendants.

The court finds and concludes that a period of detention which exceed 24 hours prior to having a probable cause determination by a neutral magistrate violates the rights of plaintiffs and members of their class under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), the Supreme Court established an outside limit on the period of time a person arrested without a warrant may be detained absent a probable cause determination by a neutral *227 magistrate. The Supreme Court held the Fourth Amendment requires a determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following an arrest. While the Supreme Court affirmed that the existence of probable cause to arrest should be determined by a neutral magistrate prior to arrest whenever possible, it recognized that requiring a pre-ar-rest probable cause determination by a neutral magistrate in all circumstances would be impractical and an intolerable handicap to legitimate law enforcement.

Thus, the court acknowledged that arrests based solely upon a police officer’s on-the-scene determination of probable cause are permissible under the Fourth Amendment. However, the court held that once an arrest is effected, the necessity for detaining the suspect beyond a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to an arrest evaporates.

The Supreme Court has never gone further in defining what it meant when it referred to a brief period of detention. However, a series of decisions rendered in similar cases have relied upon the court’s decision in Gerstein and determined that persons arrested without a warrant are entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause within 24 hours of their arrest or less, except where exceptional circumstances are presented in individual cases. Bernard v. City of Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023, Ninth Circuit (1983); Sanders v. City of Houston, 543 F.Supp. 694, Southern District of Texas (1982), Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F.Supp. 1000, District of Columbia (1978).

The court concludes that the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment in this case, declaring that detention beyond 24 hours before a probable cause determination is made before a neutral magistrate violates their constitutional rights.

This action was originally filed in early 1985. Shortly thereafter the case was placed on the suspense calendar of this court to give the parties an opportunity to resolve the issues presented without the necessity for proceeding with this action. For a period of time the parties sought to resolve the issue before a mediator, former federal Judge Harold Tyler.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
671 F. Supp. 225, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5913, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-ward-nysd-1987.