STATON, Judge.
Tyrone Williams appeals his conviction of auto theft, a Class D felony.1 He presents three issues for review, one of which necessitates reversal: whether the trial court should have granted Williams' motion to suppress evidence gained pursuant to his warrantless arrest.
We reverse.
On May 14, 1992, at approximately 1:02 am., Frankfort police officers responded to an alarm activation at the WalMart Plaza on the east side of Frankfort. Two burglary suspects were apprehended; two fled on foot. At approximately 1:80 a.m., Frankfort Police Officer Boyd Martin and Clinton County Deputy Tim Porter received a report that the Frankfort WalMart Plaza had been burglarized. The officers were advised that two black males were seen fleeing on foot east of WalMart Plaza; no detailed description of the individuals was provided.
At approximately 2:80 a.m., Officer Martin observed a vehicle eastbound on State Road 28, approximately one quarter of a mile west of WalMart Plaza. Officer Martin observed that the vehicle, which bore a Clinton County license plate, was occupied by two black males. He communicated this information to Deputy Porter. The officers detained the vehicle approximately one and one-half miles east of WalMart Plaza.
As Deputy Porter exited his vehicle, he drew his weapon. He ordered the passengers of the detained vehicle to get out of the vehicle, get on the ground and place their hands behind their heads. A subsequent search of the detained vehicle disclosed that the steering column was broken or "hot-wired."
Williams was brought to trial on a charge of auto theft; a burglary charge was dismissed prior to trial. At a pre-trial hearing and at trial, Williams unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence gained pursuant to his warrantless arrest.2
[223]*223On appeal, Williams contends that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. He relies upon this court's language in Taylor v. State (1984), Ind.App., 464 N.E.2d 1333, 1336, reh. denied: "Arrests made without the benefit of probable cause are unlawful, and evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible."
The State responds that the officers merely conducted an "investigatory stop-rather than effected an arrest-prior to gaining the information that the detained vehicle had been "hot-wired." A limited investigative stop may be conducted upon an officer's reasonable suspicion:
"As a general rule, automobile drivers are not shorn of their fourth amendment protections when they leave their homes and enter their automobiles. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 668, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). However, 'there is nothing automatically unconstitutional in subjecting citizens to a brief detention under cireumstances where probable cause for a formal arrest is lacking. Luckett v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 174, 179, 284 N.E.2d 788, 741 (emphasis in original). The so-called 'stop and frisk' doctrine announced in Terry v. Ohio, 892 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), has allowed courts to gauge the reasonableness of particular investigative stops by striking 'a balance between the public interest [behind the investigation] and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference from law officers' United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2579, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). Where the public interest served by the officer's investigation is great and the intrusion on individual privacy is small, investigative stops of limited duration and 'reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation' have been upheld. Id. at 881, 95 S.Ct. at 2580 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. at 1884). To justify a warrantless intrusion, the police officer need not have probable cause to make an arrest, but must 'point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant intrusion upon an individual's right of privacy." Gipson v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 366, 368 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880). If the facts known by the police at the time of the 'stop' are such that a man of reasonable caution would believe that the action taken was appropriate, the command of the fourth amendment is satisfied. Id. at 368."
Platt v. State (1992), Ind., 589 N.E.2d 222, 225-26.
Evidence adduced at the hearing on Williams' motion to suppress discloses that the cireumstances of Williams' detention could not fairly be characterized as "a small intrusion on individual privacy, of limited duration, reasonably related in scope to the justification for its initiation." See Gipson, supra. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Deputy Porter testified:
Q: When the vehicle was stopped at what point were guns drawn by the officers?
A: I believe I drew my gun immediately upon exiting my car.
Q: Did Commander Martin do the same thing?
A: I can't speak for Officer Martin.
Q: Where were the suspects when you drew your weapon?
A: They were still inside the car that we stopped.
Q: Who ordered them from the car?
A: I did.
Q: What was your specific instruction?
A: To get out of the car and get on the ground.
[224]*224Q: Did you order them to place their hands behind their heads?
A: Yes.
Q: Was this prior to your doing a search of the vehicle?
A: Yes, it was.
Record, p. 161.
An arrest occurs when an officer "interrupts the freedom of the accused and restricts his liberty of movement." Armstrong v. State (1982), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 647, 651. This court has stated: "Holding a person at gunpoint certainly restrains his liberty of movement and is a clear example of arrest.3 Taylor, supra, at 1335. Inasmuch as Williams was held at gunpoint immediately upon his exit from his vehicle, he was clearly arrested at that point: Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether the officers had probable cause to effect an arrest at that time. Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Id.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Martin testified:
"There was nothing that made me believe they had committed a criminal act. The fact that I stopped them was the fact that it was a black male driver that I did not recognize in a car with Clinton County plates."
Record, p. 146.
Deputy Porter testified:
Q: Did you-was there an exchange of information between you and Boyd prior to the stop taking place?
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STATON, Judge.
Tyrone Williams appeals his conviction of auto theft, a Class D felony.1 He presents three issues for review, one of which necessitates reversal: whether the trial court should have granted Williams' motion to suppress evidence gained pursuant to his warrantless arrest.
We reverse.
On May 14, 1992, at approximately 1:02 am., Frankfort police officers responded to an alarm activation at the WalMart Plaza on the east side of Frankfort. Two burglary suspects were apprehended; two fled on foot. At approximately 1:80 a.m., Frankfort Police Officer Boyd Martin and Clinton County Deputy Tim Porter received a report that the Frankfort WalMart Plaza had been burglarized. The officers were advised that two black males were seen fleeing on foot east of WalMart Plaza; no detailed description of the individuals was provided.
