UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
) SAMUEL C. WILLIAMS, IV, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 14-cv-1900 (TSC) ) ) SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, ) ) Defendant. ) )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Samuel C. Williams, IV sued his former employer, the Smithsonian Institution,
alleging race discrimination and retaliation for protected activity under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Smithsonian moves for
summary judgment on both claims. ECF No. 37. For the reasons set forth below, the court will
GRANT the Smithsonian’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Williams’ Hiring
Williams, who is African American, was employed by the Smithsonian as a Management
and Program Analyst (MPA) in the Systems Engineering Division, Work Management Center
(WMC), Office of Facilities Management & Reliability (OFMR), between November 2012 and
August 2013. ECF No. 37 (“Def.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts”) ¶¶ 1, 36.
When Williams applied for the MPA position, WMC Supervisor Enos Scragg required
him to complete two evaluations: an Excel assessment and a writing sample. ECF No. 39-1, Ex.
1 D (“Williams Dep.”) at 15:25–16:19. 1 The posting announcing the vacant position, however, did
not indicate that any tests were necessary. ECF No. 39-1 (“Pl.’s Ex. A”) at 000003. Scragg,
who is Caucasian, hired Williams and became his supervisor in the WMC. Def.’s Stmt. Mat.
Facts ¶ 1. Williams’ employment at the Smithsonian was subject to a one-year probationary
period, which the Smithsonian uses “to determine the fitness of the employee and shall terminate
his services during this period if s/he fails to demonstrate fully his qualifications for continued
employment.” Id. ¶ 2. During Williams’ first year at the Smithsonian, his supervisor was to
“continually assess [his] performance during [the] probationary period and may make a
determination regarding [his] continued employment at any time during the probationary
period.” Id. Williams was informed that the probationary period was “a highly significant and
final step in the examining process.” Id.
B. Management Project Analyst Position
The OFMR provides maintenance, repair, and other building services to more than 400
facilities owned by the Smithsonian. Id. ¶ 3. Within the OFMR, the WMC is the “key work
control point for distributing and tracking facilities work throughout the Institution.” ECF No.
1 The court notes that Williams’ opposition brief to the Smithsonian’s motion for summary judgment failed to comply with Local Rule 7(h), which states that “[a]n opposition to such a motion shall be accompanied by a separate concise statement of genuine issues setting forth all material facts as to which it is contended there exists a genuine issue necessary to be litigated ….” LCvR 7(h). Rather than submitting a separate statement of disputed material facts, Williams included a sparse and loosely-organized adaptation of this statement in the body of his opposition brief and did not identify exactly which of the Smithsonian’s proffered facts he disputes. A strict reading of Local Rule 7(h) would permit the court to treat all of the Smithsonian’s facts as admitted by Williams. Id. (“In determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.”). Nevertheless, the court will overlook this insufficiency in Williams’ pleadings and proceed by treating the relevant section of his opposition brief as if it complied with Local Rule 7(h).
2 37-9. Specifically, the WMC uses a computerized maintenance management system (CMMS) to
manage service requests, maintain equipment inventories, schedule equipment testing and
inspection, track labor, materials, venders, and contractors, and manage required data and status
update reports for Smithsonian facilities in the Washington, D.C. area. Def.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts
¶ 4. An MPA in the WMC performs “detailed-critical work” that requires close attention to
ongoing tasks and near-perfect accuracy. Id. ¶ 5.
Williams’ performance plan in the WMC had five elements: (1) analysis and
management of computerized maintenance management system processes and activities; (2)
customer service and unit staff support; (3) analysis and management of program performance;
(4) safety, health, and security; and (5) professional development and teamwork. Id. ¶ 6. The
first element required that Williams “[c]onduct[] highly complex, non-routine entry or
corrections to data records lacking defined procedures as needed or requested,” demonstrate a
“minimal need for supervisory direction,” and meet a minimum accuracy level of 95 percent. Id.
¶ 7. The second element required Williams to “[s]erve as CMMS subject matter expert on all
scheduled maintenance activities and associated processes.” Id. ¶ 8. The third element required
“the effective use of queries, pivot tables, formulas and macros in work assignments resulting
accuracy [sic] and consistent output during the performance period.” Id. ¶ 9. The parties do not
focus on the specific requirements of the fourth and fifth elements of Williams’ performance
plan.
C. Williams’ Job Performance
During the first few months that Williams worked at the Smithsonian, he processed
tickets for facility maintenance, which would “come in by the hundreds” daily. Williams Dep. at
35:23–25. The parties dispute whether the ticketing work was included in Williams’ duties, or
3 whether customer service representatives were supposed to complete these assignments. ECF
No. 39 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 3; ECF No. 40 (“Def.’s Reply”) at 4–5. Williams also asserts that he
was responsible for completing more of the ticketing work than other MPAs. Williams Dep. at
35:7–37:8.
Soon after Williams began working in the WMC, Scragg found that Williams’ “Excel
skill set was weak.” Def.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶ 10. In addition to discussing Williams’ work
performance with him on a “daily and weekly basis,” Scragg held weekly meetings with WMC
staff, including Williams, during which Scragg discussed employees’ work request statistics and
accuracy rates. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. John Kerns, Williams’ co-worker and the WMC team lead, also
observed errors with Williams’ work involving job plans and preventative maintenance
schedules. Id. ¶ 13.
During Williams’ mid-year performance appraisal on April 16, 2013, Scragg informed
him that his accuracy rate was 94 percent, just below the established minimum accuracy rating of
95 percent required by his performance plan. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17. Scragg noted that Williams’
performance was “developing well” and, notwithstanding Williams’ accuracy rating, was
“confident [Williams was] the right person for this role.” ECF No. 37-16 (“Def.’s Ex. 16”) at 9.
