Williams v. United States

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: February 7, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-2977
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KAWANA JEFFER WILLIAMS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 24-2977 (UNA) ) ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This action brought pro se is before the Court on review of Plaintiff’s complaint and

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court grants the

application and dismisses the complaint.

Plaintiff brings against the United States “this action for damages and sanctions arising

from unauthorized surveillance, fraudulent activities, illegal surveillance, misuse of

telecommunication devices, harassment, threats of violence, misuse of telephone facilities and

equipment, misuse of electronic communication or interactive computer services, and visual

surveillance.” Compl., ECF No. 1 at 7. Plaintiff “seeks $100,000,000 in damages and sanctions

against the United States of America for the alleged negligence and unlawful practices[,]” id.,

stemming from its “handling” of “the federal data breach and failing to protect citizens’ biometric

data,” id. at 10.

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power authorized

by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)

(citations omitted). It is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden

of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring a party seeking relief in the district court to plead facts that bring the suit within the

court’s jurisdiction). The United States is immune from suit save “clear congressional consent[.]”

United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980). A waiver of immunity “must be unequivocally

expressed in statutory text, and [it cannot] be implied.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)

(cleaned up).

Plaintiff asserts that the Court “has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1331,” Compl. at 7, which only confers in the district courts “Federal question” jurisdiction. “For

a case to raise a federal question . . ., it must implicate some provision of substantive federal law.”

Youkelsone v. FDIC, 560 F. App’x. 4, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Plaintiff has not plausibly

invoked “the Constitution [or] laws . . .of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Regardless, a

“complaint may be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds when it is ‘patently insubstantial,’

presenting no federal question suitable for decision.” Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff’s complaint

fits the bill. Therefore, this case will be dismissed by separate order.

_________/s/____________ RUDOLPH CONTRERAS Date: February 7, 2025 United States District Judge