ERICKSON, Chief Justice.
We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ unpublished opinion, which affirmed LeRoy Williams’ (petitioner) conviction for aggravated robbery, section 18-4-302, 8 C.R.S. (1978). The petitioner contends that the district court erred in failing to suppress incriminating statements made in the course of psychothera-peutic treatment. He also requests that we review the statutory definition of a “deadly weapon” set forth in section 18-1-901(8)(e), 8 C.R.S. (1973). We affirm.
I.
On March 1, 1980, petitioner robbed a Greeley supermarket at gunpoint. He claims that the gun was not loaded at the time of the robbery.
He left Colorado immediately after the robbery and eventually went to London, Ontario in Canada, where he attempted to take his own life. As a result of his suicide attempt, he was admitted to the psychiatric ward of Victoria Hospital in London on April 14, 1980, and was placed under the care of Dr. William Keil, a staff psychiatrist. During his initial interview with Dr. Keil, the petitioner admitted his involvement in the Greeley robbery. Dr. Keil later spoke to an officer in the Greeley Police Department and was told that an arrest warrant was issued for the petitioner based upon the Greeley robbery.
On the morning of April 17, 1980, Dr. Keil contacted the London Police Department to ascertain his obligation to notify Canadian authorities of petitioner’s presence at the hospital.
Dr. Keil spoke with Detective Schell, who indicated that he was uncertain regarding the application of Canadian law to an American citizen for whom a warrant is outstanding in the United States. Detective Schell investigated the matter that same morning, and learned that the petitioner was free to remain in Canada for up to three months. Later that day Detective Schell went to the hospital, where he informed Dr. Keil of the results of his investigation and offered his assistance.
Dr. Keil indicated at that time that
Detective Schell was free to speak with the petitioner,
but did not tell him that the conversation would be part of petitioner’s psychotherapy. Schell did not tell the petitioner that any statements he might make during the conversation would be kept confidential.
Dr. Keil introduced the petitioner to Detective Schell, and then left the room. In the subsequent conversation, petitioner told Schell of his involvement in the robbery. Later that same day, Schell contacted the Greeley Police Department and informed them that the petitioner was present in London. Williams was arrested by Greeley police officers on April 21, 1980 after he returned to Greeley.
At the suppression hearing, petitioner sought to suppress the statements he made to Detective Schell while at Victoria Hospital, claiming that the information constituted privileged communications under sections 13-90-107(l)(d) & (g), 6 C.R.S. (1973). The district court denied the motion, finding that the statements in question were not privileged.
Williams renewed his motion to suppress at trial and made a motion for a judgment of acquittal, asserting that there was no evidence of the use of a deadly weapon as required by the aggravated robbery statute.
He alleged that the gun was not loaded during the robbery, and no evidence was introduced to prove that it was loaded at that time. The court denied both motions. The petitioner later testified on his own behalf, and admitted that he had robbed the store and that he had used a gun to coerce the store’s employees into surrendering the money.
The jury found Williams guilty of aggravated robbery.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner originally presented only the privilege issues for consideration, believing
that the issue of whether an unloaded firearm constitutes a “deadly weapon” was moot under
People v. McPherson,
200 Colo. 429, 619 P.2d 38 (1980) (unloaded firearm is a deadly weapon as a matter of law). During the pendency of the appeal, however, the Colorado General Assembly enacted section 2-4-214, 1B C.R.S. (1983 Supp.), which explicitly rejected the rule of statutory construction adopted in
McPherson.
The petitioner filed a motion for leave to supplement his opening brief on grounds that the result in
McPherson
should be reassessed in the light of section 2-4-214. The Court of Appeals denied the motion and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
II.
Section 13-90-107(1)(d), 6 C.R.S. (1973), provides:
A physician ... duly authorized to practice his profession under the laws of this state, or any other state shall not be examined without the consent of his patient as to any information acquired in attending the patient which was
necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient
....
(Emphasis added.) The physician-patient privilege is statutorily created and must, therefore, be strictly construed.
See Community Hospital Association v. District Court,
194 Colo. 98, 100, 570 P.2d 243, 244 (1977). The burden of establishing the applicability of the privilege rests with the claimant of the privilege.
Clark v. District Court, Second Judicial District,
668 P.2d 3, 8 (Colo.1983);
see also Nelson v. Grissom,
152 Colo. 502, 505, 382 P.2d 991, 993 (1963). A psychiatrist is treated as a physician under the statute.
People v. Taylor,
618 P.2d 1127, 1140 (Colo.1980).
The physician-patient privilege was adopted to encourage a patient to make full disclosure to a doctor to enhance the effective diagnosis and treatment of illness. The statute also protects patients from the embarrassment and humiliation that might result from the physician’s disclosure of information about the patient.
