Vaughan's Seed Store v. Stringfellow

56 Fla. 708
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedJune 15, 1908
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 56 Fla. 708 (Vaughan's Seed Store v. Stringfellow) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vaughan's Seed Store v. Stringfellow, 56 Fla. 708 (Fla. 1908).

Opinion

Parkhill, J.

(After stating the facts.) — The plaintiff J. D. Stringfellow, testified as-a witness in his own behalf. His counsel asked him this question: “Mr. Stringfellow, did you make any purchase about the first of January, 1905, from the defendant corporation?” The witness answered: “I gave an order, * * * I met Mr. McDowell, of the Vaughn Seed Store, -- — ” To this answer the defendant objected and moved to strike the same, because the answer assumed that W. S. McDowell was the agent of the Vaughn Seed Store, while the fact of such agency was put in issue by ithe pleadings. The objection was overruled and the motion denied. This ruling is-made the basis of the first assignment of error.

The court committed no error in this ruling. The answer of the witness did not assume or disclose the agency of McDowell. As we read this answer, it was merely introductory to the subsequent statement, by the witness, of the facts and circumstances of the agency of McDowell and the means and source of knowledge of the witness. Hoadley v. Hammon, 63 Iowa 599, 19 N. W. Rep. 794; Talladega Ins. Co. v. Peacock, Adm’r, 67 Ala. 253. Any possible error was rendered harmless by the subsequent testimony of L. W. Wheeler, manager of the New York office of the Vaughn Seed Store, who testified in behalf of the defendant that “during the year 1904, we made arrangements with Mr. McDowell to sell seed for us on commissions. * * * M¡r. McDowell took an order from- J. D. Stringfellow, the plaintiff in this suit, upon the Vaughn Seed Store.” McCallum v. Driggs, 35 Fla. 277, 17 South. Rep. 407.

The witness Stringfellow testified that he gave McDowell “an order for these seed on the 26th day of September, 1904, to be shipped on January 1st, 1905. I purchased fifty pounds of seed.” The witness was asked, [717]*717“What kind of seed?” He answered: “I purchased Arlington White Spine Cucumber seed.” The question and answer were objected to and the defendant moved to strike the answer, because it was “immaterial and irrelevant and not in proof of any of the allegations of the declaration.” This is the basis of the second assignment.

The declaration alleged that the plaintiff purchased from the defendant, and the defendant sold and delivered to the plaintiff, Arlington White Spine Cucumber seed. But counsel argue “that the kind of seed he got was admitted, and that it was immaterial and should not have been testified to.” Testimony tending to prove allegations of the declaration is not immaterial. Even though the declaration admits tire contention of the defendant that the plaintiff bought and the defendant delivered Arlington White Spine Cucumber Seed, we fail to see how the defendant was harmed by proof of allegations of the declaration in harmony with the contention made by defendant. This assignment is without merit.

■Counsel for plaintiff asked the witness Stringfellow the following question: “Did these cucumber vines resulting from the planting of these particular seed produce the Arlington White Spine Cucumbers?” The witness answered: “They did not produce any Arlington White Spine cucumbers at all.” The defendant objected to the question and moved to strike the answer thereto' on the ground that the plaintiff admits- in his declaration that he purchased Arlington White Spine cucumber seed and received the same, and as being’ irrelevant and immaterial. The court overruled the objection and denied the motion to strike, and this made the basis of the third assignment of error.

This assignment is without merit. The testimony was proper. It tended to prove the plaintiff’s case. The dec[718]*718laration alleged that the defendant “offering and guaranteeing to furnish seeds for the growth of a certain quality of cucumbers, to-wit: -the Arlington White Spine cucumber, the plaintiff then and there purchased from the defendant, and the defendant sold and delivered to the plaintiff fifty (50) pounds of said Arlington White Spine cucumber seed at eighty cents per pound, aggregating forty dollars, and the plaintiff paid the defendant for said seeds, the same to be used by the plaintiff in the planting of his crop of cucumbers at and in Alachua county, Florida. And the plaintiff further says that believing the same to be good cucumber seeds, and that they would yield and produce as represented and guaranteed by the defendant, received the said seeds and planted the same, but the said seeds did not yield and produce the kind and quality of cucumbers as represented and guaranteed by the defendant, but on the contrary, yielded and produced a quality and kind of cucumbers that would not sell in the market, and that were rejected and refused by dealers, and declared by all dealers who handled them to be absolutely worthless.” No attack was made on the declaration by demurrer or otherwise. From the allegations in the declaration, we understand that the plaintiff ■bought and received from the defendant, Arlington White Spine cucumber seeds; that the defendant guaranteed said seeds would grow or produce Arlington White Spine cucumbers, but said seeds did not produce the kind and quality of cucumbers as represented and guaranteed by the defendant, which of course was the Arlington White Spine cucumber.

In support of his case it was proper for the plaintiff to prove, if he could d’o so, that the Arlington White Spine cucumber seeds bought by him did not produce the Arlington White Spine cucumber. The other db[719]*719jection that testimony was irrelevant and immaterial is too general to be considered. Neither can this court consider the argument of counsel based .upon the conditions printed upon the order for the seed, which order was not before the court when the question now being considered was propounded and ruled upon. What we have said here disposes of the fourth assignment of error also.

The 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 52nd, 53rd, 54th and that part of the 56th assignment based upon the refusal of the court to give the 25th instruction requested by the defendant ma)'- be considered together. They all relate to the measure of damage. The plaintiff, Stringfellow, and his witnesses Beville and Tenley were permitted to state the cost of the seed, the expense incurred by the plaintiff in planting, cultivating and irrigating the crop. The defendant objected to this proof, contending that the measure of damage should have been the difference between the value of the crop that would have been raised had the seed been as represented, and the value of tire crop which was actually raised.. The theory of the plaintiff is that the measure of his damage is the purchase money of the seed with interest arid the expense incurred in preparing the land, in planting the seed and compensation for any other expenditures for labor necessary in irrigating and making the crop of cucumbers.

'As will be seen by looking- at the declaration, the plaintiff complained because the seed purchased by him did not yield and produce the kind of cucumbers as represented and guaranteed by the defendant, but, on the contrary it is alleged, the seed produced a kind and quality of cucumber that was absolutely worthless and would not sell in the market. “And the plaintiff, before and since that time, incurred large expíense and damage in the purchase of said seed, in the clearing of the land, [720]*720breaking the subsoil and harrowing the same, planting and replanting the seed, fertilizing the same, working the crop, piping and preparing for irrigation, irrigating the crop, and.

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Bluebook (online)
56 Fla. 708, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vaughans-seed-store-v-stringfellow-fla-1908.