Scragg instructed Williams to focus on improving his accuracy, self-reviewing his work, and
reviewing standard operating procedures. Id.
Between April 16, 2013, and July 17, 2013, Williams’ accuracy rate decreased to 90.6
percent and his average response time doubled, from 0.09 hours to 0.18 hours. Def.’s Stmt. Mat.
Facts ¶¶ 17, 20. During this period, Williams had the lowest accuracy rating in the WMC by 7.6
percent. Id. ¶ 22. He and one other employee were tied for the longest response time. Id. ¶ 23.
4 In or around late June or early July 2013, Scragg held Williams responsible for major
data errors in preventative maintenance schedule plans. Id. ¶ 26. Before leaving for a vacation,
Williams produced 73 job plans, but did not review his work. Id. ¶¶ 26–27. The errors in the
plans caused the WMC to lose approximately one week of work product, generated confusion
throughout the Smithsonian, and took four weeks to fully correct. Id. ¶¶ 28–29. Williams
claimed that a system error was responsible for the erroneous work product. Williams Dep. at
66:3–73:19. Dan Boyle, a co-worker, told Williams that the error “was a systems malfunction
rather than a user error.” Id. at 72:14–16.
Scragg acknowledged that systemic issues were the underlying cause of the error, but he
contended that Williams, who was expected to be an expert in the system, should have quickly
identified the error had he reviewed his work and followed standard operating procedures. Id.
¶ 30; Williams Dep. at 72:25–73:19. Williams then e-mailed Scragg on July 5, 2013 to request a
copy of the relevant standard operating procedures. Id. at 73:21–75:10; Pl.’s Ex. A at 000041–
42. In response, Scragg explained that “[t]he procedure I referred to is the standing expectation
that any work done is reviewed for errors. If you had double checked the job plans you created
to verify the procedures and work tasks had been generated properly, the system error would
have been discovered sooner.” Pl.’s Ex. A at 000041. Williams’ attempts to address the errors
contained mistakes that other WMC employees subsequently had to correct. Def.’s Stmt. Mat.
Facts ¶ 28.
D. Scragg’s Use of Pre-Employment Tests and Williams’ Exchanges with Katherine Simenton
Soon after he was hired by the Smithsonian, Williams requested a copy of his pre-
employment test results from Katherine Simenton, in the Personnel Unit of the Business
Operations Division of the OFMR. Pl.’s Ex. A at 000003. Simenton informed him that no tests
5 were required for his position. Id. Scragg states he requested that applicants complete the two
assessments because the skills they tested were important to the MPA position. Def.’s Mot. S.J.
at 16; ECF No. 37-10 (“Scragg Dep.”) at 54:1–6, 59:4–61:21. Scragg also asserts that each time
he was the hiring official for a vacant position, he requested that every applicant submit the same
information, including the pre-employment tests. Id. at 51:7–12; 128:15–21.
While assisting with an interview panel for a vacant MPA position in or around May
2013, Williams heard Scragg, the hiring official, ask an African American applicant if the
applicant had submitted a written test. Pl.’s Ex. A at 000003. After the candidate refused to
complete the tests on the grounds that they were not required by the vacancy posting, Scragg
instructed the panel to remove the candidate’s name from the pool of applicants. Id. Tamia
Rush, who is also African American, was ultimately hired to fill the position. Id. She later told
Williams that she had been required only to submit a writing sample during the application
process. Id. Scragg claims that, by this time, he had decided to eliminate the Excel component
of the assessment “because he lost faith that he was getting accurate results.” Scragg Dep. at
56:6–12. Scragg later discontinued the writing sample as well. Id. at 56:6–20.
In early July 2013, Williams, allegedly confused by how Scragg handled the system
malfunction issue and concerned by the “disparity in job requirements,” spoke to Simenton about
the pre-employment tests and “expressed to her his belief it was discriminatory.” Pl.’s Ex. A at
000003. Simenton told him that Scragg had previously been informed that the two evaluations
fell outside of the Smithsonian’s Office of Personnel Management’s guidelines. Id. On July 9,
2013, Williams met with Simenton to “discuss inconsistencies with pre-employment tests that
were given to Tamia Rush . . . and [himself].” Id. at 000014. During this conversation,
Simenton reiterated that such tests were prohibited unless included on the position announcement
6 and said she had informed Scragg that pre-employment testing was “illegal.” Williams Dep. at
124:2–125:17. Later that day, Scragg stopped at Williams’ cubicle while Williams was talking
to co-worker Chris Butler. Pl.’s Ex. A at 000033. Scragg remarked, “What kind of trouble are
you troublemakers getting into?” Id. When Williams and Butler asked what Scragg meant,
Scragg “replied with a snicker and walked off.” Id.
E. Williams’ Termination from the Smithsonian
Citing Williams’ unsatisfactory performance as an MPA and his inability to accept
responsibility for errors in his work, Scragg notified Williams on July 23, 2013 that he would be
terminated from his employment at the Smithsonian prior to the end of his probationary period. 2
Scragg Dep. at 82:20–83:3. Scragg had previously discussed the decision to fire Williams with
Scragg’s supervisor, Kendra Gastright, the OFMR director. Def.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶ 35; Pl.’s
Ex. A at 000003. Williams’ termination became effective August 6, 2013. Def.’s Stmt. Mat.
Facts ¶ 36.
