Williams v. State

800 S.W.2d 739, 1990 Mo. LEXIS 123, 1990 WL 209256

• Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
• Decided: December 18, 1990
• Docket: 72746
• Status: Published

Opinions

BLACKMAR, Chief Justice.

The defendant pleaded guilty to four charges, two of rape and two of forcible sodomy. The trial judge advised him as follows:

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THE COURT: Do you understand that under the law any Court is compelled to run sentences consecutively in these cases?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And it is not within the privilege of any Court to run the sentences concurrently?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand that the minimum sentence in each of these cases is ten years? Am I correct in that?

MR. FERRELL: That’s correct, Your Honor.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand that the minimum sentence in each of these counts is ten years?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Therefore, do you understand that the minimum sentence this Court can impose in imposing the minimum would be four ten-year sentences, and that this Court must order them to run consecutively or which would be total of forty years?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Have you thoroughly discussed that with your attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Understanding that do you still believe that it is to your selfish interest to enter these pleas of guilty today?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

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The judge carefully questioned the defendant as to whether he understood the consequences of pleading guilty, and ascertained that the plea was voluntary. He then sentenced him to four consecutive ten-year sentences, suspending execution on the last count.

The defendant then proceeded under Rule 24.035, arguing that the trial court misconstrued § 558.026.1, RSMo 1986, reading as follows:

Multiple sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently unless the court specifies that they shall run consecutively; except that, in the case of multiple sentences of imprisonment imposed for the felony of rape, forcible rape, sodomy, forcible sodomy or an attempt to commit any of the aforesaid and for other offenses committed during or at the same time as that rape, forcible rape, sodomy, forcible sodomy or an attempt to commit any of the aforesaid, the sentences of imprisonment imposed for the other offenses may run concurrently, but the sentence of imprisonment imposed for the felony of rape, forcible rape, sodomy, forcible sodomy or an attempt to commit any of the aforesaid shall run consecutively to the other sentences.

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The trial court denied the relief sought. The court of appeals reviewed the apparently conflicting decisions of the Eastern and Western Districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals and transferred the ease here. The cases from the Eastern District are consistent with the views expressed by the trial court and the motion court in the present case. Cases from the Western District find ambiguity in the statute, and opt for a “rule of lenity.”

We agree that there is ambiguity in the statute. The language makes it clear that sentences for “rape, forcible rape, sodomy, forcible sodomy, or attempt to commit any of the aforesaid” must be run consecutively to “other sentences,” which are defined as “multiple sentences of imprisonment ... for other offenses committed during or at the same time.... ” The statute establishes two kinds of offenses for sentencing purposes — the listed offenses and “other offenses.” It states clearly what the court must do if the defendant is convicted of an offense in each class. It does not, however, say in explicit language what must be done if there are multiple convictions of those offenses listed. We believe that the ambiguity must be resolved, not so much through a “rule of lenity” as in favor of according the trial court maximum discretion.

The respondent argues that such a construction is illogical, and that the legislature obviously did not intend such an illogical result. It is not for us to say whether the statute is logical or not. What we say is that the statute does not clearly circumscribe the discretion which trial judges usually have in sentencing.

The state argues that the trial judge, before pronouncing sentence, clearly advised the defendant of the sentence he was to receive, and so the defendant has no complaint. We quite agree that there is no basis for allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial judge’s remarks, however, indicate that he felt that he had pronounced the minimum sentence. We cannot say that the judge might not have pronounced a less severe sentence if he thought he had discretion to do so. The appropriate remedy is to remand for resen-tencing.

The defendant also argues that his guilty plea should be vacated because his counsel promised him that he would receive only one ten-year sentence. The trial judge’s questioning of the defendant, as set out above, demonstrates that this contention is frivolous.

The judgment denying postconviction relief is reversed. The sentence, but not the conviction, is vacated. The case is remanded with directions to resentence the defendant on his plea of guilty.

ROBERTSON, COVINGTON and HOLSTEIN, JJ., concur. RENDLEN, J., dissents in separate opinion filed. HIGGINS and BILLINGS, JJ., dissent and concur in dissenting opinion of RENDLEN, J.