E.g., Clark,
668 P.2d at 8;
People v. Taylor,
618 P.2d at 1140. In determining the applicability of the privilege, the trial court must ascertain whether information disclosed by the patient is necessary for treatment by the physician.
People v. Reynolds,
195 Colo. 386, 389, 578 P.2d 647, 649 (1978).
We agree with the trial court’s finding that the petitioner’s conversation with Detective Schell at the hospital was not necessary to enable the physician to prescribe or act for the patient, and therefore did not fall within the physician-patient privilege.
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ERICKSON, Chief Justice.
We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ unpublished opinion, which affirmed LeRoy Williams’ (petitioner) conviction for aggravated robbery, section 18-4-302, 8 C.R.S. (1978). The petitioner contends that the district court erred in failing to suppress incriminating statements made in the course of psychothera-peutic treatment. He also requests that we review the statutory definition of a “deadly weapon” set forth in section 18-1-901(8)(e), 8 C.R.S. (1973). We affirm.
I.
On March 1, 1980, petitioner robbed a Greeley supermarket at gunpoint. He claims that the gun was not loaded at the time of the robbery.
He left Colorado immediately after the robbery and eventually went to London, Ontario in Canada, where he attempted to take his own life. As a result of his suicide attempt, he was admitted to the psychiatric ward of Victoria Hospital in London on April 14, 1980, and was placed under the care of Dr. William Keil, a staff psychiatrist. During his initial interview with Dr. Keil, the petitioner admitted his involvement in the Greeley robbery. Dr. Keil later spoke to an officer in the Greeley Police Department and was told that an arrest warrant was issued for the petitioner based upon the Greeley robbery.
On the morning of April 17, 1980, Dr. Keil contacted the London Police Department to ascertain his obligation to notify Canadian authorities of petitioner’s presence at the hospital.
Dr. Keil spoke with Detective Schell, who indicated that he was uncertain regarding the application of Canadian law to an American citizen for whom a warrant is outstanding in the United States. Detective Schell investigated the matter that same morning, and learned that the petitioner was free to remain in Canada for up to three months. Later that day Detective Schell went to the hospital, where he informed Dr. Keil of the results of his investigation and offered his assistance.
Dr. Keil indicated at that time that
Detective Schell was free to speak with the petitioner,
but did not tell him that the conversation would be part of petitioner’s psychotherapy. Schell did not tell the petitioner that any statements he might make during the conversation would be kept confidential.
Dr. Keil introduced the petitioner to Detective Schell, and then left the room. In the subsequent conversation, petitioner told Schell of his involvement in the robbery. Later that same day, Schell contacted the Greeley Police Department and informed them that the petitioner was present in London. Williams was arrested by Greeley police officers on April 21, 1980 after he returned to Greeley.
At the suppression hearing, petitioner sought to suppress the statements he made to Detective Schell while at Victoria Hospital, claiming that the information constituted privileged communications under sections 13-90-107(l)(d) & (g), 6 C.R.S. (1973). The district court denied the motion, finding that the statements in question were not privileged.
Williams renewed his motion to suppress at trial and made a motion for a judgment of acquittal, asserting that there was no evidence of the use of a deadly weapon as required by the aggravated robbery statute.
He alleged that the gun was not loaded during the robbery, and no evidence was introduced to prove that it was loaded at that time. The court denied both motions. The petitioner later testified on his own behalf, and admitted that he had robbed the store and that he had used a gun to coerce the store’s employees into surrendering the money.
The jury found Williams guilty of aggravated robbery.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner originally presented only the privilege issues for consideration, believing
that the issue of whether an unloaded firearm constitutes a “deadly weapon” was moot under
People v. McPherson,
200 Colo. 429, 619 P.2d 38 (1980) (unloaded firearm is a deadly weapon as a matter of law). During the pendency of the appeal, however, the Colorado General Assembly enacted section 2-4-214, 1B C.R.S. (1983 Supp.), which explicitly rejected the rule of statutory construction adopted in
McPherson.
The petitioner filed a motion for leave to supplement his opening brief on grounds that the result in
McPherson
should be reassessed in the light of section 2-4-214. The Court of Appeals denied the motion and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
II.
Section 13-90-107(1)(d), 6 C.R.S. (1973), provides:
A physician ... duly authorized to practice his profession under the laws of this state, or any other state shall not be examined without the consent of his patient as to any information acquired in attending the patient which was
necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient
....
(Emphasis added.) The physician-patient privilege is statutorily created and must, therefore, be strictly construed.
See Community Hospital Association v. District Court,
194 Colo. 98, 100, 570 P.2d 243, 244 (1977). The burden of establishing the applicability of the privilege rests with the claimant of the privilege.