On July 29, 2013, six days after Williams received notification of his termination, he
sought counseling from an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor at the
Smithsonian. Id. ¶ 38. He subsequently filed a formal complaint with the Smithsonian’s Office
of Equal Employment and Minority Affairs (“OEEMA”), the agency’s EEO office, on March 10,
2014. Id. ¶ 39. In his complaint, Williams claimed he had been subject to discrimination on the
basis of race when Scragg required him to take two pre-employment tests. Id. ¶ 40. Williams
also submitted a retaliation complaint, alleging that he was fired because he had expressed
2 Williams’ claim that he received notice of his termination “without any counsel from Enos Scragg about poor performance” is contradicted by the undisputed facts. Pl.’s Opp’n at 6. Williams does not dispute that he received a mid-year performance review from Scragg on April 16, 2013 during which he learned his accuracy rating was below the minimum standard. Def.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 15, 17. 7 concerns about Scragg’s use of the pre-employment assessments. Id. ¶ 42. OEEMA completed
its investigation and issued its Report of Investigation to Williams (included in the record) on
September 11, 2014. Id. ¶ 51. Additionally, Williams filed a complaint with the U.S. Office of
Special Counsel, reiterating the claims that he made in his EEO complaint. ECF No. 37-6 at
181:2–15. After conducting an initial investigation, the Office of Special Counsel elected not to
take further action. ECF No. 37-30.
F. Procedural History
The Smithsonian previously filed a motion to dismiss Williams’ retaliation claim and his
claim that the Smithsonian denied him training opportunities on account of race. ECF No. 6.
The court dismissed Williams’ failure-to-train claim because Williams conceded that he had
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Williams v. Smithsonian Inst., 177 F. Supp. 3d
331, 334 (D.D.C. 2016). The court denied the Smithsonian’s motion to dismiss the retaliation
claim, finding that Williams had established a prima facie case for retaliation. Id. at 6. The
Smithsonian has now moved for summary judgment on Williams’ remaining discrimination and
retaliation claims, ECF No. 37.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no disputed genuine issue of material
fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). A dispute of fact is “genuine” only “if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. 251, 251–52 (1986). A dispute is “material” only when it involves facts “that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. at 248. In determining
8 whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must view all facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district
court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the ‘pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits . . .’ which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323. In response, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and identify specific
facts which show there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. To preclude summary judgment,
the nonmovant must “provide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find [in his
favor].” Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, “the judge’s function is not . . . to weigh
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249. The court must “eschew making credibility
determinations” at the summary judgment stage. Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C.
Cir. 2017). However, “[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,
summary judgment may be granted.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citations omitted).
And “conclusory assertions offered without any evidentiary support do not establish a genuine
issue for trial.” Wang v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 206 F. Supp. 3d 46, 63 (D.D.C. 2016)
(citing Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Williams’ Discrimination Claims
Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing]
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
9 employment, because of such individual’s race, color . . . or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a). Title VII claims may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. See Brady v. Off. of
the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Where, as here, a plaintiff has offered
indirect evidence of Title VII discrimination, the court applies the familiar burden-shifting
framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to determine
whether summary judgment is appropriate. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the
plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination in violation
of Title VII. 411 U.S. at 802. In order to do so, the plaintiff must show: (1) he belongs to a
protected class under Title VII, (2) he experienced an adverse employment action, and (3) the
adverse employment action yields an inference of discrimination. Royall v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter
Carriers, AFL-CIO, 548 F.3d 137, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2008). If the plaintiff meets his burden of
establishing a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for taking the relevant action. Id. at 144. In the event that the
employer proffers such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
employer’s purported justification for the adverse employment action was merely a pretext for
unlawful discrimination. Id.
The D.C. Circuit has found that the question of whether the plaintiff in a Title VII
discrimination case actually established a prima facie case is “almost always irrelevant.” Brady,
520 F.3d at 493. When “an employee has suffered an adverse employment action and an
employer has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision, the district court
need not—and should not—decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 494 (emphasis in original). The summary judgment analysis
instead must focus on “one central question”:
10 Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted nondiscriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin?
Id.
Recently, this Circuit clarified that Brady’s singular focus on the “pretext” phase of the
McDonnell Douglas analysis is merely a “shortcut” and does not “imply that the District Court
may relieve the employer of its burden, at the second prong, to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action.” Figueroa v. Pompeo, 923 F.3d 1078, 1087 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). For the Brady rule to apply, “an employer at the second
prong must proffer admissible evidence showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, clear, and
reasonably specific explanation for its actions.” Id. at 1092. And the evidence the employer
presents “must suffice to raise a triable issue of fact as to intentional discrimination and to
provide the employee with a full and fair opportunity for rebuttal.” Id.
1. Administration of Pre-Employment Tests
Although Williams’ Complaint alleges unlawful discrimination only in his termination
from the Smithsonian, ECF No. 19 (“Sec. Amend. Compl.”) ¶ 56, his subsequent pleadings
suggest that the Smithsonian committed a separate act of discrimination by requiring him to take
two pre-employment tests. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 12. This allegation requires an inquiry into the
prima facie stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, since the facts in the record do not
clearly establish that Williams suffered any adverse employment action. See Wang, 206 F. Supp.
3d at 65 (“Of course, in a case in which an employer’s action does not clearly qualify as an
adverse employment action, the court still must first determine whether plaintiff suffered an
adverse employment action.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
11 An adverse employment action requires “a significant change in employment status, such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1293 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (quoting Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). To qualify, an
employer’s conduct must cause a plaintiff-employee to “experience[] materially adverse
consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or future employment
opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could objectively find tangible harm.” Douglas
v. Preston, 559 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1131
(D.C. Cir. 2002)). In most cases, a tangible employment action “inflicts direct economic harm.”
Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 762.
Williams has not met his burden of showing that he suffered an adverse employment
action because he was required to take the pre-employment tests. Notwithstanding the testing
requirement, Williams was hired for the MPA position for which he applied. In his pleadings, he
has not identified any objectively tangible harm he suffered because Scragg required him to
complete the Excel test and writing sample. Williams’ concerns about the fairness and
discriminatory nature of the evaluations do not, without more, establish that they constitute an
adverse employment action. See Douglas, 559 F.3d at 552 (“not everything that makes an
employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action”); Jones v. Bush, 160 F. Supp. 3d 325, 346
(D.D.C. 2016) (finding that entirely subjective harm such as employee dissatisfaction,
embarrassment, injury to reputation, and “disrespectful treatment” does not qualify as an adverse
employment action). And while Williams claims that his assignment to maintenance ticketing
tasks during his first three months at the Smithsonian fell outside of his job responsibilities, he
12 does not argue that this initial work assignment independently constituted an adverse
employment action caused by his performance on the pre-employment evaluations. 3
2. Williams’ Separation from the Smithsonian
Williams primarily contends that the Smithsonian intentionally discriminated against him
on account of race by firing him during his probationary period. That Williams’ termination is
an adverse employment action under Title VII is not in dispute. Therefore, the court need not
conduct a threshold analysis of whether Williams established a prima facie case of
discrimination before assessing the sufficiency of the Smithsonian’s non-discriminatory
explanation for discharging him. See Brady, 520 F.3d at 494.
a. The Smithsonian has presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for terminating Williams’ employment.
To determine if the Smithsonian proffered adequate evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for firing Williams, the court considers (1) whether the evidence would
be admissible at trial (or at the summary judgment phase); (2) whether the factfinder, if it
believes the evidence, “must reasonably be able to find that the employer’s action was motivated
by a nondiscriminatory reason”; (3) whether the employer’s nondiscriminatory explanation is
“facially credible in light of the proffered evidence”; and (4) whether the employer’s evidence
presents a “clear and reasonably specific explanation” that provides the employee with “a full
and fair opportunity to attack the explanation as pretextual.” Figueroa, 923 F.3d at 1087–88. As
3 A plaintiff may prove unlawful discrimination under Title VII by showing that either (1) “the employer acted with a discriminatory motive” (disparate treatment), or (2) “its action was the result of a process that, while apparently fair in form, was discriminatory in operation” (disparate impact). Davis v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 17-7071, 2019 WL 2398007, at *5 ((D.C. Cir. June 7, 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Williams argues only that he experienced disparate treatment on account of his race. He does not allege that Scragg’s pre-employment tests had a disparate impact on African American applicants for MPA positions in the WMC. 13 long as the employer’s evidence meets these requirements, the employer “need not persuade the
court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons” to meet its burden at this stage.
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
An analysis of these factors shows that the Smithsonian has met its burden. First,
Williams does not contest the admissibility of any evidence proffered by the Smithsonian, so the
court will consider this evidence in its analysis. Cf. Ali v. D.C. Gov’t, 810 F. Supp. 2d 78, 83
(D.D.C. 2011) (“Rule 56 allows a party . . . opposing summary judgment to object that the
material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible
in evidence.”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)) (quotation marks omitted).
Second, the evidence would allow a factfinder to reasonably conclude that the
Smithsonian was motivated by a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to fire Williams. The
Smithsonian required that MPAs in the WMC satisfy an objective, measurable performance
standard—a minimum accuracy level of 95 percent. Def. Stat. Mat. Facts ¶ 7. Williams’
accuracy rating consistently fell below this level. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17. During a mid-year performance
review, Scragg notified Williams that his accuracy rating was 94 percent, just below the
minimum acceptable level. Id. At the time, Scragg nonetheless expressed confidence in
Williams and was optimistic that his performance would improve as he gained more experience.
Def.’s Ex. 16 at 9. Instead, Williams’ performance continued to decline. Def.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts
¶¶ 5, 20. Between April and July 2013, his accuracy decreased to 90.6 percent, a significant
drop in a “detailed-critical” setting that demanded near-perfect work product. Id. Based on this
metric alone, Williams’ performance was 7.6 percent below that of the next-lowest analyst in the
WMC, showing that he was lagging behind others in the office. Id. ¶ 22. As his accuracy rating
declined, Williams’ average completion time doubled, and was tied for the slowest response time
14 in the WMC. Id. ¶ 20. Others, beyond Scragg, commented on Williams’ performance as well.
John Kerns, the WMC team lead who worked alongside Williams, observed errors in his work
on job plans and preventative maintenance schedules. Id. ¶ 13. Williams has not rebutted any of
the Smithsonian’s evidence showing that his performance as an MPA fell below minimum
requirements.
Courts have recognized an employee’s subpar performance as evidence that an employer
had a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for terminating the employee. See George v.
Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (observing that “performance below the employer’s
legitimate expectations” is one of the “two most common” “legitimate reasons for discharge”)
(citation omitted); Gonda v. Donahoe, 79 F. Supp. 3d 284, 295 (D.D.C. 2015) (holding that
“poor and deteriorating job performance is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing
plaintiff”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Simmons v. Cox, 495 F. Supp. 2d 57,
66–67 (D.D.C. 2007) (recognizing employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for
terminating an employee where performance evaluations documented the employee’s
“unsatisfactory level of work”). Even assuming the presence of a genuine factual dispute with
respect to Williams’ culpability for the major data errors that occurred in late June through early
July 2013, see Def’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶ 26–30; Williams Dep. at 66:3–73:19, the undisputed
evidence in the record regarding Williams’ substandard performance by July 2013 shows that a
factfinder would “reasonably be able to find that the [Smithsonian’s] action was motivated by a
nondiscriminatory reason.” Figueroa, 923 F.3d at 1088.