At approximately 2:80 a.m., Officer Martin observed a vehicle eastbound on State Road 28, approximately one quarter of a mile west of WalMart Plaza. Officer Martin observed that the vehicle, which bore a Clinton County license plate, was occupied by two black males. He communicated this information to Deputy Porter. The officers detained the vehicle approximately one and one-half miles east of WalMart Plaza.
As Deputy Porter exited his vehicle, he drew his weapon. He ordered the passengers of the detained vehicle to get out of the vehicle, get on the ground and place their hands behind their heads. A subsequent search of the detained vehicle disclosed that the steering column was broken or "hot-wired."
Williams was brought to trial on a charge of auto theft; a burglary charge was dismissed prior to trial. At a pre-trial hearing and at trial, Williams unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence gained pursuant to his warrantless arrest.2
[223]*223On appeal, Williams contends that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. He relies upon this court's language in Taylor v. State (1984), Ind.App., 464 N.E.2d 1333, 1336, reh. denied: "Arrests made without the benefit of probable cause are unlawful, and evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible."
The State responds that the officers merely conducted an "investigatory stop-rather than effected an arrest-prior to gaining the information that the detained vehicle had been "hot-wired." A limited investigative stop may be conducted upon an officer's reasonable suspicion:
"As a general rule, automobile drivers are not shorn of their fourth amendment protections when they leave their homes and enter their automobiles. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 668, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). However, 'there is nothing automatically unconstitutional in subjecting citizens to a brief detention under cireumstances where probable cause for a formal arrest is lacking. Luckett v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 174, 179, 284 N.E.2d 788, 741 (emphasis in original). The so-called 'stop and frisk' doctrine announced in Terry v. Ohio, 892 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), has allowed courts to gauge the reasonableness of particular investigative stops by striking 'a balance between the public interest [behind the investigation] and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference from law officers' United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2579, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). Where the public interest served by the officer's investigation is great and the intrusion on individual privacy is small, investigative stops of limited duration and 'reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation' have been upheld. Id. at 881, 95 S.Ct. at 2580 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. at 1884). To justify a warrantless intrusion, the police officer need not have probable cause to make an arrest, but must 'point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant intrusion upon an individual's right of privacy." Gipson v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 366, 368 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880). If the facts known by the police at the time of the 'stop' are such that a man of reasonable caution would believe that the action taken was appropriate, the command of the fourth amendment is satisfied. Id. at 368."
Platt v. State (1992), Ind., 589 N.E.2d 222, 225-26.
Evidence adduced at the hearing on Williams' motion to suppress discloses that the cireumstances of Williams' detention could not fairly be characterized as "a small intrusion on individual privacy, of limited duration, reasonably related in scope to the justification for its initiation." See Gipson, supra. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Deputy Porter testified:
Q: When the vehicle was stopped at what point were guns drawn by the officers?
A: I believe I drew my gun immediately upon exiting my car.
Q: Did Commander Martin do the same thing?
A: I can't speak for Officer Martin.
Q: Where were the suspects when you drew your weapon?
A: They were still inside the car that we stopped.
Q: Who ordered them from the car?
A: I did.
Q: What was your specific instruction?
A: To get out of the car and get on the ground.
[224]*224Q: Did you order them to place their hands behind their heads?
A: Yes.
Q: Was this prior to your doing a search of the vehicle?
A: Yes, it was.
Record, p. 161.
An arrest occurs when an officer "interrupts the freedom of the accused and restricts his liberty of movement." Armstrong v. State (1982), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 647, 651. This court has stated: "Holding a person at gunpoint certainly restrains his liberty of movement and is a clear example of arrest.3 Taylor, supra, at 1335. Inasmuch as Williams was held at gunpoint immediately upon his exit from his vehicle, he was clearly arrested at that point: Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether the officers had probable cause to effect an arrest at that time. Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Id.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Martin testified:
"There was nothing that made me believe they had committed a criminal act. The fact that I stopped them was the fact that it was a black male driver that I did not recognize in a car with Clinton County plates."
Record, p. 146.
Deputy Porter testified:
Q: Did you-was there an exchange of information between you and Boyd prior to the stop taking place?
A: -Just the fact that he was following the two black males that was in a car with Clinton County license plates.
Q: Did you observe the occupants in the car prior to its being stopped?
A: Yes, I did as I passed them.
Q: Was there any information that you obtained when you passed them that you relayed to Boyd Martin?
A: Just that, yes, there is two black male subjects in the car.
Q: Did you recognize those men?
A: No, I did not.
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Q: Do you know what the approximate black male population is in this county?
A: I'm guessing thirty at the most.
Record, pp. 158-59.
The facts and cireumstances known to the arresting officers at the time of the arrest may be summarized as follows: during early morning hours, two black males unaeq-uainted with the officers were traveling through Clinton County in a vehicle bearing Clinton County license plates.4 We cannot [225]*225conclude that these facts would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that the vehicle occupants had committed a crime.
The trial court erred in denying Williams' . motion to suppress the evidence gained pursuant to his warrantless arrest. Accordingly, Williams' conviction is reversed.
SULLIVAN, J., concurs and files separate opinion.
HOFFMAN, J., dissents and files separate opinion.