Clark v. District Court, Second Judicial District,
668 P.2d 3, 8 (Colo.1983);
see also Nelson v. Grissom,
152 Colo. 502, 505, 382 P.2d 991, 993 (1963). A psychiatrist is treated as a physician under the statute.
People v. Taylor,
618 P.2d 1127, 1140 (Colo.1980).
The physician-patient privilege was adopted to encourage a patient to make full disclosure to a doctor to enhance the effective diagnosis and treatment of illness. The statute also protects patients from the embarrassment and humiliation that might result from the physician’s disclosure of information about the patient.
E.g., Clark,
668 P.2d at 8;
People v. Taylor,
618 P.2d at 1140. In determining the applicability of the privilege, the trial court must ascertain whether information disclosed by the patient is necessary for treatment by the physician.
People v. Reynolds,
195 Colo. 386, 389, 578 P.2d 647, 649 (1978).
We agree with the trial court’s finding that the petitioner’s conversation with Detective Schell at the hospital was not necessary to enable the physician to prescribe or act for the patient, and therefore did not fall within the physician-patient privilege. There is no evidence that Detective Schell was qualified to provide psychiatric therapy or any other type of treatment to the petitioner. The detective did not obtain any information which would have been otherwise unavailable to Dr. Keil for use in the petitioner’s treatment.
III.
Petitioner claims that his statements to Detective Schell are protected by the statutory psychologist-patient privilege. § 13-90-107(1)(g), 6 C.R.S. (1973). We start with the assumption, for the purpose of this discussion, that as a psychiatrist, Dr. Keil was permitted by statute to provide psychological therapy. While conceding that neither Schell nor Keil is a psychologist, the petitioner contends that the privilege is still applicable based on the following statutory language:
[N]or shall any person who has participated in any psychological therapy, conducted under the supervision of a person authorized by law to conduct such therapy, including but not limited to group therapy sessions, be examined concerning any knowledge gained during the course of such therapy without the consent of the person to whom the testimony sought relates.
§ 13-90-107(1)(g), 6 C.R.S. (1973). Petitioner asserts that his conversation with Detective Schell was part of the psychologi
cal therapy prescribed for him by Dr. Keil, and should be protected from disclosure by the statute. The district court found that petitioner’s statements to Detective Schell did not constitute “psychological therapy” and were, therefore, not protected by the privilege statute.
The question of what constitutes psychological therapy within the meaning of section 13-90-107(l)(g) has not been previously addressed by this Court. However, we find the reasoning of other jurisdictions which have addressed this question in light of their own common law and statutory privileges to be persuasive. In
Allred v. State,
554 P.2d 411, 418-19 (Alaska 1976), the Alaska Supreme Court distinguished psychological therapy from the fields of counseling and psychiatric social work, and held that a common law psychologist-patient privilege applies only to statements that are part of psychological therapy. The Utah Supreme Court, interpreting a statute very similar to the Colorado psychologist-patient privilege statute, has held that the protection of a psychologist-patient privilege statute “should not be extended to persons merely acting as agents for or under the direction of licensed psychologists.”
State v. Gotfrey,
598 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1979). Similarly, a social worker-client privilege has not been extended by the Louisiana Supreme Court to a counsel- or in a drug addiction treatment program even though she was “in the same position” as a social worker.
State v. Lassai,
366 So.2d 1389, 1391 (La.1978).
The trial court's finding that the conversation between petitioner and Detective Schell did not constitute “psychological therapy” within the meaning of section 13-90 — 107(1)(g) is clearly supported by the record. There is no evidence that Detective Schell was qualified to provide any type of psychological therapy. Furthermore, Dr. Keil gave no indication to Schell that his visit would in any way be part of the petitioner’s therapy and Schell’s conversation with the petitioner did not in fact contribute to his psychological treatment. Neither Keil nor Schell said anything to the petitioner that would have given him reason to believe that his conversation with Schell was for a psychological therapeutic purpose. We hold, accordingly, that the trial court correctly found that the psychologist-patient privilege does not apply to the statements made by the petitioner to Detective Schell.
IV.
Petitioner argues that the General Assembly’s adoption of section 2-4-214, 1B C.R.S. (1983 Supp.)
in 1981 requires this court to reevaluate
People v. McPherson,
200 Colo. 429, 619 P.2d 38 (1980), in which we held that an unloaded gun is a deadly weapon.
The General Assembly, in adopting section 2-4-214, expressly rejected the rule of statutory construction utilized by this court in
McPherson.
Later that year, however, an amendment to section 18 — 1—901(3)(e), 8 C.R.S. (1978 & 1983 Supp.)
clarified the
language defining “deadly weapon.” In our view, the amendment does not affect our interpretation of section 18-1-901(3)(e) in
McPherson,
that an unloaded firearm is, as a matter of law, a deadly weapon under the felony menacing statute.
The judgment is affirmed.