Third, the substantial evidence of Williams’ substandard performance during his tenure
as an MPC renders the Smithsonian’s nondiscriminatory explanation for separating him facially
credible.
15 Finally, the undisputed facts in the record show that the Smithsonian has provided the
requisite “clear and reasonably specific explanation” for the materially adverse action in
question. The Smithsonian’s consistent claim—one directly supported by the record—that it
decided to discharge Williams because of his unsatisfactory job performance gave Williams a
clear opportunity to challenge the asserted justification as merely a pretext for unlawful racial
discrimination.
Because its evidentiary proffer satisfies all four Figueroa factors, the Smithsonian has
met its burden to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Williams’
employment.
b. Williams has not presented evidence which might establish that the Smithsonian’s explanations for his separation were a pretext for racial discrimination.
Since the Smithsonian presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging
Williams, the court considers whether he “produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
find that the employer’s asserted nondiscriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the
employer intentionally discriminated against [him] on the basis of race . . . .” Brady, 520 F.3d at
494. “Although a jury may ultimately decide to credit the version of the events described by
[defendant] over that offered by [plaintiff], this is not a basis upon which a court may rest in
granting a motion for summary judgment.” Leavitt, 407 F.3d at 413.
Williams could establish a reasonable inference of discrimination at this stage by
showing, inter alia, that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action is “false.” Czekalski, 475 F.3d at 366. He could similarly meet his burden
by showing “changes and inconsistencies in the stated reason for the adverse action,”
demonstrating that the employer failed to comply with established criteria or procedures related
16 to the action, or showing “that a factual determination underlying an adverse employment action
is egregiously wrong.” Wang, 206 F. Supp. 3d at 67–68 (quoting Burley v. Nat’l Rail Passenger
Corp., 801 F.3d 290, 296 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
Williams suggests the Smithsonian’s claims regarding his unsatisfactory performance are
inconsistent with the facts. He alleges he was “caught . . . off guard” by Scragg’s accusation that
he was responsible for the major data errors in late June 2013 because he had not previously
received any negative feedback for his performance. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. Although Williams cites
no facts in the record to support this assertion, Scragg’s comments in Williams’ mid-year
performance appraisal in April 2013 support this claim and thus establish a genuine dispute of
fact on this issue. While Scragg, in the appraisal, notified Williams that he was failing to meet
minimum data accuracy levels, Scragg’s overall assessment of Williams’ performance trajectory
and fitness for the position was positive. Def.’s Ex. 16 at 9.
However, given the undisputed evidence that Williams’ accuracy levels substantially
declined from April to July 2013, classifying his mid-year appraisal as a positive evaluation does
not create an inference of pretext. See Gonda, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 299 (“Instances of positive
feedback do not suggest pretext given the substantial evidence that [an employee’s] superiors
were dissatisfied with work performance and [an employee’s] failure to improve.”). While his
mid-year review was generally positive, Williams concedes facts that show that he not only
failed to subsequently improve his accuracy, as Scragg instructed in the April appraisal, but
instead produced increasingly less accurate work in the months that followed. For the same
reasons, Scragg’s recommendation letter for Williams in April 2013 does not provide
countervailing evidence that the Smithsonian’s explanation for his firing was pretextual. Pl.’s
Ex. A at 000014.
17 Even if Scragg’s conclusion that Williams was responsible for the major data errors in
late June and early July 2013 was a motivating factor in William’s termination, the court cannot
conclude that this “factual determination underlying [the] adverse employment action” was
“egregiously wrong.” Wang, 206 F. Supp. 3d at 68. While there is a genuine factual dispute
regarding William’s culpability for failing to catch the systems error, this dispute, too, is
immaterial. In light of the other evidence confirming that Williams was consistently performing
at an unsatisfactory level by July 2013, the dispute regarding his culpability for this particular
mistake does not render the Smithsonian’s nondiscriminatory explanation for his discharge
pretextual. Because the Smithsonian’s “stated belief about the underlying facts is reasonable in
light of the evidence,” id. at 68 n.7 (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at 495), a jury “cannot conclude
that [the Smithsonian] is lying” about the reasons for Williams’ separation. Wang, 206 F. Supp.
at 68 n.7.
Williams similarly fails to present any facts to defend his claim that “Mr. Scragg began to
unfairly single him out for poor work performance” prior to his termination. Def.’s Stmt. Mat.
Facts ¶ 12. While the D.C. Circuit has found summary judgment improper when a reasonable
jury could conclude that the employer’s review of the employee’s performance or conduct was
“colored by racial discrimination,” Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 857 (D.C.
Cir. 2006), this case does not raise any such concern. Williams does not challenge the
methodology of the accuracy ratings, present any facts to show that his job performance was
stronger than his ratings reflect, or otherwise suggest that these statistics were anything but
objective and accurate measurements of his performance as an MPA. Therefore, this case is
readily distinguishable from those in which an employer relies heavily on subjective criteria
when making employment decisions, which, as the D.C. Circuit has recognized, can be a vehicle
18 for disguising discrimination. See Wang, 206 F. Supp. 3d at 71 (citing Hamilton v. Geithner, 666
F.3d 1344, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
Although Williams does not raise this argument in his opposition brief, the court also
notes the absence of any evidence in the record suggesting that the Smithsonian—and Scragg
specifically—failed to comply with established agency criteria or procedures in conjunction with
Williams’ separation. See Wang, 206 F. Supp. 3d at 68. Moreover, the policies related to the
probationary employment period provide the Smithsonian with substantial flexibility to
discharge a probationary employee who, like Williams, “fails to demonstrate fully his
qualifications for continued employment.” Def.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶ 2.
