Williams v. State

2010 OK CR 11, 236 P.3d 133, 2010 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 10, 2010 WL 2354142

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
• Decided: June 11, 2010
• Docket: C-2009-169
• Status: Published

Opinions

SUMMARY OPINION DISMISSING APPEAL

LUMPKIN, Judge.

¶ 1 On October 10,1978, Petitioner Michael Leon Williams filled out a “Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty” intending to plead guilty to the crime of Injuring a Minor Child (21 O.S.Supp.1977, § 843) in the District Court of Kay County, Case No. CRF-1978-124. According to that document, the State had offered Petitioner a five year sentence for the crime, which had a ten year maximum sentence. The Honorable Leslie D. Page, Special Judge, accepted the plea and found Petitioner guilty as charged. Sentencing was set for January 9, 1979, upon completion of a pre-sentence investigation report. Petitioner did not appear for sentencing as scheduled. He apparently left the state and was not located by local authorities until December, 2008, some thirty (30) years later.

¶ 2 Petitioner was transferred from a county jail in Illinois to Oklahoma and a new sentencing hearing was set for January 15, 2009. The State withdrew its original offer of a five year sentence. Petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Plea claiming in part that the State had withdrawn its five year offer, that the guilty plea form was incomplete and that the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. At the conclusion of the motion hearing, the trial court found the plea was properly entered and denied the motion to withdraw. It is that denial which is the subject of this appeal.

¶ 3 Upon review of the appeal documents, this Court ordered a response from the Attorney General due to “several issues which appear to have merit.” In its response brief, the State argued that Petitioner had abandoned or forfeited his right to the five year sentence when he left the State before he could be sentenced and that he should not be rewarded thirty years later with the same recommendation. Finding the State raised a viable issue of abandonment and to aid in our determination whether dismissal of Petitioner’s appeal is an appropriate appellate court sanction, we remanded the case to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing. The District Court was ordered to make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding whether the State would be prejudiced in locating witnesses and presenting evidence at a trial if the appeal is successful, or if the prolonged absence and misconduct at the district court level might somehow make meaningful appeal impossible or otherwise disrupt the appellate process so that an appellate sanction might reasonably be imposed.

¶ 4 In its timely filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the District Court found, based upon the stipulation of the parties, that the State would be prejudiced to proceed to trial in the matter and “that from the standpoint of contract law, the defendant abandoned the plea agreement with the State by absconding from the jurisdiction for three decades.” The District Court also found that by absconding from the jurisdiction the defendant waived his right to the benefit of the original plea agreement. The parties in this case were given twenty (20) days from the filing of the transcript and order of the District Court to file supplemental briefs on the issue of whether the record supports the appellate sanction of dismissal of the appeal. Having received supplemental briefs from both Petitioner and the State, we now decide this appeal.

¶ 5 “It has been settled for well over a century that an appellate court may dismiss the appeal of a defendant who is a fugitive from justice during the pendency of his appeal.” Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 239, 113 S.Ct. 1199, 1203, 122 L.Ed.2d 581 (1993). See also Prock v. State, 1977 OK CR 280, ¶2, 569 P.2d 473, 474 (“the act of escape ‘disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims’ ”). However, in this case Petitioner fled the jurisdiction of the District Court but was recaptured prior to sentencing and the invocation of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Whether this is sufficient cause for dismissal of an appeal has not been previously addressed by this Court.

¶ 6 The United States Supreme Court addressed just such an issue in Ortega-Rodriguez. There, the Supreme Court noted that “while dismissal of an appeal pending while the defendant is a fugitive may serve substantial interests, the same interests do not support a rule of dismissal for all appeals filed by former fugitives, returned to custody before invocation of the appellate system.” 507 U.S. at 249, 113 S.Ct. at 1208. In determining when dismissal was appropriate, the Supreme Court noted that a “long escape, even if ended before sentencing and appeal, may so delay the onset of appellate proceedings that the Government would be prejudiced in locating witnesses and presenting evidence at retrial after a successful appeal.” Id. The Supreme Court further stated “a defendant’s misconduct at the district court level might somehow make ‘meaningful appeal impossible,’ or otherwise disrupt the appellate process so that an appellate sanction is reasonably imposed.” Id., 507 U.S. at 250, 113 S.Ct. at 1208-1209.

¶ 7 In the present case, the parties stipulated before the District Court that if the appeal was successful and the case sent back for trial, the State would be prejudiced. The record of the evidentiary hearing shows that of approximately four witnesses located, only two had any independent recollection of the events surrounding the commission of the offense. Petitioner’s flight delayed the filing of his appeal by approximately thirty years. That duration of time presents a “significant interference with the operation of [the] appellate process” and under the record before us, makes a “meaningful appeal impossible.” Id., 507 U.S. at 250,113 S.Ct. at 1209.

¶ 8 Based upon the foregoing, we find that in light of Petitioner’s thirty year fugitive status, prior to the invocation of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction, dismissal of his appeal is appropriate.

DECISION

¶ 9 Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2010), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

C. JOHNSON, P.J. and A. JOHNSON, V.P.J.: concur. LEWIS, J.: concur in part/dissent in part.