Williams v. Robinson

512 So. 2d 58, 69 A.L.R. 4th 861
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedMay 29, 1987
Docket85-1055
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 512 So. 2d 58 (Williams v. Robinson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. Robinson, 512 So. 2d 58, 69 A.L.R. 4th 861 (Ala. 1987).

Opinions

A summary judgment was granted to Dr. Ralph R. Robinson in a medical malpractice action filed against him by Maurine Williams. That judgment was made final pursuant to Rule 54(b), A.R.Civ.P., and Ms. Williams appeals.

On December 10, 1982, Ms. Williams was admitted to the Summit Medical Center ("Summit") to have an abortion performed. Dr. Robinson performed an operation intended to terminate Ms. Williams's pregnancy by using a vacuum, or suction, procedure. After the procedure was completed, Ms. Williams was taken to a "recovery room." There, a nurse gave her either a prescription or actual antibiotic tablets (the testimony is unclear as to which) and also gave her instructions that she not take "sit-down baths" or engage in sexual intercourse at any time during the next three weeks. She was also told that she was to return for a "follow-up" visit in three weeks.

The next morning, Ms. Williams, who had had a successful abortion on a previous occasion, began noticing that she felt different this time than she had after the earlier abortion procedure. She was still having morning sickness. She was also *Page 59 experiencing cramping and "spotting." Based upon her earlier experience, Ms. Williams believed she should have been experiencing heavier bleeding. When these symptoms had not dissipated by December 14, she decided to seek help. She dialed a toll-free telephone number which had been given to her before she left Summit. A woman answered the telephone, and Ms. Williams asked her if she could speak with a nurse. The woman informed her that a nurse was not available, but asked if she could help. Ms. Williams described her symptoms and explained that she still felt as if she were pregnant. The woman replied that the cramping and spotting were normal and that, as far as the morning sickness was concerned, it was simply a "neurotic reaction" to the procedure that had been performed. The symptoms, however, continued.

On December 18, at about 1:00 p.m., Ms. Williams again called the number she had been given before she left Summit. Again, the person answering the telephone informed her that a nurse was not available to talk to her. However, this time Ms. Williams insisted, and another person was called to the telephone. She explained to that person that she was still having cramping and morning sickness. Further, she told the person that the bleeding had totally ceased. The person informed her, as she had been informed the first time, that these symptoms were not abnormal.

After the telephone call, Ms. Williams rested in bed until about 4:00 p.m., when she began experiencing sharp pains in her stomach. She got up and tried to get to the bathroom, but fainted. When she regained consciousness, she felt very cold, and, yet, her hands were sweaty. She attempted to get help, but fainted again as she opened her door. A neighbor saw her and came to her aid. An ambulance was called, and Ms. Williams was taken to a Huntsville hospital. Once there, she underwent emergency, lifesaving, exploratory surgery which revealed a pregnancy in one of Ms. Williams's fallopian tubes.

On January 27, 1984, Ms. Williams filed suit against both Dr. Robinson and Summit, alleging that they had negligently performed the abortion, had negligently failed to advise Ms. Williams of the risk of the abortion procedure, had negligently failed to provide post-operative care, had negligently failed to utilize that degree of skill and care required of such hospitals and physicians, had negligently failed to inform her of the dangers of an ectopic pregnancy, and, finally, had negligently failed to diagnose an ectopic pregnancy.

Dr. Robinson filed an answer denying these allegations. Subsequently, after discovery was completed, he moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ms. Williams had "failed to produce even a scintilla of evidence that this defendant violated any standard of care which proximately caused the Plaintiff's injuries."

The trial court, while discussing only two issues, rendered judgment in favor of Dr. Robinson. These issues concerned (1) the failure of Dr. Robinson to diagnose the ectopic pregnancy and (2) his failure to provide adequate follow-up care. In rendering judgment for Dr. Robinson, the trial court expressly, and inexplicably, discounted the testimony of the plaintiff's medical expert, Dr. Josefino C. Aguilar, which was to the effect that Dr. Robinson had, indeed, violated the appropriate standard of care both in failing to diagnose the ectopic pregnancy and in failing to provide proper follow-up care. Specifically, it determined the following to be true, even though Dr. Aguilar testified to the contrary:

(1) That the presence of chorionic villi in the substance taken from the uterus always means that there was an intrauterine pregnancy, and

(2) That there is no evidence that Dr. Robinson breached the appropriate standard of care.

Our standard for reviewing a summary judgment is the same standard as that used by the trial court in ruling on motions for summary judgment. Long v. Bankers Life Casualty Co.,294 Ala. 67, 311 So.2d 328 (1975). When a summary judgment has been granted for a defendant on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to prove a cause of action, we look to see if there is *Page 60 any evidence which would be legally admissible at trial as to every essential element of the cause of action. Welch v.Houston County Hospital Ass'n, 502 So.2d 340 (Ala. 1987);Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Co., 495 So.2d 1381 (Ala. 1986). In determining whether there is any evidence of every element of a cause of action, we must review the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all reasonable doubts against the defendant. Autrey v. Blue Cross Blue Shield ofAla., 481 So.2d 345 (Ala. 1985). There must be no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Silk v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,Fenner Smith, Inc., 437 So.2d 112 (Ala. 1983). The trial court is not permitted to resolve any factual issue; such resolution is for the jury. Ingram v. Akwell Industries, Inc.,406 So.2d 897 (Ala. 1981).

Our review of the record indicates that the trial court has either erroneously failed to consider certain evidence in reaching its conclusion or has erroneously made findings of fact on these controverted issues. We take this occasion to point out only a few of the pertinent portions of the record.

The following is an excerpt from the affidavit of Dr. Aguilar, which was submitted in support of Ms. Williams's first response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment. We quote the substance of this affidavit in full:

"My name is Josefino C. Aguilar and I am a board certified forensic pathologist and general medical practitioner in Huntsville, Madison County, Alabama, and have been so for many years.

"I have examined the medical records from the Summit Medical Center and the Huntsville Hospital, including the histopathologic reports from the Biomedical Reference Laboratories, Inc., from Birmingham, Alabama, and Dr. C.L. Butler of Huntsville Hospital, Department of Pathology, of Huntsville, Alabama, which yielded the following facts:

"The surgeon, Dr. Ralph Robinson, who performed the abortion by suction on the 10th day of December, 1982, . . . entered his findings in the operative procedure . . . that the product of

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Williams v. Robinson
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512 So. 2d 58, 69 A.L.R. 4th 861, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-robinson-ala-1987.