Alternatively, Williams can avoid summary judgment at the pretext stage by pointing to
“evidence of discriminatory statements or attitudes on the part of the employer,” Mastro, 447
F.3d at 855, which can include facts related to the employer’s “general treatment of minority
employees.” Wang, 206 F. Supp. 3d at 68. While evidence that Scragg treated Williams less
favorably than comparator employees of a different race would support an inference of
discrimination, such a showing is not necessary. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
575–76 (1978).
Williams does not rely on a comparator-based argument. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 11. He does
not dispute the Smithsonian’s statement that there were no similarly situated employees
supervised by Scragg who had performance issues during their probationary employment period.
Def.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶ 22. To the extent that he intended to imply a comparator issue by
claiming Scragg “unfairly single[d] him out for poor work performance,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 12,
Williams does not defend this assertion with any evidence in the record. He offers no facts
indicating that any non-African American analysts in the WMC failed to meet minimum
19 accuracy requirements during their probationary period but experienced no adverse employment
action as a result. In fact, Williams does not dispute that by July 2013, his accuracy rating of
90.6 percent was 7.6 percent lower than that of the analyst with the next-lowest rating. Def.’s
Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 20, 22. By implication, this suggests that all other analysts in Williams’
office exceeded the minimum accuracy standard of 95 percent, at least over the final three
months of Williams’ employment in the WMC.
Most importantly, Williams argues that Scragg’s practice of requiring pre-employment
evaluations—which Williams alleges was only a requirement for African American applicants—
evinces a racially discriminatory attitude that supports an inference that his discharge was the
result of intentional discrimination. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 12. The record shows that Scragg
required three MPA applicants (including Williams) to complete a pre-employment assessment,
and that all three were African American. Pl.’s Ex. A at 000003; Def.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶ 1.
According to Williams, this pattern, combined with Simenton’s statement that the assessments
were not an authorized part of the application process, gave him “reason to believe that Mr.
Scragg only applied pre-employment tests to African American candidates.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 12.
Scragg, by contrast, claims that he required all candidates for a given vacancy to complete the
same evaluation, and that he required these assessments to evaluate skills he believed were
important to the MPA position. Scragg Dep. at 46:11–13, 51:7–12, 54:1–6, 128:15–21. The
record contains no additional evidence to corroborate Scragg’s statement.
While the evidence is not inconsistent with Williams’ assertion that only African
Americans were required to complete pre-employment assessments, it does not support a
reasonable inference that “the employer’s asserted nondiscriminatory reason [for discharging
Williams] was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against
20 [him] on the basis of race . . . .” Brady, 520 F.3d at 494. Both Williams and Tamia Rush—two
of the three African American MPA applicants discussed in the record—were hired by Scragg
after completing pre-employment tests. The D.C. Circuit has noted that “‘[w]hen the person who
made the decision to fire was the same person who made the decision to hire, it is difficult to
impute to her an invidious motivation that would be inconsistent with the decision to hire,’
especially ‘when the firing has occurred only a short time after the hiring.’” Waterhouse v. Dist.
of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130
F.3d 553, 560 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co. LLC, 413 F.3d 1090, 1096
(9th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n employer’s initial willingness to hire the employee-plaintiff is strong
evidence that the employer is not biased against the protected class to which the employee
belongs.”). Absent any evidence that Scragg did not require non-African American applicants
for vacant MPA positions to complete a test, Scragg’s decision to hire both Williams and Rush
runs directly counter to an inference that he harbored any discriminatory animus against African
American candidates.
Although Scragg’s initial decision to hire Williams “does not alone suffice for summary
judgment,” it nonetheless “is probative evidence” that Scragg did not intentionally discriminate
against Williams when he discharged him less than one year later. Vatel v. Alliance of Auto.
Mfrs., 627 F.3d 1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original). In Waterhouse, the D.C.
Circuit found that the absence of a “genuine issue regarding [an employee’s] failure to fulfill her
basic job responsibilities,” when considered alongside the fact that the same supervisor had both
hired and fired the employee, entitled the employer to summary judgment, even when the
supervisor had allegedly made a discriminatory comment during the employee’s tenure. 298
F.3d at 994. If the circumstances in Waterhouse do not yield a permissible inference of unlawful
21 discrimination, then the facts in this case—which show Scragg repeatedly hired African
American applicants while using the pre-employment assessments, and do not indicate that
Scragg made any racially discriminatory comments—certainly do not.
Williams’ expressed concerns regarding the “inconsistencies with pre-employment tests
that were given to Tamia Rush . . . and himself” do not affect this analysis. Pl.’s Ex. A at
000014. Given that both Williams and Rush are African American, the court cannot infer any
racial discrimination from the fact that Rush was only required to take one test, while Williams
had to take two. Def.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶ 1; Pl.’s Ex. A at 000003.
Finally, Williams contends that the Smithsonian did not provide him with adequate
training to perform his duties as an MPA. Specifically, he argues that he received detailed
training on the ticket generation system for the first time on July 3, 2013, and that Scragg then
“unfairly discharged Plaintiff without being given a chance to implement what he learned from
the July 3 training.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 12 –13; Pl.’s Ex. A at 000034–37.
