Williams v. State

58 Fla. 138
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedJune 15, 1909
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 58 Fla. 138 (Williams v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. State, 58 Fla. 138 (Fla. 1909).

Opinion

Shackleford, J.

The plaintiffs in error were convicted of murder in the first degree, with a recommenda[141]*141tion to the mercy of the court, Turner Williams as principal and Maurice Williams and Jacob Hargrove as accessories thereto before the fact. All of such defendants were sentenced to confinement in the State prison for the period of their natural lives. Relief is sought here upon writ of error.

Nine errors are assigned, but the fifth, sixth and seventh, all of which are based upon the refusal of certain requested instructions, are not argued, not even being mentioned by the defendants in their brief, hence must be treated as abandoned. The ninth assignment is “For errors apparent by an examination of the record.” This assignment is not argued and presents nothing for consideration. See Douberly v. State, 51 Fla. 41, 40 South. Rep. 675.

The first assignment questions the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, and the second and third assignments are to the effect that the verdict is contrary to the charge of the court and to the law. We pass these assignments temporarily but shall take them up for consideration presently. The fourth assignment is as follows:

“Because the court erred in admitting the testimony of the witness Frank Thomas, Alex Franklin, John Henry Franklin, Mary Jane Franklin and Lucius Bryant, or the testimony of any one of them, as to that particular part of the testimony wherein they testified to hearing alleged dying exclamations of the deceased as follows: ‘Oh, Lord, Turner shot me.’ ”

It will be observed that this assignment is based upon different rulings of the trial court in admitting the testimony of several witnesses as to the “alleged dying exclamations of the deceased as follows: ‘Oh Lord, Turner shot me.’ ” When we turn to the bill of exceptions and, examine the testimony of these several witnesses upon the point in question, we find that objections were interposed [142]*142to certain portions thereof and also motions made to strike ont designated parts. All of these different rulings were severally excepted to and it is attempted to group them all en masse in one assignment. This is a very unsafe practice, to say the least of it, though we do not feel called upon, in the absence of any point being made, to enter into any extended discussion. Suffice it to say that this court has several times called attention to the necessity for particularity in the assignments of error. See Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Crosby, 53 Fla. 400, 43 South. Rep. 318, and authorities there cited. Also see Daniel v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 54 Fla., 265, 44 South. Rep. 949. In line with our repeated holding that a single assignment predicated upon the refusal to give two or more requested instructions containing separate propositions of law must fail if it appears that any one was properly refused, it would seem that a single assignment attacking a plurality of rulings upon the admission or rejection of evidence would be unavailing unless all of such rulings were erroneous. See Vaughan’s Seed Store v. Stringfellow, 56 Fla. 708; 48 South. Rep. 410. See generally Seaboard Air Line Ry Co. v. Hubbard, 142 Ala. 546; 38 South. Rep. 750.

The testimony is set out in the bill of exceptions in narrative form. We find disclosed therein that a negro “festival” was being held on the night the tragedy was enacted which resulted in the death of Henry Franklin and in the defendants being indicted and tried for murder. Frank Thomas was the first witness introduced on behalf of the State and, after having testified that he was acquainted with both the deceased and the three defendants and that he attended such “festival,” further testified: “We heard a shot and Franklin ran inside the gate and said, 'Oh, Lordy, I am shot, that boy Turner Williams shot me.’ Then I ran to him and said 'Who shot you?’ [143]*143and he said-.” Before he finished the sentence, the bill of exceptions recites: “Thereupon the attorney for the defendants objected to the testimony of the said witness as to who shot him upon the ground that the same was not part of the res gestae, and secondly that no predicate had been laid for the introduction of dying declarations, but the said judge did then and there deliver his opinion and decide that the objection ought not to be allowed, and permitted the witness to testify on the ground that such statement of the said witness was part of the res gestae, to which said opinion and decision the attorney for the said defendants in their behalf did then and there except.” The witness then completed the interrupted sentence by saying, “Oh Lordy, Turner Williams shot me.” As we have already said, the questions propounded to the respective witnesses and their answers thereto are not given, the testimony being set out in narrative form. As appears from the bill of exceptions, the witness had already given the exclamation or declaration of the deceased as to who shot him before any objection was interposed thereto, and, after the overruling of the objection which was made later, simply repeated such exclamation or declaration. As we held in Schley v. State, 48 Fla., 53; 37 South. Rep. 518, “Objections to the admissibility of evidence must, as a general thing, be made when it is offered, or its admissibility cannot be assigned as error. In a criminal prosecution an objection to a question after it has been answered comes too late.” No motion was made to strike out any portion of the testimony of this witness. As we held in Dickens v. State, 50 Fla., 17, 38 South. Rep. 909, “Where an answer to a question presents evidence which is illegal or objectionable on any known ground, the proper practice is a motion to strike it out and have the jury directed not to consider it, the movant specifying his objections to the [144]*144evidence with like particularity as in objecting to questions.” The witness goes on to testify that the deceased “was shot with a shot gun just outside the gate about six or eight feet and ran inside the gate and to the house, which is about thirty feet away from the gate, and died.” He further testified that “immediately after the gun fired the exclamation was made.”

Aleck Franklin testified that the deceased was his father, that he was present on the night that his father came to his death, that he heard only one shot “fired at the frolic” that night, upon which he looked around as quickly as he could and saw his father outside the gate. The witness proceeded to testify, “As soon as he was shot he fell down and then jumped up and hollered and said, -”. Here was promptly interposed a like objection to that offered to the testimony of Frank Thomas, which we copied above and, upon the same being overruled for like reasons, the witness proceeded to complete the sentence, saying that his father exclaimed, “Oh Lordy, Turner Williams shot me,” adding that the deceased “then ran inside of the gate and said, 'Oh Lordy, Turner Williams shot me,’ and then ran to the house and said, 'Oh Lordy, Turner Williams shot me,’ and fell down and died. It was right after the gun fired, about two minutes I reckon, when he said who shot him. It was right after the gun fired.” The defendants moved to strike out that part of the testimony of the witness as to the exclamation or declaration of the deceased as to who shot him, on the grounds that same was not part of the res gestae and was also hearsay testimony. This motion was denied by the court.

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Bluebook (online)
58 Fla. 138, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-state-fla-1909.