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Williams, this claim is
unpersuasive. Nothing in the record indicates that the Smithsonian refused to provide training
opportunities to Williams while offering them to other new hires. Additionally, Williams’
performance plan expressly indicated that MPAs should exhibit “a minimal need for supervisory
direction” and “[s]erve as CMMS subject matter expert on all scheduled maintenance activities
and associated processes.” Def.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 7–8. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, this undisputed information suggests that the Smithsonian expects those entering the
position to demonstrate a mastery of CMMS processes without needing formal, detailed training.
Moreover, the performance plan indicates that Williams requested and received an Excel training
class in February 2013, which runs counter to an inference that the Smithsonian prevented
22 Williams from taking steps to improve the skills needed for his position. Def.’s Ex. 16 at 6.
While evidence showing that similarly situated Smithsonian employees received training
opportunities that were denied to Williams might support an inference of discrimination,
Williams offers none.
Because Williams has not pointed to evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the
Smithsonian’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for his termination was a pretext for
intentional race discrimination, summary judgment for the Smithsonian is appropriate on
Williams’ discrimination claim.
B. Williams’ Retaliation Claim
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate
against [an] employee [] … because he has opposed any practice” prohibited by Title VII
(known as the “opposition clause”) or “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in” a
Title VII proceeding (known as the “participation clause”). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see also
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 56 (2006). Williams did not initiate
Title VII proceedings prior to his termination. He initially contacted the Smithsonian’s EEO
office on July 29, 2013, six days after he was fired. Def.’s Stmt. Mat Facts ¶ 38. Therefore, his
claim that he was subject to retaliation as a result of his complaints regarding Scragg’s pre-
employment evaluations invokes only Title VII’s opposition clause.
Like Title VII discrimination claims, Title VII retaliation claims are analyzed under the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255, 263 (D.C.
Cir. 1999). To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, an employee must
demonstrate: “(1) that he opposed a practice made unlawful by Title VII; (2) that the employer
took a materially adverse action against him; and (3) that the employer took the action ‘because’
23 the employee opposed the practice.” McGrath v. Clinton, 666 F.3d 1377, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Once a defendant proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the materially adverse
action, the question of whether a plaintiff established a prima facie cases is generally “no longer
relevant.” Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting United States Postal
Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)). Instead, once a defendant
proffers such a reason, the court must “proceed[] to the ultimate issue of retaliation vel non.”
Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see Morales v. Gotbaum, 42 F. Supp. 3d
175, 188 (D.D.C. 2014).
1. The Smithsonian has articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for separating Williams from his position.
Since the Smithsonian does not dispute that Williams’ firing constitutes a materially
adverse action, the court need not proceed with an initial inquiry into whether Williams made out
a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation. Because the McDonnell Douglas framework applies
to Title VII retaliation claims as well as discrimination claims, Figueroa guides this court’s
analysis of whether the Smithsonian has adequately demonstrated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory rationale for separating Williams from his probationary employment. See
Santos v. Barr, No. 17-321, 2019 WL 2504101, at *8 (D.D.C. June 17, 2019) (applying Figueroa
to a Title VII retaliation claim). For the reasons previously discussed in section III.A.2.a, supra,
the Smithsonian’s evidentiary proffer satisfies the four Figueroa factors, and the Smithsonian
therefore has met its burden of offering a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for discharging
Williams.
24 2. Williams has failed to show that the Smithsonian’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation was a pretext for unlawful retaliation.
Because the Smithsonian has offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for
separating Williams, the burden reverts to Williams to point to evidence that “creates a material
dispute on the ultimate issue of retaliation.” Jones, 557 F.3d at 678. He can do so “either
directly by [showing] that a discriminatory [or retaliatory] reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.” Id. (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).
When evaluating whether a plaintiff has met this burden, the court considers “‘all the evidence,’
which includes not only the prima facie case but also the evidence the plaintiff offers ‘to attack
the employer’s proffered explanation for its action’ and other evidence of retaliation.” Jones,
557 F.3d at 677 (quoting Carter v. George Wash. Univ., 387 F.3d 872, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
In contrast to Title VII discrimination claims, “there are no mixed-motive retaliation
claims.” Duncan v. Johnson, 213 F. Supp. 3d 161, 184–85 (D.D.C. 2016). In order to survive
summary judgment at the final stage, a plaintiff must show “that the unlawful retaliation would
not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer”—in
other words, that the retaliation was the “but-for cause” of the materially adverse action.
Morales, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 188 (quoting Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570
U.S. 338, 360 (2013)). “Under the but-for standard, it is not sufficient for [a plaintiff] to
demonstrate that a reasonable jury could find that retaliatory animus by her supervisor was a
cause for the . . . subsequent termination. Rather, [a plaintiff] must demonstrate that there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether retaliatory animus was the cause for the . . .
subsequent termination.” Gonda, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 303 (emphasis in original). “A plaintiff can
meet this burden by casting doubt on the objective validity of the employer’s explanation.”
25 Duncan, 213 F. Supp. 3d at 189 (quoting Morris v. McCarthy, 825 F.3d 658, 671 (D.C. Cir.
2016)).
By choosing not to dispute most of the facts involving his unsatisfactory work
performance, Williams fails to raise doubts about the “objective validity” of the Smithsonian’s
explanation for separating him. The facts indicating that Williams’ work for the WMC did not
meet minimum accuracy requirements—which Williams does not dispute—support this
conclusion. See Gonda, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 303 (“The existence of unrebutted facts about
[plaintiff’s] unsatisfactory work performance would make it impossible for a jury to conclude
that retaliatory animus was the only cause for [plaintiff’s] . . . subsequent discharge.”). By not
rebutting any of the Smithsonian’s facts related to his performance statistics, Williams never
challenges the veracity of these objectively measurable standards of his job performance. Again,
even assuming a genuine dispute of fact regarding his responsibility for the major data errors in
June through July 2013, the uncontested facts establish that he fell short of meeting the WMC’s
minimum standards for his position.
Moreover, the Smithsonian notified Williams that his work was failing to meet
expectations and provided him with performance evaluations, both formal and informal, during
his employment. Def.’s Stmt. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 11–13, 15–18. During Williams’ mid-year
performance review in April 2013, Scragg notified him that his accuracy rating was below the
minimum requirement and suggested best practices for improving his performance. Id. ¶¶ 15–
18. According to the Smithsonian’s employment policies, the purpose of the probationary period
is “to determine the fitness of the employee,” and the Smithsonian “shall terminate [the
employee’s] services during this period if [he] fails to demonstrate fully his qualifications for
continued employment.” Id. ¶ 2. Based on the facts not in dispute, Williams has conceded that
26 he fell short of fully demonstrating his qualifications to continue serving as an MPA by July
2013.
Further, Williams identifies no direct evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer
that retaliatory animus motivated the decision to discharge him. To support his argument that the
Smithsonian’s performance-based rationale for separating him was merely pretextual, Williams
claims that “Mr. Scragg began to unfairly single him out for poor work performance.” Pl.’s
Opp’n at 12. As discussed in section III.A.2.b, supra, this contention lacks support from the
record. Moreover, it is inconsistent with Williams’ failure to dispute the Smithsonian’s evidence
that all MPAs in the WMC were subject to the same minimum accuracy requirements, and that
others in the position surpassed these standards. And while there is a factual dispute regarding
whether Williams received any negative feedback from Scragg prior to July 2013, this does not
call into question the objective validity of the Smithsonian’s cited reasons for discharging
Williams, given the uncontroverted facts showing that his performance decreased markedly in
the months following his mid-year appraisal.
To support his position that the retaliation claim should survive summary judgment,
Williams relies most heavily on his July 9, 2013 exchange with Scragg, in which Scragg asked
Williams and co-worker Chris Butler, “What kind of trouble are you troublemakers getting
into?” Pl.’s Ex. A at 000033. Williams argues that this evidence satisfies the causation element
of a prima facie case of retaliation, which requires showing (1) the employer had knowledge of
the employee’s protected activity, and (2) a close temporal proximity between the protected
activity and the retaliatory event. Duncan, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 301. Because this exchange
occurred later on the same day that he communicated complaints about the pre-employment tests
to Simenton, Williams contends that Scragg’s behavior serves as circumstantial evidence that
27 Scragg knew about Williams’ protected activity. 4 See Jones, 557 F.3d at 679 (stating an
employee “need only offer circumstantial evidence that could reasonably support an inference”
that an employer had knowledge of protected activity); Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 903
(D.C. Cir. 2006).
Even at the prima facie stage, where the plaintiff bears only a “minimal burden” to
establish an inference of causation, Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 903, Williams’ argument is
unpersuasive. Notwithstanding the close proximity in time between his conversation with
Simenton and the cubicle exchange with Scragg, the brief conversation does not provide enough
circumstantial evidence to create a genuine dispute with respect to whether Simenton informed
Scragg of Williams’ complaints. 5 Other than the exchange at the cubicle, Williams identifies
nothing in the record to rebut either Simenton or Scragg’s statements that Simenton never
conveyed the content of her conversations with Williams to Scragg. Even viewing the facts in
the light most favorable to Williams, Scragg’s remarks at the cubicle do not reasonably support
an inference that he knew of Williams’ complaints. Thus, without more evidence, Williams fails
to establish a permissible inference of a causal connection.
Even assuming this evidence created a reasonable inference of a retaliatory motive, such
an inference would not end the causation inquiry. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “positive
evidence beyond mere proximity [and defendant’s knowledge of protected activity] is required to
defeat the presumption that the proffered explanations are genuine.” Hamilton v. Geithner, 666
4 The court assumes for the purposes of argument that Williams engaged in protected activity by conveying his concerns about the pre-employment evaluations to Simenton. Since the causation question is dispositive here, the court need not decide whether these communications qualify as protected activity. 5 The temporal proximity between Williams’ protected activity and his subsequent separation from the Smithsonian is not at issue. 28 F.3d 1344, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 530 (D.C. Cir.
2007)). Here, the scant circumstantial evidence Williams offers is not enough to support a
conclusion that the Smithsonian’s reason for discharging him is “unworthy of credence.” Jones,
557 F.3d at 678. The undisputed evidence that Williams’ work product fell below objective
accuracy requirements, the fact that Scragg had directly notified him of the need to improve his
performance on at least one occasion, and the highly performance-contingent nature of the
probationary employment period lead the court to conclude that Williams has failed to show
“that no adverse action would have been taken if [he] had not complained [of alleged
discrimination].” Gonda, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 303.
The Smithsonian has presented an objectively valid, nondiscriminatory reason for
Williams’ discharge that would “make it impossible for a jury to conclude that retaliatory animus
was the only cause” for his separation from employment. Id. Because Williams has not met his
burden to show that the proffered reason for the action was pretextual, the Smithsonian is entitled
to summary judgment on the retaliation claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the Smithsonian is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on both claims. The Smithsonian’s motion for summary judgment will therefore
be GRANTED.
A corresponding Order will issue separately.
Date: August 16, 2019
Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge